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Abstract 
This thesis explores how, in the wake of momentous agrarian reforms 
implemented during the 1980s and 1990s, Vietnam succeeded in generating both a 
strong increase in agricultural growth, and remarkable trends in poverty reduction. 
Three specific channels of transmission between agricultural growth and rural poverty 
reduction are explored and evaluated empirically using the Vietnamese Living Standard 
Survey. 
Chapter 2 investigates the impact on agricultural investments of the 
strengthening in tenure security induced by Vietnam's 1993 Land Law, which set up a 
new land tenure system based on de jure private property rights. Idiosyncratic 
characteristics of Vietnam's land reform and the panel nature of the VLSS are taken 
advantage of to capture the exogenous changes in tenure security brought by the 1993 
Land Law. By interpreting the results in the light of Vietnam's agrarian history, I shed 
light on the role of formal institutions during the process of establishing a new private 
property right system. 
Chapter 3 explores the role of education in promoting agricultural growth and 
documents how, in the 1980s, Vietnam emerged from thirty years of war with literacy 
levels that are normally achieved by middle-income countries. The differential in 
educational attainment between North and South Vietnam is used to devise an 
instrumental variable strategy and to evaluate the contribution of Vietnam's high initial 
education levels to rice yields. The results confirm the importance of literacy and 
numeracy skills as pre-conditions for agricultural growth but highlight the importance 
of non-linearities in the impact of schooling, and of factoring in information on the 
quality in education in order to better understand the processes through which 
education affects economic efficiency. 
Finally, Chapter 4 showed that growth in the agricultural sector had been 
remarkably pro-poor as it benefited even the poorest of the poor, probably because of 
favourable initial conditions for pro-poor agricultural growth. 
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Chapter 1 - Overview of the Thesis 
1.0 Description and Contribution of the Thesis 
Where land becomes increasingly scarce as a result of land erosion and high 
population growth, and where it is the main rural productive asset, poverty and 
access to land are strongly associated. In this context, economists have long 
debated the impact of land reforms on agricultural productivity and forceful 
theoretical and empirical arguments have been presented in favour of small-scale 
farming production. Some have argued that redistributive land reforms could be 
both productivity-enhancing and poverty-alleviating (Lipton 1993; Bardhan, 
Bowles and Gintis 1998; Banerjee 1999). This thesis is located in the context of 
this long-standing debate. 
Exceptional historical events in the past twentieth-century allowed Vietnam to 
implement drastic changes in property relations and ownership patterns in a short 
historical time span. In less than half a decade, Vietnam saw its agrarian system 
transform itself from a colonial plantation system, to a centrally planned 
cooperative system, into a household-based farming system. Since the start of the 
agricultural decollectivisation process in the early 1980s, the productive 
environment of rural Vietnamese households changed dramatically, with the 
dismantling of agricultural cooperatives and the transfer of farm decision-making 
to individual households in the late 1980s; the gradual affirmation of 
individualised and exclusive land property rights following the enactment of the 
1993 Land Law; and the embrace of a market economy as agricultural output, 
input and export markets were liberalised during the course of the 1990s. The 
focus of this thesis is on Vietnam's land decollectivisation process, which 
allegedly played a key role in promoting rapid agricultural growth and allowed 
many rural poor to lift themselves out of poverty during the 1980s and 1990s. 
9 
Since the implementation of these reforms, the growth performances of 
Vietnam's agricultural sector since the late 1980s have been remarkable. In the 
period immediately following the reunification of Vietnam in 1975, paddy output 
declined by about 10 percent. Agricultural productivity started to grow anew 
during the 1980s as agricultural cooperatives contracted land back to individual 
farmers. Vietnam experienced its last shortfall in paddy production in 1987, 
when it declined by 5.6 percent. In 1989, Vietnam had begun exporting rice and 
was to become the world's second largest rice exporter in 1998. Since 1988, 
Vietnam's agricultural sector has grown at an average annual rate of 4 percent 
with yields in paddy growing by 6 percent. These remarkable trends in 
agricultural growth are shown in Table 1-1 and Figure 1-1 below. Meanwhile, 
Vietnam's achievements in poverty reduction were no less impressive, with the 
incidence of poverty declining from 75 percent in 1984 to 58 percent in 1993, 
and to 37 percent in 1998 (Dollar, Glewwe, and Litvack 1998). 
Table 1-1: Growth rates in paddy production 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Paddy output (% growth rate) 2.1 10 5.8 3.0 6.1 5.7 4.3 5.9 
Sown areas (% growth rate) 4.6 2.7 1.3 0.6 2.5 3.5 1.4 3.7 
Yield (ton/ha) 3.1 3.3 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.9 4.0 
Food output (kg per capita) 323 346 364 364 373 387 400 408 
Source: various issues of Vietnam's statistical yearbooks for agriculture and forestry 
Figure 1-1: Agricultural Productivity Growth (1955-1998) 1 
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This thesis explores how, in the wake of momentous agrarian reforms 
implemented during the 1980s and 1990s, Vietnam succeeded in generating both 
the strong increase in agricultural growth, and the remarkable trends in poverty 
reduction noted above. The specific mechanisms through which growth 
contributes to poverty reduction have long been debated. In particular, a long-
standing debate about the role of agriculture in the process of economic 
development and about its contribution to poverty reduction continues unabated. 
The thesis has been inspired by these debates, and by theories that emphasize the 
role of agriculture in the process of economic development and posit the 
existence of multiple linkages between agricultural growth and non-agricultural 
growth. 
The thesis hopes to contribute to a better understanding of how the 
decollectivisation of agriculture in Vietnam succeeded in generating a 
remarkably pro-poor agricultural growth process. Three specific channels of 
transmission between agricultural growth and rural poverty reduction are 
explored and evaluated empirically using the Vietnamese Living Standard 
Survey (VLSS), a nationally representative household survey collected in 1992 
and 1998. Overall, the thesis argues that the reduction in rural poverty achieved 
by Vietnam during the 1990s may be attributed to revolutionary circumstances 
that led to a notable egalitarian distribution of key resources, in particular, land 
and human capital. 
As I hope to demonstrate in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 of this thesis, it is possible 
to harness insights from history to devise an empirical strategy that allows one to 
test a particular causal relationship and circumvent endogeneity issues2 . Indeed, 
in order to tackle important estimation issues, I devise empirical strategies 
which, to the extent possible, make use of quasi-experimental features of 
Vietnam's land reforms or Vietnam's history as well as relevant features the 
Vietnamese Living Standard Survey. 
2 Prominent examples include the works of Acemoglu and Johnson (2003), who exploit features of the 
European colonisation to identify the impact of institutions on subsequent growth performances. Similarly, 
Banerjee and Iyer (2002) make use of features of Britain's colonisation of India. For a critique of such work, see 
Bardhan (2005a). 
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The thesis is structured around three core chapters. Chapter 2 probes whether one 
major source for the resilience of Vietnam's agricultural growth performances 
over the past 20 years may be traced to Vietnam's land decollectivisation 
programme and the introduction of household farming. I investigate a precise 
channel of transmission through which the land reform may have had an impact: 
the impact on investment incentives of the strengthening in tenure security 
induced by the 1993 Land Law. I argue that the role of the 1993 Land Law was 
first and foremost to strengthen tenure security and stabilise expectations, and 
that it was largely successful in doing so in regions where tenure security had 
been most disrupted by the agricultural collectivisation process of the 1960s and 
1970s. Therefore, a first contribution of this thesis is to affirm the importance of 
land tenure security as an investment incentive. 
However, significant regional differences indicate a more complex working of 
land property relations in Vietnam. In particular, I argue that, by setting a new 
land tenure system based on de jure private property rights guaranteed by land 
titles, the 1993 Land Law signifies a momentous change in Vietnam's history of 
land tenure and as such, enables us to examine the very process of establishing a 
new private property rights system. Two distinct aspects of such a process are 
distinguished and tested separately: (i) the strengthening of tenure security 
through a body of public rules; (ii) the role of formal institutions in enforcing or 
protecting these rights. Land tenure data extracted from the Vietnamese Living 
Standard Survey capture the first of these two dimensions. Provincial cadastral 
land titling data graciously granted by the Central Cadastral Office in Hanoi are 
used to capture the institutional law enforcement aspect of Vietnam's land 
reform3 . Quasi-experimental features of Vietnam's land reform and the panel 
nature of the VLSS are taken advantage of to capture the exogenous changes in 
tenure security brought by the 1993 Land Law. 
The striking historical divergence in property right ideologies between North and 
South Vietnam is exploited in order to shed light on the role of formal 
institutions in the process of establishing a new property rights system. I argue 
3 I extend heartfelt thanks to the director of the Cadastral Office in Hanoi for providing me with the provincial 
land titling data, and for the insightful conversations we had on Vietnam's agrarian transition and the 
functioning of Vietnam's land property rights system. 
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that by making exclusion rights central to the definition of land rights, the 1993 
Land Law represents a potent shift in the property rights paradigm that used to 
prevail in North Vietnam. In that context, law enforcement institutions could 
play an important role in promoting the new rules, thereby strengthening the 
perceived sense of tenure security. By contrast, an opposite institutional 
environment exists in South Vietnam, where local authorities have long been 
supportive of private property rights. These long-prevailing perceptions of land 
relations help explain why land titling (the variable used to capture the law 
enforcement aspect of Vietnam's 1993 Land Law) did not have a significant 
impact on investment incentives in South Vietnam. 
Chapter 3 explores the role of education in promoting agricultural growth. It first 
sheds light on exceptional historical circumstances that allowed Vietnam to 
emerge from thirty years of war with literacy and numeracy levels normally 
attained by middle-income countries such as Thailand or Indonesia. Second, the 
difference in educational attainment between North and South Vietnam is traced 
back to the partition of Vietnam in 1954 and to the implementation of differential 
education policies between 1954 and 1975. This historical divergence in 
education is exploited to devise an instrumental variable strategy and evaluate 
the contribution of Vietnam's high initial levels of education (using various 
indicators of educational attainment extracted from the Vietnamese Living 
Standard Survey) to agricultural productivity during the 1990s. 
Chapter 3 contributes to the literature on education by confirming the importance 
of literacy and numeracy skills as pre-conditions for agricultural growth. 
Moreover, primary4 education and lower secondary education are found to have 
no impact, whilst upper secondary education was found to have a strong and 
significant impact, on rice productivity. These results add to the literature on 
education by highlighting the existence of non-linearities in the impact of 
schooling on productivity, and by underlining the importance of factoring in 
information on the quality of education in order to better understand the 
processes through which education affects economic efficiency. 
Results on primary education are subject to strong caveats since instrumental variables are found to be weak. 
Results for the other indicators of educational attainment, including years of education, lower secondary 
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Finally, Chapter 4 explores more directly the relationship between agricultural 
growth and rural poverty reduction, with a particular focus on the legacy of 
Vietnam's agrarian history. This chapter is inspired by a body of research, which 
highlights the role of access to productive assets such as land and human capital 
in mediating the impact of growth on poverty reduction. The argument in 
Chapter 4 is developed in three stages. First, using distribution-sensitive 
measures of poverty, I ascertain the extent to which economic growth during the 
1990s had been pro-poor and find that Vietnam's poverty reduction was both, 
wide in that poverty was substantially reduced in absolute numbers, and deep in 
that agricultural growth benefited the poorest of the poor. Moreover, a sectoral 
decomposition of poverty reduction indicates that it is growth in the agricultural 
sector that contributed the most to rural poverty reduction, suggesting a strong 
link between agricultural growth and poverty reduction. 
I then document how, at the start of the agricultural liberalisation period, 
Vietnam benefited from favourable initial conditions for pro-poor agricultural 
growth brought about by Vietnam's recent eventful agrarian history. These initial 
conditions included an agricultural growth process spurred by labour intensive 
wet-rice cultivation techniques, widespread access to land and to yield-raising 
technology, and high levels of literacy. The detailed story of how two of these 
pro-poor initial conditions came about is told in Chapter 2 for access to land, and 
in Chapter 3 for education. 
Finally, the last section of Chapter 4 highlights a dilemma and a paradox: a 
dilemma in that the increase in food prices triggered by the liberalisation of 
agricultural markets may have favoured the rural poor as farm producers, but 
possibly harmed them as consumers; a paradox in that the deep trends in poverty 
reduction documented earlier in the chapter took place at the same as the rural 
poor experienced a large increase in food prices. 
I explore the welfare consequences of the large increase in food prices 
experienced by Vietnamese households between 1992 and 1998. By doing so, I 
make use of and find limitations in, first-order welfare analytical tools that 
education and upper secondary education, are not subject to such caveats. See Chapter 3 for more details on 
the strength of the instrumental variables used in the estimation strategy. 
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approximate the welfare impact of price changes by the net production status of 
households. Instead, I find a substantial disconnect between net production status 
and welfare changes. 
To disentangle the ambiguous results obtained from first-order welfare impact 
methods, I then explore the relationship between rice self-sufficiency and 
welfare using non-parametric tools. Two possible motives are then discussed in 
theory to explain the changes in market participation and rice self-sufficiency 
previously highlighted. These two motives include (i) changes in transaction 
costs brought about by the lifting of internal trade barriers during the 1990s, and 
(ii) the desire to self-insure against price risks. 
Nevertheless, as this chapter ultimately shows, despite the strong trends in 
agricultural growth and rural poverty reduction, and despite the existence of 
favourable initial conditions as shown in this section, the sheer multiplicity of 
effects at play makes it difficult to causally determine the precise mechanisms 
through which (agricultural) growth translated itself into poverty reduction. 
Avenues for future research in order to disentangle the food price 
dilemma/paradox are suggested in the Conclusion of this thesis, Chapter 5 —
Contribution of the Thesis and Future Avenues for Research. 
1.1 The 1992 and 1998 Vietnamese Living Standard Survey 
The data used in this thesis come from the Vietnamese Living Standard Survey 
(VLSS), a nationally representative household-level survey collected by the 
General Statistical Office of Vietnam in cooperation with the World Bank. In 
fact, the VLSS closely follows the format of the World Bank's Living Standard 
Measurement Survey (LSMS)5 . The VLSS gathered a wide range of information 
on households' activities, on individuals within a household, and on the 
communities in which households live. Information on the household was 
collected from the household head or the person identified as being the most 
5 So much so that one is surprised that the agricultural module of the VLSS 1992 did no collect plot-level data, 
despite the fact that extreme land fragmentation is a conspicuous feature in Vietnam's agricultural landscape. 
This important omission was corrected during the 1998 VLSS survey, which collected plot-level agricultural 
data. 
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knowledgeable to answer questions on farming activities, non-farm self-
employment, food expenditures, and non-food expenditures. 
This thesis makes use of the first two waves of the VLSS, which were collected 
in 1992/1993 and 1997/1998 6 . In the text, for ease of expression, I shall refer to 
each survey year as 1992 and 1998 respectively. The VLSS collected 
information on 4800 households in 1992 and 6000 households in 1998, together 
with information on their communities of residence. Most households from the 
VLSS 1992 were re-sampled for the 1998 survey, so that the two waves of VLSS 
form a panel household survey of 4305 households. The focus of this thesis in on 
households living in rural areas, so that I only make use of the rural panel sample 
composed of 3495 households. 
Most of the VLSS data used in this thesis come from the agricultural production 
module (section 9 of the VLSS) 7, from the education module (section 2 of the 
VLSS), as well as from the VLSS expenditure file, which puts together relevant 
data from various sections of the VLSS including household food and non-food 
expenditures. Information on the household's commune of residence (e.g. 
infrastructure, schooling and health facilities) comes from the commune 
questionnaire. 
While working with the VLSS, I have found the data to be of reasonable quality, 
although they did require screening for outliers and cleaning for obvious data 
entry mistakes or inconsistencies. To the extent possible, I have preferred to 
work with simple variables that require little data manipulation and have shun 
working with an aggregate measure such as income 8 . Expenditure data come 
from the expenditure file provided by the World Bank, which is said to be of 
good quality and has been used extensively in the micro-econometric literature 
on Vietnam. 
The measure of welfare used in Chapter 4 of this thesis is real household 
expenditures per capita. Nominal expenditures for survey years 1992 and 1998 
6 The data was collected between the month of September and the month of October of the following year. 
Detailed information on the two Vietnamese Living Standard Surveys can be found in VLSS (1992); Dollar, 
Glewwe and Litvack (1998); Bales (2000); World Bank (2001); Dollar, Glewwe and Agrawal (2004) 
7 Mention of sections hereafter refers to sections found in the 1993 VLSS. Equivalent sections are found in the 
1998 VLSS under different numbers. 
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are deflated regionally to allow for differentials in the cost-of-living across 
regions, adjusted for monthly variations in prices over the survey year, and 
expressed in real January 1998 prices for ease of comparison. Weights to make 
these adjustments were included in the VLSS datasets and instructions are 
provided in the basic information document provided by the World Bank (World 
Bank 2001). 
Chapter 2 of this thesis makes use of the panel component of the VLSS, which 
raises concerns about potential attrition bias affecting the results. Alleviating 
these concerns, Falaris (2003) studied the issue of attrition bias in the VLSS and 
found that, although households that dropped from the survey were significantly 
different from those who stayed, 
"attrition, however, is not sufficiently severe so that the equations for stayers 
have the same slope coefficients by statistical criteria that would be obtained 
if there were no attrition. (Falaris 2003: 151) 
The VLSS 1998 survey was both stratified and clustered so that expansion 
factors, provided with the VLSS datasets, need to be applied (World Bank 2001). 
The VLSS 1992 is self-weighted but clustered at the commune level. Estimation 
results have been corrected for clustering whenever appropriate. 
1.2 Caveats to the Thesis 
This thesis is an empirical exploration of how the decollectivisation of 
agriculture in Vietnam succeeded in generating a remarkably pro-poor 
agricultural growth process. A detailed literature review is presented in each of 
the three core chapters and several channels of transmission are explored 
theoretically in order to guide the empirical strategy. As mentioned earlier, I 
hope to demonstrate that 'accidents' of history can be exploited in order to 
devise an identification strategy that enables to circumvent endogeneity and 
reverse causality issues that routinely threaten the search for causal explanations 
in the social sciences. 
8 I found the data on non-farm self-employment (section 10 of the VLSS) particularly problematic. 
17 
During the course of writing this thesis, I have immensely benefited from the 
meticulous attention paid by applied econometricians to find appropriate 
identification strategies in the econometric analysis of causal explanations (Chay 
and Honore 1998; Card 1999; Heckman 1999; Heckman and Vytlacil 2000; 
Wooldridge 2002). Nevertheless, as in all empirical work, there is so much one 
can do to control for all sources of endogeneity. Indeed, for example, few 
empirical works would survive Heckman's unfailingly critical eyes (Heckman 
1999; Bardhan 2005b). 
Whilst I have done my best to tackle the issues of endogeneity and reverse 
causation in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 of this thesis, which seek to identify 
particular causal relationships, I am also keenly aware of the pitfalls of such 
exercises (Heckman 1999; Heckman and Vytlacil 2000; Heckman, Lochner, and 
Todd 2003; Heckman and Vytlacil 2003). All the sources of endogeneity that 
could come to mind are discussed in detail in each chapter, and results are 
caveated accordingly. These caveats need to be borne in mind, in particular until 
more can be known about the significance of the remaining sources of 
endogeneity highlighted in Chapter 2 and 3. 
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Chapter 2 - Establishing Quasi-Private 
Property Rights: the Impact of Vietnam's 
1993 Land Law on Investment Incentives 
2.0 Introduction 
Macroeconomic evidence since the start of Vietnam's land decollectivisation 
process in the early 80s indicates both a strong and lasting increase in 
agricultural productivity. As the decollectivisation of Vietnam's agriculture 
necessitated the break-up of large-scale collective farms, the associated changes 
in production relations and ownership pattern cannot be overstated. They 
modified the operational environment of Vietnamese farmers along three major 
dimensions: (i) the organisational changes brought about by the dismantling of 
agricultural cooperatives and the transfer of farm decision-making to individual 
households; (ii) the changes in operational scale resulting from the redistribution 
of cooperative land to individual households; (iii) the progressive 
individualisation of land rights and the gradual affirmation of exclusive land 
property rights following the enactment of the 1993 Land Law. In addition, the 
decollectivisation of agriculture also involved the reorganisation and the 
liberalisation of agricultural input and output markets as well as the construction 
of new rural infrastructures. 
Agricultural growth and the improvement in rural welfare observed during the 
1990s in Vietnam have been attributed to the changes brought about by the 
reorganisation of agriculture and the liberalisation of agricultural markets 
(Pingali and Xuan 1992; Ravallion and van de Walle 2003; Benjamin and Brandt 
2004). Vietnam's large land redistribution programme seems to provide a stark 
example of an asset redistribution policy that contributed to foster economic 
growth by improving the efficiency of resource use. Yet, it is noteworthy that 
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these economic performances were also realised in the presence of imperfectly 
defined private property rights. 
This chapter seeks to probe whether one major source for the resilience of 
Vietnam's agricultural growth performances over the past 20 years may be 
traced to Vietnam's land decollectivisation programme and the introduction of 
household farming. It investigates a precise channel of transmission through 
which the land reform may have achieved an increase in agricultural 
productivity: the impact on long-term investment incentives of the strengthening 
of tenure security following the enactment of the 1993 Land Law, which 
strengthened land tenure security and established a number of transfer rights 
(transfer, lease, mortgage and bequest rights). By setting a new land tenure 
system based on de jure (quasi) private property rights, guaranteed by land titles, 
the 1993 Land Law signifies a momentous change in Vietnam's land tenure 
history. Two distinct aspects of establishing a new private property rights system 
are distinguished and tested separately: (i) the strengthening of tenure security 
through a body of public rules; (ii) the formal institutions that enforce or protect 
these rights. 
The impact of Vietnam's 1993 Land Law on investment incentives is evaluated 
using agricultural production data from the Vietnamese Living Standard Survey 
(VLSS), as well as provincial data on land titling. The main features of the 
methodology are two-fold: firstly, quasi-experimental features of Vietnam's land 
reforms are being taken advantage of to ensure that the land rights variable that is 
constructed using data from the VLSS captures the exogenous changes in tenure 
security brought about by the 1993 Land Law. Provincial cadastral land titling 
data are used to capture the institutional law enforcement aspect of Vietnam's 
land reform. 
Secondly, the Vietnamese Living Standard Survey provides data collected for the 
same farm households before and after the enactment of the 1993 Land Law. It is 
therefore possible to use panel fixed-effects techniques in order to control for 
latent farm and household fixed-effects that maybe correlated with land tenure 
rights. A semi-parametric estimator has been chosen in order to deal with non-
linearity problems. Additional control variables are included in order to deal with 
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time-variant heterogeneity. Endogeneity of the credit variable is handled with 
proxy variables. Finally, robustness checks are performed using alternative 
specifications. 
The results affirm the importance of tenure security as an investment incentive. 
However, significant regional differences indicate a more complex working of 
land property relations in Vietnam. Vietnam's agrarian history provides a 
striking case of diverging property right ideologies between the North and the 
South of Vietnam. Analysing differences in the conception of land rights as they 
evolved in North and South Vietnam in recent history help explain why the 
strengthening in land tenure security had a positive and significant impact on 
long-term investment in North Vietnam but not in South Vietnam; the impact of 
land titling had a weak impact in North Vietnam but not in South Vietnam; both 
land tenure security and land titling variables are relevant and affect investment 
behaviour additively in North Vietnam. 
Chapter 2 is organised as follows. Section 2.1 presents the changes brought 
about by the 1993 Land Law, which is the focus of this chapter. It also discusses 
the standard theory of private property rights, which provided the conceptual 
basis for the 1993 Land Law. Sections 2.2 and 2.3 explore the estimation issues 
and explain the identification strategy that exploits the quasi-experimental 
features of Vietnam's land reforms as well as the panel properties of the 
Vietnamese Living Standard Survey. Results are presented in a summary form 
and analysed in Section 2.4. The full sets of results are presented in Section 2.6 —
Appendices, located at the end of this chapter. 
2.1 Vietnam's 1993 Land Law 
In the 1980s, barely 5 years after the end of the war and the reunification of the 
country in 1975, Vietnam started its agricultural decollectivisation process: the 
control of production was transferred from cooperatives to individual 
households. This transfer was gradual but eventually led to drastic organisational 
changes. One major component of Vietnam's land reform consists in the gradual 
affirmation of individual property rights, a process which took place during the 
21 
course of the 1980s. The 1993 Land Law marked an important step in the 
evolution of Vietnam's land tenure system by strengthening land tenure security 
and by enlarging individual farmers' bundle of land rights. These recent changes 
in Vietnam's land tenure system are reviewed in detail below. 
2.1.1 From Decree 100 to the 1993 Land Law: the Progressive 
Individualisation of Land Rights 
Since the start of the decollectivisation of agriculture in the 1980s, Vietnam's 
successive land reforms gradually enlarged the individual farmer's bundle of 
rights. In particular, the land laws successively established three broad sets of 
rights: management rights (Decree 100, enacted in 1981), residual income and 
tenure security rights (Resolution 10 enacted in 1988 and the 1993 Land Law), 
and transfer rights (the 1993 Land Law). The need to strengthen land tenure 
security came from the failure of Decree 100 to provide adequate production 
incentives for farmers. Indeed, although Decree 100 stipulated that land was to 
be allocated to individual households in order to be farmed independently 
(except for certain tasks which were organised by the cooperative and were to be 
performed collectively), cooperatives would still interfere in production 
decisions. Most importantly, land use-right tenure periods were very short 
(contracts between cooperatives and households were annual) and renewal was 
left at the discretion of cooperative authorities. High production quotas also 
prevailed, allegedly amounting to 80 percent of total output in some areas. The 
disincentives to work were such that households would return their allocated 
land back to the cooperative, or leave the harvest uncollected (White 1985; 
Fforde 1989; Hy V. Luong 1992; Yvon-Tran 1994; Jesus and Anh 1998; Hoang 
Viet 1999; Sikor 2001a). 
As a result, Resolution 10 was enacted in 1988, sanctioning the complete transfer 
of decision-making in production from the cooperative to the individual farmer, 
granting the latter long-term use rights, and clearly laying down the farmer's 
right to retain the product of his farm. However, Resolution 10 left the length of 
tenure during which households could retain their land use-right unspecified: the 
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Resolution 10 stipulated a period up to 15 years, with no distinction between 
annual or perennial crop land; and except for the right to bequest land, land 
transactions were forbidden. 
Building on Resolution 10, the 1993 Land Law set a framework for the 
establishment of quasi-private property rights and included three important new 
features: 
(a) the legal recognition of household's land use rights for a lengthy period of 
time; 
(b) the halt to further land redistribution which occurred in order to adjust 
landholdings to changes in household size; and 
(c) the establishment of a land use-rights market. 
The tenure period for long-term use-right was extended and fixed to 20 years for 
annual crops, and 50 years for perennial crops (starting from year 1993)9 . The 
tenure period can be renewed on expiry. Also, tenure security was to be further 
strengthened through the granting of land use right certificates (the so-called red 
books) 10 . Most importantly also, the 1993 Land Law allowed the functioning of 
a land use rights market by giving farming households the right to rent (thue), 
mortgage (the chep), transfer (chuyen nuong) or bequest (thua Ice) their land use-
rights". 
However, there remain a number of legal restrictions that formally weaken land 
tenure security and encumber land transactions as shown in Table 2-1 below, 
which distinguishes land rights along two dimensions: control and transfer rights. 
The new land tenure system still retains aspects of Vietnam's customary land 
tenure system: land is managed by a collective entity, which reallocates land 
among village members according to relatively egalitarian distribution rules. 
9 See July 1993 Land Law, Article 20, which stipulates the period of tenure for each type of land allocated. 
10 See July 1993 Land Law, Article 2, which specifies that land-users will be given land-use rights certificates 
(so do or giay chung nhan quyen su dung dat). Article 3 underlines the effort to increase tenure security: "Land 
allocated to households and individuals under this Regulation shall be official and shall be accompanied by 
the issuance of a certificate of the right to stable and long-term use of the land". 
11 See Article 3 of the July 1993 Land Law. The establishment of land markets is authorised through Article 75, 
which allows for land transfer in the case where the household is moving to a new place, changing profession, 
is not able to work on the land. The authorised State body must approve the transfer. Article 76 stipulates the 
right to inherit the land use rights, article 77, the right to mortgage the land use rights. 
23 
This is because legally, private ownership of land is not recognised I2 : land 
belongs to the whole people and only use rights on land are allocated. Land users 
are entitled to the products grown on their land but cannot claim the land as their 
own. The collective entity in charge of the management of land is the State. In 
practice, this task is decentralised at the district and village level. 
Management rights are still somewhat restricted: farmers do not have the right to 
change annual cropland (notably rice land) into perennial cropland without the 
permission of district or provincial authorities. This is because in order to 
preserve Vietnam's food security, a centralised system of land use planning has 
been put into place that gives each province (then each district) the right to 
change only a given proportion of land into perennial land. In reality, this 
restriction does not seem to be enforced or to impose a real constraint on 
production decisions. 
Also, there are various limitations on transfer rights, including ceilings on 
landholdings I3 and a maximum land lease period of up to three years. Full 
private ownership is not recognised by law and land sales are not legally 
permitted. Instead, land transactions that are equivalent to land sales are referred 
to as land transfers (chuyen nuong dat). These land transfers are subject to the 
approval of the district's People's Committee. 
Finally, although the insecurity in land tenure that prevailed under Resolution 10 
was an important motivation for the enactment of the 1993 Land Law, all 
uncertainty regarding land tenure was not comprehensively dispelled. Although 
the 1993 Land Law put a halt to the periodic reallocation of lane, the 
redistributive spirit of Vietnam's land reforms is apparent in several articles of 
the Land Law, which stipulate that all households should be provided with land 
for their survival (including those households left landless after distress sales) I5 . 
Also, the renewal of land use rights at the end of the legal tenure period (until 
12 It is not recognised in the 1993 Land Law nor in the recent 2004 Land Law. 
13 The law permits farmers to keep acreage in access of the ceiling if they pay additional taxation (cf. Article 14 
of Decree 64 on the Regulation on allocation of land to households and individuals for stable and long-term 
use, 27/09/1993 and Decree 84 of 08/08/1994 for the additional tax). 
14 According to Article 14 of Decree 64 on the "Regulation on allocation of land to households and individuals 
for stable and long-term use" (27 September 1993): "The land reserved for the public demands of the 
communes shall not be used to accommodate the annual increase in population of the commune". 
15 See Decree 64 (27 September 1993), Article 11 and 12. 
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2013 and until 2043 for annual and perennial cropland respectively) is 
conditional upon administrative approval 16 . All this may create a general sense 
of uncertainty about what will happen after 2013 and 2043. However, it is 
noteworthy that concerns that land would be reallocated were not vindicated in 
the latest Land Law voted in November 2003. 
Table 2-1: Land rights from Decree 100 to the 1993 Land Law 
Decree 100 (1981) Resolution 10 (1988) New Land Law (1993) 
Control Rights 
Use Yes Yes Yes 
Management No Restricted Restricted 
Residual Income Restricted Yes Yes 
Tenure No Undefined Restricted (land title) 
Transfer Rights 
Sale No No No 
Transfer-exchange No No Restricted 
Lease No No Restricted 
Mortgage No No Yes 
Bequest No Yes Yes 
2.1.2 The 1993 Land Law in Theory 
Clearly, the 1993 Land Law constitutes an important departure from Vietnam's 
traditional land tenure system where communal land played a significant role 17 . 
In fact, Vietnam is going a long way towards setting a land tenure system based 
on formalised private property rights. To understand why it is doing so, this 
section reviews the standard theory of private property rights, which provided 
the conceptual basis for the 1993 Land Law. 
According to traditional private property right theorists, under conditions of 
resource scarcity and in the presence of transaction costs, individualised, secure 
and transferable property rights provide the greatest incentive for the efficient 
16 Land use is allocated provided the land is used as stipulated by the 1993 Land Law. According to Article 26 
of the July 1993 Land Law, the State can recover the land if it is left unused for 12 consecutive months without 
permission from the State body which has the authority to allocate the land. 
17 According to Gourou (1965 (1936)), population pressure and increasing land scarcity contributed to the 
gradual erosion of communal land in the villages of the Red River Delta. Both Phan Huy Le (1993) and 
Wiesgerma (1988) document more ambiguous changes in the proportion of communal land over time. 
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use of resources 18 . Full-fledged property rights 19 are composed of a number of 
rights, amongst which two broad sets of rights can be distinguished: firstly, 
control rights, which are composed of (i) use rights (the right to access the 
resource), (ii) management rights (the right to make decisions affecting the 
resource), (iii) residual income rights (the right to the product generated by the 
land), and (iv) tenure rights (the length of time during which rights to land are 
awarded); secondly, transfer rights, which are composed of the rights to (i) sale, 
(ii) transfer or exchange, (iii) lease, (iv) mortgage and (v) bequest land. 
This decomposition of property rights was used in Table 2-1 to present the 
bundles of rights legalised by the 1993 Land Law. Property rights theorists also 
argue that the more complete an individual's bundle of rights over an asset is, the 
greater will be the incentive to maximise the asset's value. In that respect, 
Vietnam's land property rights can still be considered imperfectly defined. 
Land-titling programmes are an entire part of the logic delineated by the standard 
private property right theory. First, land titles aim at providing a legal foundation 
for the protection of land users' rights and at dispelling those concerns over 
tenure security that have an adverse affect on production decisions. Also, land 
users are able to capture the benefits of their investments both through higher 
income streams (land users have residual income rights), and through rental 
income or sale value when transfer rights are allowed. Secondly, by permitting 
the development of a land market, land titles are expected to allow typically 
credit-constrained landowners to use their land as collaterals, thereby enhancing 
their creditworthiness towards lenders. The functioning of a land market is also 
expected to allow the transfer of land to the most-skilled farmers and to remove 
inefficiencies associated with excessive land fragmentation. 
The channels through which these various land rights operate in order to 
generate greater efficiency of land use have been well documented and 
18 The productive efficiency of assets is maximised when the control of assets is individualised and assigned to 
those who can most influence their returns. See Barzel (1989: 9): "The greater a party's inclination to affect the 
mean income an asset can generate, the greater is the share of the residual (ownership share) that party should 
have". 
19 See Alchian and Demsetz (1973) amongst many others. An insightful review of the private property rights 
literature is provided by Platteau (1998); ibid. (1999); ibid. (2000: Chapter 3). Table 2-1 above shows by how 
much Vietnam's current land rights system still differs from the full-fledged private property system. 
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passionately debated 20 . Until recently, in policy-making circles, customary land 
tenure systems were commonly criticised for imposing constraints on 
productivity by weakening tenure security and restraining transfer rights 21 . In 
turn, the proponents of the standard private property theory have been scolded 
for overlooking the socio-cultural setting in which land matters are embedded, 
and for underestimating the extent to which informal institutions are able to 
guarantee tenure security and allow transfer rights. Currently, the main point of 
contention in the literature rests on whether customary land tenure systems, 
despite their informal setting, can continue to work efficiently under condition of 
increasing population density and growing pressures on scarce resources, or 
whether, in the face of mounting land conflicts, formal rules are more desirable 
from an efficiency view point. 
2.1.2.1 Lessons from Past Land Reforms: Review of the Evidence 
The review of evidence that is presented below aims at taking stock of the body 
of evidence that has been accumulated since the pioneering study by Feder et al. 
(1988) on the impact of Thailand's land titling programme on investment and 
farm profitability. A new point of departure in the debate on land property rights 
has now been reached. Overall, the evidence does not decisively confirm the 
alleged inefficiency of customary land tenure system (Migot-Adholla et al. 1993; 
Platteau 1999; Brasselle, Gaspart, and Platteau 2002). Neither does it corroborate 
the alleged superiority of formalised private property rights over customary land 
tenure systems22 . 
20 All papers that seek to empirically evaluate the effectiveness of land reform programmes are based on the 
private property rights theory and are inspired by the early conceptual and empirical work by Feder et al 
(1988). A formalisation of the different channels through which private property rights are expected to operate 
is found in Besley (1995). Platteau (1992, 1999 and 2000) provides a review of the empirical evidence that 
qualifies the relevance and the applicability of the standard private property rights theory in practice (notably 
with respect to land tenure systems in Africa). See also Berry (1993) for an analysis that takes into account the 
non -economic determinants of land rights and the continued "importance of social networks as channels of 
access to productive resources". (2003: 16). The latest World Bank paper on land reform (2003) provides an up-
to-date literature review of all the arguments. 
21 Customary property rights regimes are commonly assessed by the extent to which they 'deviate' from 
private property rights, which are assumed to provide the 'correct' incentives. See Platteau (1992). 
22 See Feder, et al. (1988) for Thailand, Bruce and Migot-Adholla (1993), Otsuka and Quisumbing (2001), 
Migot-Adholla, et al. (1993), Carter, Wiebe and Blarel (1993), Besley (1995) for Africa, Carter and Olinto 
(2003)for Paraguay, Rozelle, Li and Brandt (2000) for China. Otsuka and Quisumbing (2001) also provide 
similar tests for Indonesia. 
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In line with theory, empirical studies have tried to assess the strength of the 
relationship between more individualised ownership rights on the one hand, and 
various measures of investment and productivity. Several lessons have been 
gleaned from these empirical studies and will inform this study of Vietnam's 
land reform. 
One early econometric testing of the impact of land titling on agricultural 
investments and productivity in a developing country was performed by Feder et 
al. (1988) for Thailand. The authors tested the relationship between stronger land 
rights (the possession of a land title), and various measures of investment and 
productivity. The existence of two mutually exclusive groups, one of squatters 
living in forest reserve areas, and one composed of legally titled farmers living 
outside the reserve area, provided a useful way to neatly capture the effect of 
holding land titles. Controlling for farmer and plot characteristics, in most cases 
it was found that ownership of land titles had significant and positive effects on 
the propensity to engage in land improvements, on high-yielding input use and 
on farm productivity. 
One common reading of the Feder et al. (1988) survey is that it confirms the 
general predictions of the traditional theory of property rights. In reality, the 
Feder et al. survey contributes to add a number of qualifications to the traditional 
property rights framework. For instance, although forest reserve squatters were 
deprived of land certificates, they nevertheless enjoyed de facto (albeit not de 
jure) tenure security. However, because they could not use their land as 
collaterals, they did not have access to formal sources of credit. Therefore, as 
readily underlined by the authors themselves, lower farm investments from 
squatters are the result of constrained access to formal credit23 rather than due to 
weaker tenure security. 
Also, most interestingly, in the survey, a number of squatters were also granted 
land titles (called STK certificates). However, because squatters already enjoyed 
de facto tenure security and were freely (although illegally) transacting land, the 
23 This is further evidenced by the vanishing of the significant and positive impact of owning land titles on 
input use where cropping activity is highly commercialised and non-titled farmers can circumvent their credit 
constraints through additional informal sources of credit provided by traders. 
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certificates introduced uncertainty over their future ownership 24 . Also, holding 
STK certificates imposed restrictions on the ability to sell, lease or give land as 
well as additional transactions costs (Feder et al. 1988 125-131). Consequently, 
instead of stimulating land transfers, land titles put into question squatters' 
ability to freely transfer land. Further, as STK titles did not include the right to 
mortgage land, newly titled squatters did not have any credit advantage over 
those without title. Overall, the Feder et al. survey presents a very interesting 
example of a land-titling programme that was counterproductive (it increased 
tenure insecurity), or which was at best ineffective because it failed to provide 
title-holders with the needed mortgage rights. 
Subsequent studies of the impact of private property rights on investment have 
been conducted, predominantly in the African context, although growing 
research on land tenure reforms in Latin America and South East Asia is 
currently being produced 25 . An extensive review is provided in the latest World 
Bank report on land policies (World Bank 2003c). Overall, robust evidence of a 
significant and positive relationship remains elusive. In their study of indigenous 
land rights in Sub-Saharan Africa26 , Bruce and Migot-Adholla (1993) can only 
find a weak and non-systematic relationship between more individualised land 
rights on the one hand, and land improving investments, use of formal credit or 
farm productivity on the other. Similar ambiguous results were confirmed by 
Otsuka and Quisumbing (2001) in a recent study on the evolution of land rights 
in Ghana and Indonesia, as well as by Brasselle, Gaspart and Platteau (2002) for 
Burkina Faso". 
A number of recent studies have found that the causality between land tenure 
security and investments could actually run in the opposite direction to that 
commonly predicted: that is, farmers engage into long-term land investments in 
order to enhance their rights over land, and not only after they receive security of 
24 According to Feder, et al. (1988: 125), although no end date for the expiry of the land use right was specified, 
they were granted "temporary occupation status". Moreover, STK certificates would cover only up to a certain 
amount of land, casting doubt of the status of excess land. 
25 Carter and Olinto (1996); Carter and Yao (1998) Deininger and Chamorro (2002); Deininger and Jin (2003) 
26 Case studies include Burkina Faso, Kenya, Ghana, Uganda, Somalia, Senegal and Rwanda. 
27 See also table 1 in Brasselle, Gaspart and Platteau (2002) for a review of other surveys showing that the 
effects of tenure security on investment in Sub-Saharan Africa are ambiguous. 
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tenure28 . In fact, the failure to take into account the potential endogeneity of land 
tenure together with limitations in the measurement of land rights may account 
for the failure to find a relationship between land tenure security and investment. 
The failure of land titling programmes to stimulate agricultural growth has also 
been attributed to the lack of complementary reforms that help create an 
environment that is conducive to investment: irrespective of the tenure regime, 
when factor and output markets are poorly functioning and physical rural 
infrastructures are underdeveloped29, profitable investment opportunities will be 
few. Consequently, the benefits from land titling will also vary across space, 
depending on local economic endowments as well as production and exchange 
opportunities that determine the profitability of investments. Both Alston, 
Libecap and Mueller (1999) for Brazil, and Carter, Wiebe and Blarel (1993) for 
Kenya, argue that title contribution should be highest near market centres where 
factor and output markets are likely to be more developed and well-
functioning30 . Similarly, the benefits from land titling will vary across 
individuals, depending on their endowment in education, farming experience, 
social capital, or wealth. 
The recent study of land tenure in Burkina Faso by Brasselle, Gaspart and 
Platteau (2002) highlights the importance of viewing property rights within the 
social context in which they are rooted 31 . For example, in Burkina Faso, it was 
found that rights on borrowed land are easily renewable among members of the 
same lineage and many users actually engage into long-term investments32 . It so 
appears that customary property rights, which may at first sight appear weakly 
defined, are in reality nested within personalised networks of relationships 
(lineages or kinships), which strengthen the actual rights to which people are 
entitled. 
28 The problem of reverse causality is most emphasised in the work of Besley (1995), and particularly in 
Brasselle, Gaspart and Platteau (2002). 
29 See de Janvry, et al. (1998), de Janvry, et al. (2001) Chapter 11, Bruce and Migot-Adholla (1993), Carter, 
Wiebe and Blarel (1993), Carter and Olinto (2003), Alston, Libecap and Mueller (1999). 
30 Because the acquisition of titles is costly, title ownership was correlated with market access, when access to 
market was controlled for, the positive correlation between title ownership and farm profitability that was 
found otherwise, disappeared. These two studies show how systematic disparities can be traced out to 
differences in natural resources, access to markets and rural infrastructure, as well as in initial physical and 
human endowments. 
31 See also Platteau (1992a), Platteau (1992b) and Feder and Feeny (1993). 
32 Brasselle, Gaspart and Platteau (2002: 35-38) 
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Data requirements for measuring land rights are therefore challenging. 
Confronted to the difficulties of finding appropriate data to identify tenure 
security, many empirical studies tended to equate the existence of formalised 
land rights with security of tenure. By implication, this contributed to 
overemphasize legal individual ownership as the preferred way to increase the 
security of land tenure. The emphasis on the formalisation of land rights both in 
policy formulations and in research methods can be doubly misleading: on the 
one hand, the lack of formal titles is not necessarily indicative of lack of tenure 
security; on the other hand, titling programmes may actually contribute to 
weaken secure customary tenure rights. 
A more refined understanding of the complex functioning of land property rights 
and a better appreciation of the merits and disadvantages of privatising land 
rights is emerging, as illustrated in the latest World Bank report on land reform 
(World Bank 2003c) 33, which provides a cautious review of the classical 
property rights paradigm. By and large, a consensus seems to emerge around the 
need to take into account existing customary institutions and integrate them into 
land reform programmes 34 . A greater scepticism against the effectiveness of land 
titling also seems to prevail: it is now recognised that land titles do not 
necessarily improve tenure security where customary land tenure is already in 
place, and that the existence of land titles is neither a necessary nor a sufficient 
condition for a land market to operate35 . It is accepted that land-titling 
programmes may best contribute to strengthen tenure security where there is an 
institutional void such as in resettlement or frontier areas 36 . 
33 See also the reassessment of the World Bank's land reform policies by Deininger and Binswanger (2001). 
34 Deininger and Binswanger (2001: 422), the two masterminds of land reform programmes at the World Bank, 
caution against land titling programmes which run the risk of undermining existing customary land tenure 
regimes. "In all of these cases, clear quantitative evidence on the inadequacy of current tenure arrangements 
should be made to justify such an intervention. Indicators to be used are the costs of disputes, the efficiency 
loss imposed by preventing cross-community transfers, or the productivity losses arising from investment 
disincentives" 
33 See Deininger and Binswanger (2001: 421): "Land titling is not the panacea. [...]. Lack of title is rarely a 
constraint on efficiency-enhancing land transactions. All over the world, but most clearly in the recent past in 
many Eastern European countries, land rental and even sales transactions emerged long before individuals 
were able to obtain formal land title. By contrast, in many countries, government regulations that limited the 
operation of rental and sales markets precluded the operation of an efficiency-enhancing land market, even in 
situations where individuals had formal titles to their land". 
36 See for example Alston, Libecap and Mueller (1999) for the Amazonian frontier. Even so, in Platteau (1999: 
63), Jean-Philippe Platteau argues, "effective communities may be formed under the decentralized initiative of 
the migrant settlers themselves. In general, the local informal order embedded in the rural community 
guarantees basic land rights to all villagers (including migrants) and these are sufficient to induce investment. 
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To sum up, that tenure security is critical to elicit land-related investments is 
empirically confirmed. If anything, the fact that farmers engage in observable 
land-attached investments such as planting trees in order to obtain secure tenure 
over their land testifies of its importance 37 . However, whilst posited in theory, 
the superiority of formal property rights over customary ones has not been 
validated empirically. A number of important caveats have recently been raised 
as various land tenure reforms failed to produce the expected results, and as 
seemingly incomplete property rights regimes do not seem to be as inefficient as 
previously thought. Given these important caveats from the literature, how can 
Vietnam's land reform fare? 
Undoubtedly, Vietnam's 1993 Land Law does not operate in a socio-cultural 
vacuum. To understand whether a priori, Vietnam's new land tenure system 
based on de jure private property rights may successfully contribute to greater 
efficiency of land use, it is important to distinguish between two components of 
the new Land Law: the strengthening of tenure security, and the land titling 
programme. 
2.1.2.2 The 1993 Land Law — First and Foremost, Strengthening Tenure 
Security 
Across centuries, Vietnam has developed a permanent and intensive system of 
irrigated wet-rice cultivation as a response to intense population pressure38 . In 
such an agricultural system, long-term planning and investments of labour and 
capital in land improvement are required: terrace walls need to be built to 
prevent erosion, and manure needs to be composted and distributed to prevent 
the depletion of soil fertility. As cultivation was intensified, cultivation 
techniques were more complex and supervision became increasingly difficult 
There is then no need for the state to intervene through centralized procedures aimed at formalizing land 
rights. If, for one reason or another the village informal order is absent, had vanished, or is proving unable to 
regulate access to land, however, the state may be well-advised to substitute for the missing social structure" 
37 The importance of tenure security is emphatically asserted by the World Bank (2003c: 26) in its latest review 
of land reform: "Of all the attributes of land rights, the duration for which use may be enjoyed is one of the 
most important. [...1 The length for which rights to land are awarded, and the mechanisms available for 
extending them, that is whether they are automatically renewed or whether extension depends on a 
discretionary process, will affect the incentive to invest in and manage land in a sustainable fashion." 
38 Gourou (1952); ibid. (1965 (1936)) documents the acute population pressure in the Red River Delta in the 
1930s and across South-East Asia, and describes the labour intensive cultivation methods that were developed 
over time. 
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and costly. Netting (1993: 17) argues that intensive cultivation systems require 
secure and individualised land rights including tenure and transfer rights 39 : 
"if returns on the work of intensification and build-up of productive capital in 
the farmstead are threatened by insecure tenure, reallocation of the land to 
others, or denial of household members' right to future benefits, the incentive 
to intensify will decline. Intensive cultivation is therefore invariably 
associated with quasi-private property rights systems, although "permanent 
alienation by sale seldom occurs". 
Vietnam's traditional land tenure system consisted in an intricate system of 
different types of landholdings, with a complex array of rights and obligations 
attached to them. Principally, private land coexisted alongside communal land, 
which was owned and managed by the village entity and could represent a 
substantial part of total agricultural lane. Over time, population pressure and 
increasing land scarcity contributed to the gradual erosion of communal land and 
Vietnam's customary land tenure system evolved to provide permanent and 
inheritable rights that approximated those of private ownership 41 . 
The collectivisation of agriculture during the 1960s and the 1970s represented a 
considerable disruption in land property relations. During the 1980s, as 
agriculture was being de-collectivised, tenure insecurity was rife and dampened 
work and investment incentives. As a counterpoint to that period, the 1993 Land 
Law was in effect confirming the return to the pre-colonial land tenure system 
where land could be farmed individually for a relatively long and secure period 
of time. In fact, the 1993 Land Law actually restored key traditional land rights 
that allow the intensive cultivation system to function: tenure security, and 
39 See also Boserup (1965/1998); Bray (1986); Netting (1993) and Hayami and Kikuchi (1981); Bray (1986); 
Netting (1993); Hayami (2001); Otsuka and Quisumbing (2001); Platteau (2002) 
40 There were two types of communal land, tong digin and tu (inn dies, and private land (tu digin). See Scott 
(1976); Wiesgerma (1988); Phan Huy Le (1993); Scott (2001), Gourou (1965 (1936)). Under the stress of certain 
events, village authorities could decide to convert private land into communal land. Phan Huy Le (1993) gives 
the example of a village that had to be evacuated because warring factions fighting each other threatened it. 
Land was left fallow for a long period, and upon their return, the villagers realised that they would not be able 
to farm all their land on their own. The village authorities decided to pool and redistribute the village land 
equally, according to each family's labour endowment, for a period of three years. After three years, 70 
percent of the land was returned to its former owners, but 30 percent was converted into communal land. 
41 Amongst rice-growing countries, Vietnam was no exception in that matter. For example, Bray (1986) 
explains that in China, as cultivation techniques became more complex and supervision became increasingly 
costly for landlords, tenants saw the terms of contracts evolve in their favour and were granted managerial 
independence. Secure tenure took the form of lifetime leases with transferable and negotiable cultivation 
rights. The landlord-based tenure system evolved into what Bray terms a two-owner system. 
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residual income rights. In that respect, the strengthening of tenure security and 
the stabilisation of expectations are the most important contributions of the 1993 
Land Law. 
2.1.2.3 The 1993 Land Law — Formalisation of Private Property Rights 
Another important component of the 1993 Land Law is the issuance of land 
titles. By setting a new land tenure system based on de jure (quasi) private 
property rights, guaranteed by legal titles, the 1993 Land Law signifies a 
momentous change in Vietnam's history of land tenure. However, as was seen 
earlier, land titles do not necessarily contribute to increase tenure security. Also, 
land titles are neither necessary nor sufficient to stimulate the functioning of a 
land and credit market. To some extent, the effectiveness of Vietnam's land 
titling programme depends on whether or not the new de jure rights contravene 
existing community norms embedded in the socio-cultural system 42 and on the 
extent to which these norms can be overruled by the new formal land tenure 
system. 
The land-titling programme represents the institutional, law enforcement aspect, 
of Vietnam's land reform. To understand how land titling works, two distinct 
aspects of establishing property rights need to be distinguished: (i) the body of 
public rules that enable individuals to exercise a number of rights (i.e. the land 
law); (ii) the formal institutions that enforce or protect these rights 43 . 
These two dimensions of a property rights system interact and can either support 
or undermine each other. When the public enforcement of law is defective either 
because of sheer administrative capacity constraint or because institutions have 
been subject to local capture, alternative institutional arrangements emerge. In an 
insightful article, Glaeser and Shleifer (2003) provide a theory of institutional 
choice and law enforcement that depends on whether law enforcing institutions 
42 Nee (1998: 87) explains the divergence that can emerge between formal rules and informal norms: "To the 
extent that members of networks have interests and preferences independent of what rulers and 
entrepreneurs want, the respective contents of informal norms and formal organizational rules are likely to 
reflect opposing aims and values" 
43 Acemoglu and Johnson (2003) distinguish contracting institutions from property rights institutions. North 
(1990: 23) explains that institutions "[...]are composed of formal rules (statute law, common law, regulations), 
informal constraints (conventions, norms of behaviour and self-imposed codes of conduct), and the 
enforcement characteristics of both." 
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can be perverted by vested interests44 . Another example comes from the current 
situation in Russia, where it is shown that when public rules could not be 
enforced because of a malfunctioning judicial system, public rules are privately 
enforced. Hay and Shleifer recount: 
"In some cases, these [public] rules are enforced by courts, though with 
significant efforts by private parties to simplify the courts' decision process. 
In other cases, these rules are enforced by private parties without any reliance 
on courts. In still other cases, the parties agree to a resolution in line with 
these rules without any help with enforcement, since they know which is 
going to be enforced. In all these ways, private enforcement of public rules 
can work reasonably efficiently even when public enforcement remains 
ineffective" (Hay and Shleifer 1998: 401). 
The 1993 Land Law clearly included the two above-mentioned institutional 
dimensions of a property rights system. In particular, it created a set of formal 
institutions in charge of enforcing the new de jure rights and of managing the 
various tasks associated with the land tenure system (e.g. the issuance of land 
titles or the settlement of land disputes). These formal institutions represent the 
law enforcement capacity of the State. 
Law enforcement institutions can influence the security of tenure as perceived by 
land users in two conflicting ways. On the one hand, local institutions that are 
supportive of the land reform in Vietnam can contribute to reduce uncertainty 
and can therefore play a significant role in promoting long-term investment and 
in encouraging land transactions. On the other hand, when institutions are 
subverted by the rich and powerful, they can contribute to weaken the rights of 
individual land users (Glaeser and Shleifer 2003). 
The difficulties faced by Vietnam in establishing these new institutions for law 
enforcement were documented in a recent evaluation of Vietnam's public 
administrative system (ADB 2003a; ADB 2003b), which highlighted problems 
of capacity constraints (e.g. lack of required skills, training and resources) as 
well as "complicated procedures and abuse of power [...] by local officials in the 
44 Glaeser and Shleifer (2003) show that in the USA at the beginning of the 20th century, institutions in charge 
of protecting property rights were perverted in their task of enforcing property rights by vested interests. As a 
35 
case of residential permits, house registration, land allocation, and forestation" 
(ADB 2003a 6)45 . As a response to these problems, the new Land Law, which 
was enacted in November 2003 and became effective in April 2004, puts the 
emphasis on strengthening the institutions in charge of protecting property rights. 
It also "gives people the right to complain about any official violating 
administrative procedure"46 . 
All in all, the new land laws represent drastic changes in the institutional 
framework that governs land rights in Vietnam. Establishing institutions that are 
able to formally enforce land rights takes times and ultimately involves deep 
changes in the social structures and norms of a country 47 . The difficulties in 
establishing such institutions should not be underestimated. Fifty years into the 
enactment of Kenya's land titling programme (the Swinnerton Plan dating back 
to 1954), the titling and land transaction registration process remains incomplete 
and is criticised for being ineffective (Quan 2000). Therefore, in order to assess 
the impact of the 1993 Land Law on investment incentives, it is important to 
distinguish the effect of strengthening tenure security from the effects of the 
land-titling programme, which may take more time to materialise. 
Sections 2.2 and 2.3 set out to examine the impact of the 1993 Land Law along 
these lines and seek to separately test the impact on investment incentives of (i) 
strengthening tenure security by enacting a new body of public rules, and (ii) 
establishing institutions that protect land tenure rights. 
consequence, the prevailing system of law enforcement based on ex-post private litigation could not be 
sustained and a system based on (ex-ante) regulation was eventually preferred. 
45 The need for administrative reform was formally recognised in the Prime Minister's decision 136/2001/QD-
TTg (September 2001), which forms the basis for the Public Administration Reform plan (PAR) that was 
launched in several pilot provinces in 2003. See ADB (2003a) for an analysis of the PAR. 
46 Interview on Feb 03, 2004 with minister Mai Ai Truc, Minister of Natural Resources and Environment. 
"Revising Land Law", by Vietnam News. For example, the 2004 Land Law establishes a dedicated Land 
Office, and clarifies the decentralisation of responsibilities at provincial and district levels. People's 
Committees at the provincial level allocate or lease land to organisations, whilst Peoples Committees at 
district levels allocate or lease land to households and individuals. 
47 Shirley (2003: 17) points out that "secure property rights, for example, are outcomes, the result of a number 
of different institutions — norms of conduct, religious precepts, historical traditions, laws and courts, and rules 
that check the state's ability to expropriate". 
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2.2 Econometric Model and Estimation Issues 
Research on the relationship between land tenure security and investment is 
fraught with empirical difficulties. Recent surveys that have been purposively set 
up in order to assess that relationship have fallen short of adequately measuring 
either land tenure security or investment. As pointed out by the authors of a most 
careful investigation of the relationship between land tenure security and 
investment incentives in Burkina Faso (Brasselle, Gosport, and Platteau 2002: 
402): 
"[...] the conventional way of measuring land tenure security is problematic. 
This is because the categories of rights used do not discriminate adequately 
between varying levels of security as actually experienced by people in 
societies pervaded by highly personalized networks of social relationships. 
[...] To improve on this situation, it is necessary to go beyond the veil of 
rather simple definitions of land rights to identify the social context in which 
they are embedded. This is bound to be a very arduous task involving the use 
of more complex methods than the standard household survey questionnaire 
commonly used by economists." 
The impact of Vietnam's 1993 Land Law on investment incentives is evaluated 
using agricultural production data from the Vietnamese Living Standard Survey 
(VLSS). The VLSS is a panel survey of 3381 rural households who were 
interviewed in 1992, before the enactment of the 1993 Land Law, and in 1998, 
five years after the implementation of the Land Law. Provincial land titling data 
collected at the central Cadastral Office 48 in Hanoi will also be used. 
The VLSS collected information on land tenure in a "conventional way". 
Straightforward questions on land tenure categories and length of tenure were 
asked with no reference to the legal enforcement of land rights or to the social 
context in which they operated. Clearly, given the caveats provided above, 
caution will be required when interpreting the results. 
Nonetheless, it is possible to take advantage of idiosyncratic characteristics of 
Vietnam's land reform to ensure that the land rights variable that is constructed 
48 Tong Cuc Dia Chinh 
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using data from the VLSS captures the exogenous changes in tenure security 
brought about by the 1993 Land Law. Also, because the VLSS provides panel 
data before and after the enactment of the 1993 Land Law, it is possible to use 
panel fixed-effects techniques to control for unobserved farm and household 
fixed-effects that may be correlated with these changes in land tenure. It will also 
be argued that the provincial land titling data captures the institutional law 
enforcement aspect of Vietnam's land reform. 
The estimation issues that needed to be solved in order to empirically test the 
impact of the 1993 Land Law are now reviewed in detail. According to the 
standard property rights theory, the relationship between land rights and long-
term investment can be modelled into a triangular system as in Figure 2-1. 
Figure 2 -1: Land rights and Investment 
In turn, the triangular relationship can be modelled into a system of two 
simultaneous equations: 
Equation 2-1: I ;, = a0 +aI R„ + a 2 C „ + a3 X„ + a, + ,u„ 
Equation 2-2: C„ = 160 + AR„ + AZ„ + b, +77„ 
where 
- I is a measure of long-term investment 
- R is a measure of land rights 
C is the amount of formal credit 
- Xis a vector of exogenous determinants of I 
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Z is a vector of exogenous determinants of C. X and Z can be 
overlapping. 
a, and b. 	time-invariant unobserved variables 
and 	are the mean-zero independent error terms 
t= 1, 2 and i = 1,...,n 
Ideally, a measure of land rights would distinguish transfer rights from tenure 
security rights and it would be possible to estimate both equation (1) and 
equation (2). As will become clear later (see sections 2.3.2 and 2.3.3 below), the 
data do not allow us to make such distinctions in the composition of land rights 
at the household level. In particular, the VLSS does not provide household level 
data on land titling. As a result, it is not possible to directly evaluate whether 
ownership of a land title contributed to enhance a household's access to formal 
sources of credit. The chief aim of this chapter is to estimate Equation 2-1 and to 
test the impact on investment incentives of (i) strengthening tenure security by 
enacting a new body of public rules, and (ii) establishing institutions that protect 
land tenure rights. 
Before presenting the variables used in the model (Section 2.3), three estimation 
issues are now analysed: the endogeneity of land rights or the issue of reverse 
causation; the household and plot heterogeneity bias or the issue of omitted 
variables; the endogeneity of credit. It is shown that it is possible to exploit the 
idiosyncratic characteristics of Vietnam's land reform together with the features 
of the VLSS to tackle these estimation issues. 
2.2.1 Exogeneity of Land Rights 
The issue of reverse causality (that is, the situation when farmers engage into 
long-term land investments in order to enhance their rights over land) has been a 
major concern in empirical research on the relationship between land rights and 
investments. Recent empirical works demonstrate that failing to control for such 
an endogeneity problem would lead to spurious results (Migot-Adholla et al. 
1993; Besley 1995; Brasselle, Gosport, and Platteau 2002). 
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The evidence from secondary literature that such a relationship is at play in 
Vietnam is sparse. A survey of three Black Thai villages in the northern 
mountains of Vietnam indicates the existence of the reverse causation for forest 
land: those who cleared and transformed the land into terraced rice fields in turn 
benefited from de facto ownership rights (Sikor 1999). However, although such 
land tenure practices may persist in Vietnam, this seems to have been reported 
only for indigenous communities living in the uplands. 
Moreover, when analysing data from the VLSS, several idiosyncratic features of 
Vietnam's land reforms emerge that seem to ensure that the strengthening in 
tenure rights can be considered exogenous to households' decisions. In 1998, the 
Vietnamese Living Standard survey collected data on the year in which a farmer 
started cultivating a plot of land. Annual land tenure data are used to graph the 
timing of land redistribution Vietnam in Figure 2-2 to Figure 2-4 below and 
show that most annual land (90 percent) was redistributed prior to 1993. 
These data also reveal an important divide between the Northern and Southern 
regions of Vietnam. In the South East and Mekong River Delta, the two regions 
at the southern end of Vietnam, 90 percent of annual land was distributed before 
1988, and 98 percent before 1993 (in Figure 2-3, see the two upper lines for the 
South East and Mekong River Delta regions). In Northern Vietnam, the 1993 
Land Law had the largest impact in the Red River Delta where about 75 percent 
of annual land was redistributed between 1992 and 1993 (in Figure 2-2, see the 
lowest line, and notice the large peaks in 1992 and 1993). At the other end of the 
spectrum, in the Northern Uplands, one can see that the pattern of land 
redistribution was shaped to a greater extent by Decree 100 and Resolution 10 
(in Figure 2-2, see the upper line and the gradual build-up of length of tenure 
between 1982-1988, and between 1988-1992). 
Considering the whole of Vietnam, about 90 percent of annual land had been 
redistributed by 1993 (see Figure 2-4). Thus, although the new 1993 Land Law 
offered another opportunity to administratively redistribute land, it appears that 
the majority of village authorities decided to not reallocate land but to confirm 
the allocation that had been carried out earlier, under Resolution 10 (1988). 
40 
Cu
m
ul
at
iv
e  
di
st
rib
ut
io
n  
an
nu
al
 la
nd
 (%
)  
C
um
ul
at
iv
e  
di
st
rib
ut
io
n  
an
nu
al
 la
nd
 (%
)  
Overall, this means that the 1993 Land Law did not bring about a radically new 
distribution of land, but rather exogenously transferred additional rights to 
farming households on their existing land: first and foremost, the Land Law 
stabilised expectations by granting long-term use rights on the allocated land. 
This transfer of tenure rights can be considered largely exogenous to households' 
decisions. 
Figure 2-2: Timing of Land Distribution in North Vietnam (annual land) 
1975 	 1981 	 1988 
tenure start date 
NORTHERN VIETNAM 
Figure 2-3: Timing of Land Distribution - South Vietnam (annual land) 
SOUTH CENTRAL COAST 	 CENTRAL HIGHLANDS 
	SOUTH EAST 	MEKONG RIVER DELTA 
1975 	 1981 	 1988 
	
1993 
tenure start date 
SOUTHERN VIETNAM 
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Figure 2-4: Timing of Land Distribution — All Vietnam (annual land) 
1975 	 1981 	 1988 
	
1993 
Tenure start data 
All Vietnam 
Source: VLSS 1992 and VLSS 1998, rural households only, one outlier excluded. 
NB: "In which year did your household begin farming this plot?" Average year over households' plots. 
2.2.2 Regional and individual heterogeneity bias 
Using data on land tenure types from the VLSS, it is possible to identify the 
strengthening in land tenure security that was induced by the 1993 Land Law. A 
close analysis of the data reveals that the change in tenure security was of a 
significant magnitude but also that its distribution across Vietnam was not 
random, but historically determined, closely following the historical North-South 
divide. This source of non-randomness points to the importance of controlling 
for factors that may be correlated with both tenure status and productivity 
characteristics. Omitting these factors from the analysis would lead to spurious 
results. Let us first ascertain the source of non-randomness in the distribution of 
land tenure rights. 
2.2.2.1 Non Randomness of Land Rights 
The VLSS gathered data on various land types, which are associated with 
different land tenure rights. It is this variation in land tenure type that will be 
exploited to identify the strengthening in tenure security induced by the 1993 
Land Law. The distribution of each land tenure type in 1992 and in 1998 is 
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shown in Table 2-2 below (page 46). In 1992, at the time of the first VLSS 
survey, there were four main types of land tenure: 
i. 	Allocated land49 refers to land allocated to households by the cooperative 
under Decree 100. Households received the right to cultivate the land 
against the payment of a land tax and a share of the harvest contracted in 
advance with the cooperative. The length of tenure was also decided by the 
cooperative and before the enactment of Resolution 10 could be very short. 
At the end of the tenure period, the allocated plots of land were 
reintegrated into the collective farm or would be reallocated to another 
household. Allocated land is predominant in Northern Vietnam (e.g. it 
accounted for 72 percent of total agricultural land in the Red River Delta) 
where most agricultural land had been collectivised and was under the 
management of cooperatives. It is almost absent in the southernmost 
regions of Vietnam, where land could not be collectivised during the 
collectivisation push between 1975 and 1981 (Mekong River Delta and 
South East regions). 
ii. Long-term use (LTU) land refers to the land that falls under Resolution 
10. LTU land differs from allocated land in that long-term use rights were 
allocated for a tenure period that was left undefined by Resolution 10: the 
Resolution stipulated a period up to 15 years. As a result, the final tenure 
period could end up being much shorter. At the end of the tenure period, 
the land was returned to the collective in order to be reallocated. LTU 
land is notably predominant in South Vietnam (52 percent and 41 percent 
of total agricultural land in the Mekong River Delta and the South East 
respectively). 
iii. Private land refers to the so-called '5-percent land' that was allocated in 
the 1960s by cooperatives for private production (garden land) in North 
Vietnam. Private land is unencumbered by any obligation towards the 
State: households have management, residual income, as well as bequest 
rights on their private land. Private land was famously productive during 
the collective period, whilst productivity on collective plots was 
languishing. Private land is most prevalent in South Vietnam where land 
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was not or only partially collectivised, and represented between 40 and 
50 percent of total agricultural land. 
iv. Auctioned land refers to land auctioned (dau thau) to households who can 
demonstrate greater productive abilities (greater labour or capital 
endowment) and who have the capability to pay the highest rental fees to 
the cooperative or village authorities. Tenure rights on auctioned land are 
decided by local authorities and are generally short-term (3-5 years). At 
the end of the tenure period, the land is returned to the village authorities 
to be re-auctioned. 
v. Other land refers to land that is farmed by a household but does not fall 
into any of the above-mentioned category. It can consist in cleared land 
or hill bare land on which households expended labour and gained de 
facto ownership. Because other land falls outside of the jurisdiction of the 
land laws and is under the control of households, tenure rights may be 
considered as strong. 
Following the enactment of the 1993 Land Law, only three main types of land 
remain: 
i. Long-term use (LTU) land is the land that is governed by the 1993 Land 
Law. As detailed in section 2.1.1, usufruct right on land is allocated for a 
tenure period of 20 years for annual land, and for a period of 50 years for 
perennial land. LTU land is transferable and can be mortgaged. Farmers 
have to pay a fixed land tax and can retain the entirety of the residual. 
Land categorised under private land in 1992 is merged into the LTU land 
category in 1998. 
ii. Auctioned land and other land: same as above. 
iii. Contract land5° refers to land that is contracted out by State farms to 
households, who receive usufruct rights for gong-term and stable use'. 
The length of tenure is negotiated between the households and the State 
49 VLSS 1992's interviewer's handbook, p.40. 
99 Contract land refers to land that is contracted out by State farms to households, who receive usufruct rights 
for 'long-term and stable use'. The length of tenure is negotiated between the households and the State entity, 
but farmers are not provided with land titles and do not have any transfer rights. This type of contract is 
mostly found in the Central Highlands for the exploitation of the forest land that is still managed by State 
farms, and will not concern us as we focus exclusively on agricultural land. 
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entity, but farmers are not provided with land titles and do not have any 
transfer rights. 
The strengthening in tenure rights was performed through the switch from 
allocated land into LTU land. Land categorised under LTU land and private land 
in 1992 are merged into LTU land in 1998, as shown graphically in Figure 2-5 
below. 
Figure 2-5: Changes in Land Tenure Contracts from Resolution 10 to the 
1993 Land Law 
Table 2-2 below illustrates the magnitude of the shift in tenure security induced 
by the 1993 Land Law. Before 1993, land with short-term or insecure tenure was 
composed of allocated and auctioned land. Land with de facto secure tenure 
rights included long-term use and private land. The share of LTU land (that is, 
land with strong tenure rights) in North Vietnam increased from 3-11 percent to 
80-90 percent of total agricultural land. 
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Table 2-2: Land Tenure Types (share of total agricultural land) 
1992 	 Allocated 	LTU 	Private 	Auctioned All Other Type 
Northern Uplands 	39.45 10.29 26.42 4.03 	19.81 
Red River Delta 72.12 	3.22 	16.75 	4.59 3.32 
North Central Coast 	61.05 11.28 18.51 3.02 	6.14 
South Central Coast 	49.47 	6.5 	26.6 	1.1 16.33 
Central Highlands 20.76 2.9 49.45 0.0 	26.89 
South East 	 0.17 	41.33 	43.08 	0.0 15.42 
Mekong River Delta 	0.42 51.75 41.75 0.0 	6.08 
1998 	 LTU 	Contract 	Auctioned All Other Type 
Northern Uplands 	 83.26 3.71 2.70 	10.33 
Red River Delta 90.06 	0.72 	4.65 4.57 
North Central Coast 	 80.01 11.86 3.28 	4.85 
South Central Coast 91.13 	0.37 	1.09 7.41 
Central Highlands 	 79.48 0.40 0.15 	19.97 
South East 	 94.36 	0.00 	0.00 5.64 
Mekong River Delta 	 96.57 0.14 0.00 	3.29  
Source: VLSS 1992 - 1998 
Table 2-2 also strongly indicates the existence of a significant North-South 
divide and suggests that the variation in tenure security across Vietnam is not 
random but historically determined. The North-South divide appears cogently in 
Figure 2-6 below, where allocated and auctioned land are subsumed into one 
group representing weak land tenure (weakright2), and the remaining tenure 
categories (LTU land, private land and other types of land) are aggregated into 
another group representing strong land tenure (strongright2). The share of land 
under weak tenure right is negligible in the South East region (SE) and the 
Mekong River Delta (MD) and remains limited in the Central Highlands (CH). 
In the South Central Coast, where the collectivisation drive was somewhat 
successful after 1975, the share of land under weak tenure is somewhat larger. In 
the Northern regions, land under weak tenure is predominant. Only in the 
Northern Uplands does one see a larger share of land with strong tenure right. 
This is due to the important presence of land under the category "other", i.e. land 
that does not fall under the collective authority such as forest land converted into 
agricultural land as illustrated in the survey of the Black Thai community by 
Sikor (1999). 
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Figure 2-6: Distribution of Tenure Security by Region 
Breakdown by region 
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This North-South divide can be traced back to the history of Vietnam's land 
reform in the second half of the twentieth century. In Southern Vietnam (South 
East and Mekong River Delta regions), after the reunification of the whole 
country in 1975, the push for the collectivisation of agriculture was staunchly 
resisted and throughout the 1980s, agricultural land continued to be farmed by 
individual households. As a result, private and long-term use lands were 
predominant in 1992 and accounted for about 80-90 percent of total agricultural 
land. Also, households in South Vietnam report having farmed their land for a 
total period of time that is longer than in the North by 8 to 10 years. On the 
contrary in Northern Vietnam, most land had been collectivised in the course of 
the 60s and the 70s so that in 1992, as much as 50 to 75 percent of agricultural 
land was classified as allocated land (that is land under the control of 
cooperatives and allocated to individual households under Resolution 10), on 
which weak tenure rights prevailed. 
The distribution of land tenure rights is therefore non-random and it becomes 
important to control for factors that may be correlated with both tenure status and 
productivity characteristics. There are two main sources of unobserved 
heterogeneity: regional and individual. Firstly, there may be systematic 
differences between the Northern and Southern regions of Vietnam in 
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characteristics that are correlated with investment or productivity characteristics 
(e.g. ecological conditions and soil conditions, infrastructure development). 
Similarly, variation in tenure may be correlated with individual characteristics 
that are linked to productivity (better farming ability, greater entrepreneurship, 
greater wealth). 
The bias due to unobserved individual heterogeneity is likely to be moderate 
because, as was shown earlier, the changes in land tenure rights brought about by 
the 1993 Land Law were largely exogenous to households. However, as tenure 
rights differ systematically between North and South Vietnam, it is possible that 
household characteristics also differ systematically in a way that is correlated 
with land tenure status. For instance, household characteristics (education and 
family size) do differ systematically between North and South Vietnam. 
Likewise, regions differ systematically in their infrastructure endowments such 
as roads and irrigation (Dollar and Glewwe 1998; Haughton, Haughton, and 
Phong 2001). The omission of two specific regional factors have been pointedly 
criticized by Carter, Wiebe and Blarel (1993), who show that where titling status 
is systematically correlated with market access, and by Alston et al. (1999) who 
show that returns to tenure status are correlated with distance to the road. Finally, 
plot heterogeneity can constitute an important source of bias if plot 
characteristics (e.g. land quality) are covariant with changes in land tenure 
security. 
2.2.2.2 Fixed-Effects Estimator 
The Vietnamese Living Standard Survey offers a considerable advantage to 
address the issue of unobserved heterogeneity. Its panel feature allows the use of 
first-differencing techniques in order to wipe away that part of the unobserved 
heterogeneity that is time-constant. To see how, it is useful to distinguish two 
kinds of omitted variables: those that vary with time and those that are time-
invariant. Time-variant omitted variable are included in the error term. 
Time-invariant omitted variables are modelled separately as a; in Equation 2-1 
(p. 38 above). They can be correlated with any of the other exogenous regressors, 
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including R, . The VLSS collected data from the same household before and 
after the enactment of the 1993 Land Law. It is therefore possible to remove the 
heterogeneity bias due to time-constant factors through first-differencing or 
fixed-effects. A time dummy d98 that equals 0 for the year 1992 and 1 for 1998 
is added in Equation 2-1. This allows the intercept to change over time and to 
capture secular changes in the independent variables that are not captured by the 
explanatory variables. Rewriting Equation 2-1, one obtains: 
Equation 2-3: 	=a0 + go d98 +oc i R„ + a2 C + a3 X i, +a, + 
First-differencing between the two survey years sweeps away the unobserved 
fixed effects a,: 
Equation 2-4: AI; = 80 + aI AR, + a2 AC, + a3AX, + A,u, 
2.2.2.3 Time-Variant Control Variables 
First-differencing leaves unresolved the issue of time-varying omitted variables 
that may be directly or indirectly correlated with the explanatory variables. This 
issue will be tackled by including a whole set of control variables from the large 
range of information collected by the VLSS at the household and community 
levels. Adding control variables removes the inconsistency and also improves the 
fit of the model and enhances the precision of the estimation 
Even so, fixed effects are particularly robust to omitted variables. In a first- 
difference/fixed effects setting, a necessary condition for consistency is 
E(,u, 	a j= 0 : the fixed effects a, are allowed to be correlated with 
any other independent variable (E(a, I R„C,X) can be any function of the 
independent variables). A sufficient condition for consistency is 
E(F,(u„ — ,u,))= 0, with F = (R, C, X) the vector of all the independent 
variables in equation 2.1. This means that each element of and in particular 
the land rights variable R or the credit variables C , can be correlated with it, . 
Independent variables are allowed to be 
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"systematically related to the persistent component in the error. (...) It is 
for this reason that FE is often superior to pooled OLS or random effects 
for applications where participation in a program is determined by pre-
program attributes that also affect y, ." (Wooldridge 2002:279) 
Before presenting the set of control variables and the reasons for choosing them 
in section 2.3.4 (page 65 below), one last estimation issue needs to be addressed 
in detail. It is related to the omission of unobserved variable that are both 
correlated with the credit and the investment variables. 
2.2.3 Endogeneity of Credit 
From Equation 2-1 and Equation 2-2 (see p. 38) and Figure 2-1, one can see that 
the credit variable C is endogenous if E(C,u) # 0 , that is, if there is a variable 
included in Equation 2-2 (which models the determinants of credit) that is 
omitted in Equation 2-1 (which models the determinants of long-term land-
attached investment), and which is correlated with both credit C and investment I 
albeit uncorrelated with tenure rights R in Equation 2-1. For example, there is 
evidence that formal credit markets in Vietnam are rationed and that wealthier 
households are both more likely to invest and to obtain credit (World Bank 1999; 
Pham and Izumida 2002)51 . As a result, although in Vietnam wealth is not a 
priori related to tenure rights (the changes in tenure rights are exogenous to 
households), its omission may be an importance source of inconsistency for all 
the estimates. 
The endogeneity of credit has been verified, using the test for the violation of the 
strict exogeneity condition for linear fixed effects panel data model indicated by 
Wooldridge (2002: 285). In the first-differenced Equation 2-4, neither c, 1 or c, 2 
should be significant as additional explanatory variables. The test for the 
consistency of the FE/FD estimator is performed by adding c, 2 and carrying out 
an F-test for significance of c 12 . Using the F-test, robust to heteroskedasticity, 
51 In Vietnam's credit constrained setting, other factors such as connections to mass party organisations or 
membership in the Communist Party may also influence one's access to credit. That these factors influenced 
access to credit seems confirmed by findings in Ravallion and van de Walle (2004) and Pham and Izumida 
(2002). 
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we verify the endogeneity of c, 52 . It is therefore necessary to control for time- 
varying omitted factors that may be correlated with both access to formal sources 
of credit and the propensity to engage in long-term investment. 
As mentioned above, fixed effects are particularly robust to omitted variable 
bias. Unfortunately, it does not seem possible to exploit the robustness of fixed 
effects with respect to the omission of wealth. Indeed, between 1992 and 1998, 
households experienced unprecedented fluctuations in well-being 53 in a very 
short period of time 54 . If omitted, the important changes in wealth that occurred 
between the two VLSS surveys are likely to bias the results. 
Due to data limitation, it was not possible to use instrumental variable (IV) 
techniques to tackle the issue of the endogeneity of credit55 . Nevertheless, given 
the wealth of data on households' characteristics in the VLSS, it is possible to 
find a proxy for wealth and include it as an independent variable in Equation 2-1. 
2.2.3.1 Proxy for Wealth 
Proxies for wealth56 typically include a selection of variables including 
indicators of housing quality, nature of toilet facilities, ownership of certain 
durable assets, private access to water, also sources of lighting and cooking. 
Including proxy variables individually as control variables in the main regression 
52 The Wald test for the exclusion of C 1  is 6.68 (prob=0.0098), so that the test for the exogeneity of credit is 
rejected. 
53 The changes in welfare are analysed in detail in Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
54 See for example Glewwe, Gragnolati and Zaman (2000); Haughton, et al. (2001); Haughton, Haughton and 
Phong (2001). 
55 This is because the IV for credit should be well correlated with credit, but uncorrelated with investment 
except via its effect on credit. The IV should also be uncorrelated with any other unobservable factors affecting 
investment. In theory, credit supply factors that are specific to Vietnam's credit market could provide such an 
instrument. For example, if one reason for not taking a loan is the absence of a nearby bank, the presence of 
bank could be used as an instrument. Unfortunately, the VLSS provides very little data on credit supply, and 
it is consequently very difficult to find a satisfactory IV for credit. 
56 Wooldridge (2003: 296) explains that a proxy for wealth should have two characteristics. It should be related 
to the unobserved variable that we would like to control for in the analysis (wealth) and be uncorrelated with 
the error term. In other words, since the proxy does not directly affect investment, it should be an irrelevant 
variable once all other exogenous variables including the omitted variable are included in the main equation. 
E(I I R, C, X, w, p) = E(I I R, C, X, w), where w is the omitted variable wealth and p is a vector of proxies for 
wealth. Once the proxy is partialled out, the omitted variable has no correlation with the exogenous variables. 
w=bo+ bi+y. p is such that E(w I R, C, X, p) = E(w I p) = bo+bip. p is such that R, C, X and W are independent, 
conditional on p. These two properties ensure that when we include the proxies in the regression equation, 
partial effects can be consistently estimated as a function of the observable p instead of the unobserved w. 
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removes the inconsistency (Montgomery et al. 1999)57 . Indicators that are 
available in both VLSS surveys and which can be thought of as proxies for 
wealth include (i) the amount of dowry paid, (ii) ownership of durable assets 
(number of cupboards, beds, tables, car, motorbike, bicycle), (iii) quality of 
dwelling material (floor material, roof material) and other housing characteristics 
(number of rooms, the sources of drinking water, toilet facilities)58 , (iv) data on 
value of livestock and farm equipment. 
The correlation of these variables with wealth is verified by an estimation of the 
natural log of household consumption on the set of variables for both survey 
years. In 1992, using the variables that indicate whether the household owns a 
bicycle, the number of rooms, the value of dowry, the value of equipment, and 
the number of draft animals, all the covariates are significant at the 1% 
significance leve159 and the R2 is equal to 0.20. In 1998, all the variables, 
including variables on lighting, are jointly significant. Using the variables that 
indicate whether the household owns a bicycle, the number of rooms, the value 
of dowry, the value of equipment and the number of draft animals, all the 
covariates are significant at the 1% significance leve160 and the R2 is equal to 
0.23. 
57 It is also possible to construct a composite proxy for economic status that combines in one index all the 
indicators of wealth indicated above, using principal component analysis to derive the weights as Filmer and 
Pritchett (1999) do using 21 asset variables. The assumption underlying their approach is that "household 
long-run wealth is what causes the most common variation in asset variables." Because the objective is to 
'control' for wealth, which creates the inconsistency, and not to estimate the impact of wealth on investment 
per se, entering all asset variables individually in the multivariate regression equation will suffice. 
58 Indicators (i) to (iii) are similar to those used by Filmer and Pritchett (1999) in constructing their proxy to 
wealth using principal component factors (see the list of variables in table 1 of their paper). 
59 A Bonferroni adjustment is made to calculate the significance levels at 0.01. 
69 A Bonferroni adjustment is made to calculate the significance levels at 0.01. 
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2.3 Identification and Estimation Strategy 
This section presents the main variables used in the model to identify the long-
term investment variable and the two dimensions of land tenure rights that were 
discussed above (see Section 2.1.2.2 and 2.1.2.3). While presenting the 
identification strategy, caveats will be discussed and will inform the choice of 
control variables that will feed into the final econometric equation to be 
estimated. 
2.3.1 The Long-Term Investment Variable 
Different types of land-attached long-term investments have been considered in 
the literature on land rights and investment. Firstly, investments that enhance the 
quality of the land such as irrigation, drainage, bunding, etc. constitute an ideal 
direct measure of a farmer's propensity to engage in land attached long-term 
investment61 . Unfortunately, the VLSS did not collect any data on this type of 
investment. 
A second measure of a farmer's long-term time horizon that has been used in the 
literature is long-term soil fertility: it is argued that there is a relationship 
between insecure property rights in land and sub-optimal fertilising practices. 
When tenure is insecure, farmers would be reluctant to apply those fertilisers 
with longer-run effects on soil fertility. They would also be inclined to overuse 
inorganic fertilisers in order to maximise crop yields in the short-run, although 
this practice may reduce soil fertility in the long run. Organic and phosphate 
fertilisers are the two types of fertiliser that have the greatest long-term impact 
on soil fertility, whilst nitrogenous fertilisers are found to procure the best yields 
in each season. 
The use of fertiliser data to capture farmers' propensity to engage into long-term 
investment is problematic for several reasons. Firstly, optimal fertiliser 
application requires the application of a mix of both organic and inorganic 
materials: nitrogen is the most important nutrient for crop growth and 
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productivity and the lack of both phosphate and potassium can inhibit nitrogen 
efficiency. Also, in some soils, more humus is a pre-condition for efficient 
absorption of inorganic N or even Phosphate by plants. In addition, fertiliser use 
is highly dependent on soil characteristics and water regimes. Although it is true 
that phosphate has more long-term' effects than nitrogen, it is nevertheless very 
difficult to empirically disentangle the use of one against the other, and attribute 
the use of nitrogen to the farmer's short time horizon, and the use of phosphate 
to having greater security of land tenure. 
Moreover, the VLSS did not collect information on the exact type of fertilizers 
used by the farmers. Households were only asked to report the quantity of 
manure, NPK, nitrogen and phosphate and potassium bought or collected over 
the past 12 months. As a result, one can only speculate on the nutrient content of 
the particular fertilizer use chosen by a farmer. For example, the VLSS does not 
provide information on the nutrient content of the combined fertilizer NPK. 
According to Nguyen (2001), one can find two main types of nitrogen in 
Vietnam: Urea (46% N) and Ammonium Sulphate (21% N); three main sources 
of phosphates (single super phosphate: 22% P205 fast release; DAP: 18% N, 
46% P205; and FMP Fused calcium magnesium phosphate: 20% P205, 12% 
MgO slow release) and two main types of potassium (MOP Muriate of Potash: 
60% K2O; and 30%-50% K20). The diversity in nutrient composition in the 
different fertilizers, compounded with the sheer complexity of nutrient use 
decision-making, makes the use of fertilizer to capture farmers' propensity to 
engage into long-term investment a hazardous enterprise. Finally, a close look at 
the data in the VLSS on organic fertilizers shows a wide distribution with a 
skewness of 3 and a kurtosis of 34 and the existence of a substantial number of 
large outliers. The data on fertilisers from the VLSS are therefore noisy, 
potentially ridden with inconsistencies and large measurement errors, and will 
not used62 . 
61 For example, see Feder, et al. (1988); Migot-Adholla, et al. (1993); Besley (1995); Brasselle, Gaspart and 
Platteau (2002). 
62 Information on fertiliser use comes from FAO (1991); European Fertilizer Manufacturers Association (1997); 
Kung and Cai (2000); Wichmann (2001); Agro Services International (2002); National Institute for Soils and 
fertilizers, Tran and Pham (2002). 
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The third measure of long-term investment used in the literature is the planting 
of crops whose returns are delayed in the future, notably perennial crops 63 and 
fruit trees (e.g. Alston et al. (1999) use the proportion of land planted with 
perennial crops64). However, as pointed out by Brasselle et al. (2002), investment 
is a flow, not a stock. I shall use the change in the amount of land planted to 
perennials and fruit trees between 1992 and 1998 because it is more directly 
related to the intrinsic nature of investment as a flow. Holding the amount of 
cultivated land constant, an increase in the total amount of perennial land would 
indicate that farming households diversified away from rice farming and 
invested in higher value-added perennial cropping. Such a move would involve 
the long-term transformation of rice land into non-rice land and requires a 
substantial amount of initial sunk costs: drainage in lowland areas, erosion 
control investment in the uplands. Pingali et al. (1997) explain: 
"even for lands that can be converted, substantial investments in land 
improvements need to be made to sustain long-term productivity and 
profitability of non-rice crop production. Investments in land improvements 
are likely to be made only where secure rights to land exist". 
Therefore, the conversion of land away from rice farming would constitute a 
good indicator of long-term investment. Rice land can be converted in order to 
grow other annual crops (e.g. cash crops such as vegetables or other higher-value 
added annual industrial crops), whose returns materialise in the short-term. 
Although converting the land back to rice land would be costly for any crop, 
using perennials and fruit trees as indicators of long-term investments adheres 
more strictly to the definition of long-term investment of sunk investments with 
delayed returns. Consequently, the chosen measure of long-term investment is 
the change in the amount of land planted to perennials and fruit trees 65 
63 In 1998, 1.8 million hectares were planted with perennial crops, of which multi-year industrial crops 
accounted for 1.2 million hectares (or 73 percent of total perennial area). The area planted with multi-year 
industrial crop grew considerably faster than the area planted with fruit crops, with particularly dramatic 
expansion in coffee, tea and sugarcane plantations. Fruit crops represented 27 percent of total perennial crop 
area. See data from Tong Cuc Thong Ke (2000). 
64 e.g. Besley (1995); Brasselle, Gaspart and Platteau (2002) 
65 The last type of land use is water land. Farmers may convert their land into water land by digging a pond 
where they can raise fish or shrimps. This also requires a long-term conversion of agricultural land away from 
cropland and can involve substantial initial sunk costs. However, benefits from fish or shrimp raising can be 
generated within the same year as when the pond was prepared. Therefore, because returns are not 
necessarily delayed in time, the conversion of agricultural land into water land differs from the definition of 
long-term investment stricto sensu and is not included in the measure of long-term investment. 
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2.3.2 Land Tenure Security Variable Using Survey Data 
The VLSS does not provide data on land titling at the household level, nor does 
it provide a breakdown of the various land rights that households are entitled to 
on their land. However, as seen earlier, the VLSS does provide a breakdown of 
land ownership by different categories of land tenure security for each household 
(see Figure 2-5, p. 45). In 1992, households experienced weaker tenure on both 
allocated and auctioned land as these two types land could be reclaimed by local 
authorities in order to be redistributed. On the contrary, households enjoyed de 
facto tenure security on long-term use land, private and other land. It is possible 
to exploit these different tenure categories in order to construct a variable for 
land tenure rights that captures the change in land tenure security. 
2.3.2.1 Caveats in the Construction of the Land Tenure Variable 
Before presenting the identification strategy for the land rights variable, one 
issue needs to be considered. There could be substantial inter-plot variations in 
investment depending on the quality of each plot and the land tenure rights 
attached to it. Indeed, land tenure types (auctioned, allocated or long-term use 
land) could be systematically correlated with some unobserved plot 
characteristics such as plot quality, which would in turn determine the choices of 
land use. Without controlling for the quality of land associated with each tenure 
type, in a cross-section setting, the results would suffer from omitted variable 
bias. 
How serious is the potential bias due to omitting land quality? The VLSS does 
not provide plot- by plot information on land quality for all types of land use in 
1992, although it provides household-level data on the quality of annual land in 
both survey years. A priori, in a cross-section setting, without plot-by-plot data, 
it is not possible to estimate with accuracy the sign and size of the bias. 
However, it is possible to say that the magnitude of the potential bias will be 
limited for several reasons. 
Firstly, as explained in detail in section 2.2.2.3 above, the chosen estimation 
strategy is robust to unobserved heterogeneity. Indeed, in a fixed-effects setting, 
56 
one only needs to consider those changes in land quality that are systematically 
associated with changes in land tenure security. 
Moreover, following the enactment of the 1993 Land Law, land rights were 
exogenously and uniformly strengthened across all plots, in particular through 
the conversion of allocated land into long-term use land. The changes in tenure 
security that were brought about by the new Land Law were considerable. It can 
be safely argued that changes in land quality that would be (i) of a similar 
magnitude and (ii) correlated with the changes in tenure security, are improbable. 
Also, the VLSS does provide household-level data on the quality of annual land 
in both survey years. The inclusion of this variable in the regression should allow 
to partly control for the impact of a potential correlation between changes in land 
quality and changes in land tenure. 
2.3.2.2 Construction of the Land Tenure Security Variable 
The land tenure security measure will be constructed as follows. For 1992, 
allocated land and auctioned land together constitute the category of land that 
embodies weak tenure security. Conversely, long-term use, private and other 
land, which are characterised by strong land tenure security, are subsumed into 
another category that embodies the strong tenure right category. Similarly in 
1998, households have weaker land tenure security on contract land, whilst 
greater tenure security is associated with long-term use land and other land, 
which are included into the strong tenure right category. 
Table 2-3: Constructing the land tenure variable using tenure categories 
from the VLSS 
Land tenure variable 	1992 	 1998 
Weak tenure rights 66 
 Strong tenure rights 
Allocated land 
Auctioned land 
Long-term use land 
Private land 
Other land 
Contract land 
Long-term use land 
Other land 
66 Rented land is also included in the weak tenure security category because in 1992, the VLSS questionnaire 
collected data on rented land separately from the other land tenure categories. 
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2.3.2.3 Change in Land Tenure Security Rights (Weak Right Category) 
As shown in Table 2-4 and Figure 2-7 below, the 1993 Land Law converted 
allocated land into long-term use land. In Figure 2-7, the x-axis shows the 
proportion of land under weak tenure right in 1992 and the y-axis shows the 
change in weak tenure rights between 1992 and 1998. Households with weak 
tenure rights experienced an increase in tenure security that was proportional to 
their share of owned land under the weak tenure right category. A smaller 
number of households saw a decline in their security of tenure as indicated by 
the data point above the 0 line on the y-axis. Those households are concentrated 
in the North Central Coast and to a lesser extent in the Northern Uplands. 
Table 2-4: Proportion of land under weak tenure security (mean, P50) 
Weak Right Land MEAN MEDIAN 1992 1998 1992 1998 
Northern Uplands 46.0 % 2.7 % 46.2 % 0.0 % 
Red River Delta 79.4 % 0.7 % 86.5 % 0.0 % 
North Central Coast 64.1 % 10.2 % 80.3 % 0.0 % 
South Central Coast 51.4 % 0.5 % 63.5 % 0.0 % 
Central Highlands 31.6 % 0.0 % 4.4 % 0.0 % 
South East 5.2 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 
Mekong River Delta 4.5 % 0.2 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 
Source: VLSS, rural panel household only. N= 3381 
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The breakdown of changes in land tenure rights across regions (Table 2-5 below) 
indicates that most of the variation took place in the northern regions, whilst in 
southern Vietnam, the greater part of households did not see any change in 
tenure rights except in the Central Highlands. In the northern regions, about 5 
percent of households experienced a weakening in tenure security (i.e. an 
increase in weak rights). 
Table 2-5: Change in the proportion of land under tenure right 
Weak right Increase in 
weak rights 
No change Decrease in 
weak rights 
1. Northern Uplands 
2. Red River Delta 
2 0/0 
0 % 
22 % 
5% 
76% 
94 % 
3. North Central Coast 8% 15% 77% 
4. South Central Coast 0% 33 % 67% 
5. Central Highlands 0 % 48 % 52% 
6. South East 0 % 90 % 10% 
7. Mekong River Delta 0% 89 % 10% 
Source: VLSS, rural panel household only. N= 3381 
As explained earlier (section 2.1.2.1), the difficulty to find a measure that 
captures the reality of land rights cannot be understated. In previous surveys on 
land rights, measures of land tenure security suffered from shortcoming as they 
failed to capture the social reality in which land rights were embedded (Platteau 
1992a; Singer 2000; Brasselle, Gaspart, and Platteau 2002). Measures of land 
rights are therefore likely to either understate or overstate the security of tenure 
enjoyed by landholders. 
"As a matter of fact, what appears to the external observer as precarious 
rights may actually be rather long-term entitlements in the specific context of 
these societies" (Brasselle, Gaspart, and Platteau 2002: 401). 
Due to data limitations, it has not been possible to create a variable that would 
capture a more sophisticated continuum of land rights. In particular, the weak 
and strong rights categories do not inform us on the extent to which rights are 
being actually exercised by individual households. A decomposition of land 
rights between the various transfer rights and tenure right is not available and 
issues of access and autonomy in exercising these rights that could be addressed 
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in other surveys of land rights 67 which made use of elaborate measures of land 
rights, cannot be addressed here. The chief aim here is therefore to estimate 
Equation 2-1: the impact of tenure security on long-term investment decisions. 
2.3.3 Land titling variable (using provincial cadastral data) 
In addition to the VLSS data on land tenure, land titling data at the provincial 
level were collected from the Cadastral Office in Hanoi 68 . By most accounts, the 
land use certificates (LUCs or the so-called Red Books) seem popular among the 
population and awareness of the rights attached to them seems high (CPLAR 
1998; ADB 2003a; ADB 2003b). Indeed, in principle, the LUCs are a guarantee 
of tenure security and enable the exercise of the five transfer rights granted by 
the 1993 Land Law. They also enable farmers to resort to the People's Court in 
order to solve land disputes. 
As discussed earlier, the possession of a land title can be equated with security of 
tenure only when enforcement institutions are in place and are functioning with 
impartiality. In fact, land titling represents the institutional aspect of land reform 
programmes. In Vietnam, the distribution of land titles took place at an uneven 
pace across Vietnam. As will be explained below, there is evidence that the 
variation in the speed of the issuance of land titles may be attributed to 
administrative gridlock. It could also be argued that the rate of issuance of land 
titles is indicative of the extent to which local authorities were supportive of the 
1993 Land Law. In both cases, a high (low) speed of title issuance is indicative 
of existing formal enforcement institutions that are able (not able) or willing (not 
willing) to perform the tasks of enforcing and protecting property rights. 
Therefore, the provincial land titling data capture the progress in the 
development of local law enforcement institutions that support the 
implementation of the Land Laws. 
67 Migot-Adholla, Place and Oluoch-Kosura (1993); Brasselle, Gaspart and Platteau (2002) ordered the various 
land rights in different bundles of rights. Besley (1995) counted the number of rights that households had at 
their disposal. 
68 Do and Iyer (2003) also explore the impact of the 1993 Land Law using provincial land titling data. They 
make use of a difference-in-differences estimation strategy that takes advantage of the variation across 
provinces in the issuance of land titles. Their research differs substantially from that conducted in this chapter 
both in terms of the concepts of property rights investigated and in the empirical strategy adopted to identify 
the impact of the 1993 land Law on investment incentives. 
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2.3.3.1 Progression in land registration 
Figure 2-8 shows the proportion of households holding a land title in 1992 and in 
1998, whilst Table 2-6 and Table 2-7 show the annual progression of titling 
between 1995 and 1999 by region. The distribution of the titling data indicates a 
different story than that told by the household data on land tenure. The North-
South divide becomes almost non-apparent as very few households in each 
region had titles in 1992. Ten to twenty percent of households in the southern 
regions had received land certificates in 1992. 
Figure 2-8: Proportion of rural households holding a land title (provincial 
data) 
E 1992 	 El 1998 
.8 - 
• °Northern 	North Central 	Central 	Mekong River 
Red River 	South Central 	South East 
1992 - 1998 Proportion of titled households (provincial data) 
Table 2-6: Agricultural households to whom land use certificates have been 
issued 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
(% of households) 
Northern uplands 36 % 43 % 47 % 54 % 86 % 
Red River Delta 20 % 28 % 51 % 65 % 81 % 
North Central Coast 43 % 67 `)/0 76 % 83 % 92 % 
South Central Coast 26 `)/0 55 % 66 % 74 % 90 `)/0 
Central Highlands 32 % 44 % 58 % 69 % 77 % 
Southeast 20 % 36 % 69 % 68 % 87 % 
Mekong River Delta 44 % 74 `)/0 86 % 80 % 91 % 
Vietnam 32 % 41 % 64 % 71 )`/0 87 % 
Source: General Department of Land Administration. 
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Table 2-7: Agricultural land for which land use certificates have been issued 
1995 1996 1997 	1998 1999 
(% of agricultural land) 
Northern uplands n.a. n.a. 36 `)/0 43 % 79 % 
Red River Delta 19 % 24 % 41 % 63 % 76 
North Central Coast 40 % 57 % 58 % 76 % 89 % 
South Central Coast 34 % n.a. 49 % 66 % 78 % 
Central Highlands 23 % 24 `)/0 25 % 41 % 45 % 
Southeast 20 % 30 % 39 % 67 % 64 % 
Mekong River Delta 50 % 61 % 73 % 82 % 90 % 
Vietnam n.a. n.a. 52 % 67 % 78 % 
Source: General Department of Land Administration. 
The box-whisker plots in Figure 2-9 below shows the progress in land titling by 
region. The line in the middle of the box represents the median. The upper and 
lower limits of the box indicate the 25 th to the 75th percentile of the data, whilst 
the whiskers indicate the upper and lower adjacent values. Progress in land 
titling following the 1993 Land Law was slowest in the Red River Delta, the 
Northern Uplands, and most particularly in the Central Highlands. The median 
percentage change in titling is highest in the three of the four Southern regions 
(South Central Coast, South East and Mekong River Delta). However, as 
indicated by the length of the boxes and whiskers, the spread in the titling data is 
larger in two of the three Northern regions. 
Figure 2-9: Changes in land titling by region (using provincial data) 
t cprovtitles 
1 
T T 
T 
O 
O 
.004804 
Northern Upland 	North Central Coast 	Central Highlands 	Mekong River DE 
Red River Delta 	South Central Coast 	South East 
Change in the proportion of households with a land certificate 92-98 
O 
	 O 
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2.3.3.2 Exploiting the changes in the land titling variable between 
1992 and 1998 
As seen earlier (see Figure 2-4 above), by and large, the allocation of agricultural 
land was completed soon after the enactment of the 1993 Land Law. Together 
with the allocation of land, land users were informed of the main provisions of 
the Land Law. However, the issuance of land use certificates (LUCs or the so-
called Red Books) took place at an uneven pace throughout Vietnam. Exploiting 
the variations in land titling intensity across provinces by combining provincial-
level data with household-level data raises several issues. 
Firstly, titling data are clustered at the provincial level, which is the highest 
administrative level in Vietnam. There are 61 provinces and the level of 
aggregation of the titling data is therefore sizeable. For that reason, one may 
obtain insignificant results that are more indicative of the lack of variation in 
titling data at the household level, than the result of an absence of impact of 
tenure security on investment behaviour. However, one advantage of using 
provincial data is that titling data can be taken more directly as exogenous at the 
household level and will therefore yield more robust results. 
Notwithstanding the scale of the aggregation of the data at hand, the problem of 
omitted variable is likely to be serious if the allocation of land titles was not 
random but was correlated with the progression of other omitted programs at the 
provincial level, or was endogenous to households' decisions. Indeed, both 
demand and supply factors may explain the slow progress in the distribution of 
land titles. On the supply side, the procedures for the registration of land and the 
issuance of LUCs are lengthy and complex, involving several layers of 
administration at the provincial, district and communal levels. The procedures 
are as follows: farmers apply for LUCs; their applications are assessed by the 
Land Registration Council at the commune level and the decision to issue the 
land titles is taken by the People's Committee at the District or Provincial level. 
On the demand side, land registration procedures require that farmers apply for 
and contribute a fee to obtain the LUCs. The cost of land titling for individual 
farmers has been identified as one reason why some farmers were not interested 
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in receiving LUCs (CPLAR 1998) 69 . Anecdotal evidence7° also suggests that 
leasing and land transactions are taking place without being duly registered both 
in North and South Vietnam. This reluctance to register land transactions has 
been attributed to high taxation on land transactions 71 and cumbersome 
administrative red tape. Hence, the speed in land registration may depend on 
both provincial characteristics and on household's wealth. 
Evaluations of Vietnam's land administration and registration programme 
attribute the slow progress in land titling to administrative deadlock and the lack 
of adequate technology and funding (CPLAR 1998; Anzdec Limited 2000). 
Also, in 1998, the Government issued Directive 10 (1998/CT-TTg) in order to 
speed up the registration of land 72 . The 2004 Land Law stipulates a new deadline 
to finalise the distribution of LUCs. The progress in the distribution between 
1993 and 1998 and the marked increase in the speed of issuance of LUCs at the 
provincial level that followed the enactment of Directive 10 seem to indicate that 
supply factors are chiefly responsible for the delays in land registration. 
The robustness of the estimation strategy rests on whether adequate solutions are 
found in order to control for the potential endogeneity of both the land tenure 
and the land title variables. Indeed, if land rights (captured by either measure) 
were to be correlated with unobserved variables, coefficients would be biased. 
This problem could be more severe when using data on land titling as households 
with better endowments, better social capital, or better quality plots may put 
more effort and resources to obtain land titles. 
69 A survey by CPLAR (1998) indicates that costs for LUCs were considered high by land users in remote and 
mountainous areas (e.g. Lao Cai in the Northern Uplands). 
70 Personal communication with the Central Cadastral Office in Hanoi. 
71 Decree 04 and Decree 17 enacted in 1998 and 1999 regulate the implementation of the five land transfer 
rights. Among the amendments is a decrease from 10 percent to 2 percent in the tax on agricultural land 
transactions. 
n According to the decree, the issuance of LUCs had to be finalised in 1998 for plain areas, and before the end 
of 1999 for other areas. 
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2.3.4 Control Variables 
Fixed-effects techniques have been chosen because they are particularly robust to 
unobserved regional and individual heterogeneity bias. Time-invariant 
unobserved heterogeneity is taken care of through first-differencing, and only 
time-varying factors that are correlated with any of our two measures of land 
rights and with investment need to be controlled for. 
The analysis of survey data on land tenure showed that the omitted variable bias 
is mitigated by the fact that the change in land tenure status in Vietnam was 
largely determined through an exogenous process. This is confirmed 
econometrically in a recent study by Ravallion and van de Walle (Ravallion and 
van de Walle 2004), who find no evidence that the recent land redistribution 
favoured wealthy or more powerful households. Hence, household-specific 
omitted variables should not be correlated with changes in tenure status and 
should leave the coefficient of interest unbiased. In any case, the first-
differencing allows to control for a wide range of potential time-invariant 
omitted variables, including spatial (provincial) or household characteristics. 
Time-variant omitted variables such as household wealth, which may determine 
access to land titling, is controlled for through proxy variables. The list of other 
control variables follows. 
Figure 2-2 and Figure 2-3 above show that a sizeable proportion of land in 
several regions (particularly in the Red River Delta) was redistributed after 1993. 
Anthropological accounts of the land reforms in Vietnam report that changes in 
household size were the main determining factors in the allocation rule during 
the decollectivisation period73 . In turn, household size and the number of 
working members in a household are likely to also influence investment 
decisions. Hence, it is necessary to control for changes in household size. The 
ratio of adults to children within a household (the dependency ratio) was also 
introduced as a control variable but does not appear to be significant. 
73 Spijkers (1984); Chu Van Lam (1992); Hy V. Luong (1992); Tran Duc (1992); Le and Rambo (1993); Phan and 
Nguyen (1994); Tran Duc (1994); Bergeret (1995); Nguyen Sinh Cuc (1995a); Pillot (1995); Institut National des 
Sciences Agronomiques du Vietnam and GRET - Programme Fleuve Rouge (1996); Le, et al. (1996); Tran 
Hoang Kim (1996); Hartingh (1997); Lam Quang Huyen (1997); Dao The Anh (1998); Jesus and Anh (1998); 
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Not all land can be converted out of rice production, and the choice to diversify 
away from rice into perennial cropping may be influenced by ecological 
constraints, differential access to reliable irrigation and availability of adequate 
technology. This would cause spurious results if those characteristics were also 
correlated with the variation in land tenure security captured by the main 
explanatory variable. Ecological constraints are largely time-invariant and will 
be swiped away through first-differencing. Time-varying regional characteristics 
that are controlled for comprise distance to markets, agricultural investment 
programmes (irrigation, roads), and rice and perennial crop prices. 53 percent 
and 38 percent of households live in communes where new roads and new 
irrigation infrastructure respectively were built or improved within the past 5 
years. Distance to market, both by increasing operating costs and by making it 
more difficult to obtain timely access to market information will have an impact 
on investment decisions. Interpreting the impact of this variable on investment 
behaviour is complicated by the fact that distance to markets actually lengthened 
on average between 1992 and 1998. An increase in distance to markets between 
1992 and 1998 may be a reflection of increased road access and transportation 
accessibility. A dummy for natural disasters that occurred within the past five 
years is also introduced, as disaster are likely to greatly influence investment 
decisions. 
Systematic differences in the initial ecological conditions in which each 
household is situated will affect the magnitude of the effects that is being 
measured. Areas with ecological conditions that are more suitable for growing 
perennial crops will experience higher amounts of investment. Changes in the 
strengthening in land rights or land titling may be more prevalent in those 
regions where perennial crops are grown in greater quantity. If these regional 
characteristics were constant over time, the fixed effects would absorb this. 
However, a spurious result would obtain if regional characteristics and 
opportunities to invest for farmers living in areas where land rights were 
strengthened had evolved differently than for the rest of the farming population. 
For example, this may be a particular concern in the Central Highlands, where 
Tran Thi Que (1998); Hoang Viet (1999); Sikor (1999); Truong (1999); Gironde (2001); Sikor (2001b); ibid. 
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the liberalisation of agricultural export markets and booming world coffee prices 
in 1995 triggered a substantial increase in the cultivation of coffee. One would 
wish to control for this by using commune data on the proportion of land planted 
to perennial crops (this would also control for knowledge spillover effects at the 
commune level). Unfortunately, misreporting in the commune level data (in the 
VLSS commune questionnaire) does not allow this. I resort to aggregating 
household data and calculating the mean proportion of perennial land at the 
commune level75 . 
Inter-households differences in investments may be associated with differences 
in household land endowments. Total cultivated land size can be included as a 
control variable on the right hand side of the final equation to be estimated. 
Alternatively, the investment measure can be scaled directly and become the 
proportion of land planted to perennials 76 . 
In either case, because plot-by-plot data is not available in 1992, it has not been 
possible to control for the acquisitions of new plots of land. The VLSS indicated 
a relatively low incidence of land acquisitions in 1998: about 6 percent of 
households are reported to have transferred land. However, anecdotal evidence 
from newspapers and my own discussion with the director of the cadastral office 
in Hanoi indicates that a substantial number of transactions may remain 
undeclared. This means that the amount of investment will be overstated if the 
investment is made on newly acquired land, and if other unobserved factors 
correlated with both the acquisition of new plots and land rights drive the 
decision to invest. 
(2001a); Tanaka (2001); Sikor (2002) 
74 90 percent of Vietnam's coffee area is concentrated in the Central Highlands. By 1999, coffee was the second 
largest export after rice and earned $592 million in export revenues (against $1 billion for rice exports). 
75 However, this variable may introduce what has been termed by Manski (1993) a 'reflection problem', caused 
by the simultaneity between an individual's decision to invest and aggregate investments by individuals at 
the commune level. By most account, the reflection problem is rather intractable as it is very difficult to find an 
instrumental variable that would affect aggregate decisions independently from individual ones. An 
alternative specification that would help control for the regional effects just described would be to introduce 
regional dummies interacted with the 1998 time dummy instead of the former variable. This alternative 
specification has the disadvantage to absorb variations in the impact of land policies across regions and would 
only exploit variations in land policies within regions. This could be particularly costly when estimating the 
impact of land titling using provincial land titling data. I am deeply grateful to Dr. Dominique Van de Walle 
and Professor Oliver Linton for pointing out and discussing this issue with me. 
76 Alston, Libecap and Mueller (1999) also use the proportion of the farm placed in improved pasture and 
permanent crops (cacao, pepper, citrus). 
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2.3.5 Choice of Estimator: Tobit Random Effects and Tobit Fixed 
Effects 
The measure of long-term investment exhibits a high censoring probability at 0. 
About 32 percent of panel households in 1992 (13 percent in 1998) had not 
planted perennials or fruit trees Similarly, 14 percent and 8 percent of panel 
households in 1992 and 1998 had no non-rice land 77 . Tobit will therefore be the 
preferred estimation technique. 
However, Tobit is particularly non robust to the violation of the assumption that 
the error term is normally distributed. In addition, when one adds fixed effects, 
Tobit maximum likelihood estimation methods (random effects) will be 
inconsistent even when the distribution of the error is correctly specified (Honore 
1992; Chay and Powell 2001). Bo Honore devised a semi-parametric estimator 
for censored regression models with fixed effects that is robust to the violation of 
the normality of the error term and allows the use of fixed effects (Honore 
1992) 78 . This estimator called Pantob estimates a Tobit Fixed-Effects for a two-
year panel and, unlike OLS or Tobit, does not require distributional assumptions 
on the error term in order to obtain consistent and asymptotically normal 
estimators. Therefore, Pantob is our preferred estimator79 . However, because 
Pantob does not make any assumption on the distribution of the error term, 
marginal effects cannot be estimated. The Pantob results are therefore only 
indicative of the sign and significance of the conditional effects. 
77 That is, the nature of the data indicates a corner solution model. In the words of Wooldridge (2003: 516), the 
corner solution model is such that "y takes on the value of zero with positive probability but is a continuous 
random variable over strictly positive values". Using OLS would therefore be inappropriate as "E(y I X) is 
unlikely to be linear in X, partial effects are unlikely to be constant over the range of X values, and predictive 
values can be negative". 
78 Pantob is recommended by Baltagi (2001) and was used in recent papers by Bardhan and Mookherjee (2003) 
and Quisumbing and Otsuka (2001). 
79 Pantob provides estimates by minimising either the least squares or the least absolute deviation of the 
errors. Whilst the estimation procedure that minimises the least-absolute deviations of the error terms is 
robust to the influence of large values or outliers, convergence is often achieved only with large bandwidth. 
Therefore, least squares results only are reported. 
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2.3.6 Summary of the Estimation Strategy 
Following Chay and Powell (2001), several estimators were computed in order 
to check for the sensitivity of the results to identifying assumptions, using casual 
comparisons of coefficient estimates and standard errors. 
(i) OLS first-differences with commune clustering; 
(ii) Tobit Random Effects with commune dummies in order to control for as 
many omitted factors as possible; 
(iii) Pantob (Tobit Fixed Effects) using the quadratic loss function. 
Three sets of regression are presented. 
(A) Set A includes the land tenure variable using survey data (the proportion 
of cultivated land under the weak right category); 
(B) Set B includes the land tenure variable using provincial titling data (the 
proportion of households with a land title at the provincial level); and 
(C) Set C includes both variables. 
Results using two measures of investment as the dependent variable are also 
reported: 
(I) Panel (I) uses the amount of land planted with perennial crops; 
(II) Panel (II) uses the proportion of cultivated land that is grown with 
perennial crops. 
As Pantob only allows for left-hand side censoring at 0, it will not be possible to 
use Pantob when using measure (II) which is censored at both 0 and 1. The 
analysis of the land tenure survey data signalled the importance of a North-South 
divide in the implementation of Vietnam's land reform. As a result, results are 
reported for three samples 80 : 
(a) the full sample of panel households; 
(b) the sample of panel households living in northern Vietnam (i.e. households 
living in the Northern Uplands, the Red River Delta and North Central 
Coast); and 
8° The analysis was also conducted for each region. However, the sample size drops for which the sample size 
was large enough to yield significant results: the three regions in North Vietnam (the Northern Uplands, the 
Red River Delta and the North Central Coast), and two regions in South Vietnam (the South Central Coast and 
the Mekong River Delta). 
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(c) the sample of panel households living in southern Vietnam (South Central 
Coast, Central Uplands, South East and Mekong River Delta). 
2.4 Establishing Quasi-Private Property Rights: Results and 
Interpretation 
The definition of, and descriptive statistics for all the variables used in the final 
specification are provided in Appendices (Section 2.6.1 and Section 2.6.2). Table 
2-8 below reports the main results for Vietnam and for North and South Vietnam 
(the full set of tables can be found in the Appendices, Section 2.6.3, on page 81). 
Large differences in point estimates between the three different estimations do 
not come as a surprise. Firstly, OLS does not take into account the censoring of 
the data and hence yields downward-biased coefficients. Moreover, it is verified 
that the Gauss-Markov assumptions are violated (heteroskedasticity and non 
normality of the errors). Secondly, substantial differences between the maximum 
likelihood and the semi-parametric results (Pantob) suggest that non-normal 
errors are a non-negligible source of bias in the Tobit maximum likelihood 
estimator81 . 
Therefore, the results obtained by using the Pantob estimator will be the 
preferred ones and will provide the main basis for the discussion of the results. 
OLS results are not reported as the bias and inconsistency in the estimates appear 
so substantial as to make the results uninformative. 
Table 2-8 reports the main results for Vietnam and for North and South Vietnam. 
Estimates that are significant at the 5% or 10% significance level are highlighted 
in bold characters. Line A reports the estimates for the variable which captures 
the change in tenure security experienced by households after the enactment of 
the 1993 Land Law. The variable, labelled 'Weak right' is the share of total 
agricultural land under weak tenure rights (see the description and the analysis of 
that variable in section 2.3.2) and captures the change in tenure security induced 
by the 1993 Land Law. Line B reports the estimates for the provincial land titling 
81 The assumption on which Pantob rests is that the error terms are distributed independently and identically, 
although not necessarily symmetrically: the error variances must be stationary over time for the estimator to 
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variable. The variable, labelled 'Provincial titling' is the proportion of 
households in the province who received a land use certificate. The change in the 
land titling variable captures the extent to which local law enforcement 
institutions are supportive (either because of administrative or ideological 
reasons) of the 1993 Land Law (see section 2.3.3). Line C reports the results 
when the two variables are included in the model additively. If the two estimates 
were jointly significant, this would confirm the fact that the variables capture 
two different aspects of land property rights. 
A number of results stand out. Firstly, the strengthening in land tenure security 
had a positive and significant impact on long-term investment in North Vietnam. 
In South Vietnam, the estimate is of the expected sign and of a significant 
magnitude but it is not significant at the 10% level. Secondly, looking at the 
coefficients on the provincial land titling variable, no impact is found for the full 
sample. When disaggregating the results by region, large and positive estimates 
are obtained in North Vietnam, albeit only significant at the 10% level. Land 
titling have no impact in South Vietnam. Thirdly, both variables are jointly 
significant in North Vietnam. 
Despite the emphasis on individual entitlement to land and the abandonment of 
collective control that were decided with the 1993 Land Law, these results 
indicate a more complex working of land property relations in North and South 
Vietnam. Differences in the conception of land property rights as they evolved 
between North and South Vietnam may explain several of the outputs obtained 
here. These findings are now reviewed in detail. 
be consistent. This would not be the case if the impact of individual effects were not constant over time for a 
given household. 
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Table 2-8: Effect of tenure security and land titling on investment in 
perennials 
I. Amount of perennial crop land (m2) Full Panel Sample Panel North Panel South 
TOBIT RANDOM EFFECTS* 
coef. s.e. t coef. s.e. t coef. s.c. 
A Weak right (% of total land) -1654 225 -7.35 -1155 199 -5.81 -2151 536 -4.01 
B Provincial titling (%) 602 336 1.79 1154 269 4.29 -377 716 -0.53 
C Weak right (% of total land) -1717 232 -7.40 -1139 208 -5.46 -2277 546 -4.17 
Provincial titling (%) 752 337 2.23 1146 269 4.26 -629 717 -0.88 
TOBIT FIXED-EFFECTS (PANTOB) 
Quadratic Loss Function 
A Weak right (% of total land) -1161 437 -2.66 -1341 771 -1.74 -1562 1136 -1.38 
B Provincial titling (%) 687 480 1.43 2273 1259 1.81 -171 905 -0.19 
C Weak right (% of total land) -1252 418 -3.00 -1475 647 -2.28 -1694 1147 -1.48 
Provincial titling (%) 863 545 1.58 2479 1456 1.70 -102 916 -0.11 
* with commune dummies 
II. Proportion of perennial crop land ( %) Full Panel Sample Panel North Panel South 
TOBIT RANDOM EFFECTS* 
coef. s.e. t coef. s.e. t coef. s.e. 
A Weak right (% of total land) -0.30 0.02 -15.49 -0.25 0.02 -12.52 -0.41 0.05 -8.33 
B Provincial titling (%) 0.09 0.03 3.42 0.09 0.02 3.73 0.04 0.07 0.50 
C Weak right (% of total land) -0.28 0.02 -14.64 -0.23 0.02 -11.70 -0.37 0.05 -7.49 
Provincial titling (%) 0.12 0.03 4.30 0.08 0.02 3.53 0.01 0.07 0.13 
* with commune dummies 
2.4.1 Results 
2.4.1.1 Weak Rights (See line A) 
For North Vietnam, the coefficient of interest is unambiguously large and of the 
expected sign. However, it is significant only at the 8% level (the t-statistic is 
1.74). In the model with both variables (line C), the estimate becomes significant 
at the 3% level (the t-statistic is 2.28). 
Looking at the panel for South Vietnam, it is remarkable to obtain a coefficient 
that is both large and strongly significant when using Tobit Random Effects. 
Indeed, given limited variation in land tenure status in South Vietnam between 
1992 and 1998, one would have expected only negligible effects. This may 
signify that in the Central Highlands and the South Central Coast where prior to 
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the 1993 Land Law a significant proportion of land was under weak tenure, 
removing tenure insecurity may have had a particularly strong impact. However, 
controlling for fixed-effects with Pantob, although the point estimate remains 
large, it is not significant anymore at the 10% level. 
Although the result that strengthening land tenure had a positive impact on 
investment in South Vietnam is not robust to Pantob specification, it is somewhat 
confirmed by the last set of regressions, which uses the proportion of land 
planted with perennial crops as a measure of investment (see Table II above). 
Being a proportion, this measure is more robust to measurement errors and to the 
influence of large values. However, the model is not robust to time-variant 
unobserved heterogeneity bias. Looking at the results using Tobit RE, all 
coefficients are unambiguously large and significantly negative for the Weak 
right variable. Also, the coefficient for North Vietnam (-0.25) is much smaller in 
magnitude than for South Vietnam (-0.41). 
Therefore, two results seem to find confirmation here: (i) the strengthening in 
land tenure security had a positive and significant impact in North Vietnam; (ii) 
the large and positive impact in South Vietnam loses significance when 
controlling for fixed effects; (iii) comparing point estimates between North and 
South Vietnam (although that for South Vietnam is not robust to controlling for 
fixed effects), the impact of tenure security seems to be more muted in North 
Vietnam than in South Vietnam. 
2.4.1.2 Provincial Land Titling (See line B) 
Turning to the other measure of land rights, the proportion of households in the 
province who received land titles, one would expect insignificant results due to 
the aggregation of the land titling data and indeed, no impact is found for the full 
sample and in South Vietnam. When disaggregating the results by region, large 
and positive estimates are obtained in North Vietnam, although they are 
significant only at the 7% level (the t-statistic is 1.81). The positive impact of 
land titling in North Vietnam find support in the last set of regressions using the 
proportion of land planted with perennial crops as the dependent variable (see 
Table II). 
73 
The absence of impact in South Vietnam may be caused by the lack of variability 
in titling data at the household level. However, the impact in North Vietnam is 
remarkable since for the very same reason the estimation is bound to suffer from 
a downward bias. 
2.4.1.3 With Both Measures of Land Rights (See line C) 
When both measures of land rights are included in the Pantob model, only the 
tenure security variable is significant at the 5% level for the full sample and for 
the North Vietnam sample. Interestingly, at the 10% level, both land rights 
variables are separately and jointly significant in North Vietnam. This could 
indicate that the model with only one of the variables (set A or set B) is under-
specified and that the coefficients could suffer from an omitted variable bias. 
However, when the two variables are included, the coefficients are very similar 
to those obtained in the simpler models, indicating that the two variables (in 
first-differences) are uncorrelated. That these two variables (in first-differences) 
are weakly correlated is verified by a correlation coefficient of 0.022 and a rank 
spearman correlation coefficient of 0.026. 
2.4.1.4 Contribution of Other Factors 
Looking at the contribution of other factors in South Vietnam (see full tables in 
the appendices, section 2.6.2), it seems that the decision to engage in perennial 
cropping was negatively correlated with the availability of good quality annual 
land and with the construction of new irrigation infrastructure. This may reflect 
the fact that for those households who are endowed with good quality annual 
land and with access to irrigation, rice farming becomes a most profitable 
commercial endeavour. This is confirmed by findings by Brandt et al. (2002) of 
greater specialisation in rice farming in South Vietnam following the 
implementation of the 1986 Doi Moi economic reforms, which saw rice quota as 
well as export and trade restrictions lifted. Small size households are more prone 
to invest in perennial cropping, as indicated by the convex relationship between 
perennial investment and household size. Also, holding other factors constant, 
perennial investments are positively correlated with the construction of new 
roads and changes in prices. 
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Most control variables in the Pantob for North Vietnam are not significant, after 
controlling for the proportion of land in the commune planted to perennial crops. 
This control variable captures idiosyncratic conditions at the commune level that 
are strong determinants of perennial cropping investments. 
2.4.2 Changing the Prevailing Property Rights Paradigm 
Vietnam's agrarian history provides a striking case of diverging property right 
ideologies between the North and the South of Vietnam. The significant impact 
of both tenure security and land titling in North Vietnam and the absence of such 
an impact in South Vietnam, may be interpreted as evidence that both individuals 
and institutions used to differ substantially with respect to their attitudes to land 
property relations. Analysing differences in the conception of land rights as they 
evolved in North and South Vietnam in recent history helps explain the four 
findings obtained here: 
1. The strengthening in land tenure security had a positive and significant impact 
on long-term investment in North Vietnam. 
2. In South Vietnam, the impact is of the expected sign but not significant at the 
10% level. 
3. The impact of land titling has a weak impact in North Vietnam but no impact 
in South Vietnam. 
4. Both land rights variables are jointly significant in North Vietnam. 
2.4.2.1 Finding 1: positive and significant impact of tenure security in 
North Vietnam 
By putting exclusion rights at the centre of the definition of property rights, the 
1993 Land Law represents a potent shift in the property rights paradigm 
prevalent in North Vietnam. In the period preceding the French colonisation, 
North Vietnam had a long history of communal ownership. Village members 
were entitled to a share of village land that guaranteed basic subsistence 
requirements. To warrant access to land, households had to bestow a share of 
their output to the village community and had to perform a number of duties (e.g. 
payment of collective fees, labour contribution). In North Vietnam, tenure 
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security was therefore historically equated to the right to access land (rather than 
to the exclusive right to a specific plot of land), and to the right to claim a share 
of the product. As seen in Section 2.1, following two decades of collectivisation, 
the de-collectivisation of agriculture in the 1980s allowed a return to land 
relations as they traditionally existed in North Vietnam. Resolution 10 in 1988 
restored use and management rights to village communities and generally abided 
by a definition of land rights based on access to land rather than on exclusion 
rights. This gradual comeback to traditional property relationships in the 1980s 
can help explain the egalitarian redistribution of land that was documented in 
various case studies of North Vietnamese villages. 
Over the past 50 years, North Vietnam experienced momentous changes in its 
land tenure system. In 1993, the new Land Law aimed at establishing de jure, 
quasi- private property rights. The halt to the periodic reallocation of land and 
the stabilisation of expectations are amongst its most important contributions. 
The impact of the 1993 Land Law is therefore expected to be strongest in North 
Vietnam. Finding 1 confirms that the uncertainty on tenure security left 
unresolved under Resolution 10 negatively impacted investment incentives 82 . 
2.4.2.2 Finding 2: Positive impact of tenure security but only 
significant at the 10% level in South Vietnam 
By contrast, property rights relations in South Vietnam were critically shaped by 
the experience of the French colonialisation and evolved in a radically different 
way compared to North Vietnam (Rambo 1973). During the French colonisation, 
additional irrigation and drainage investment allowed the expansion of cultivated 
land and the establishment of a plantation system that transformed South 
Vietnam into an exporting agricultural area. The system of periodic allocation of 
communal land did not exist in South Vietnam and land rights were centred on 
exclusive private property rights. This was reinforced by Diem's land reform in 
1966, which redistributed land to smallholders. When the land collectivisation 
drive was launched after Vietnam's reunification in 1975, fierce resistance, 
82 This result is obtained despite the fact that the 1993 Land Law did not entirely dispel all uncertainty and 
continued to maintain limitations on the exercise of transfer rights. It is to be noted that the empirical test 
conducted here does not address the issue of the impact of transfer rights on investment incentives. 
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condoned by local authorities, was encountered in the South East and the 
Mekong River Delta regions (Kolko 1985). Therefore, for a long time in South 
Vietnam, the land tenure system has been based on exclusive private ownership 
rights and local institutions have been favourable to private property rights. 
This situation is well illustrated in Table 2-5, which shows that the greater part of 
households in South Vietnam did not see any change in tenure rights, and in 
Figure 2-3, which shows that South Vietnamese households received their plots 
of land well before the 1993 Land Law was enacted. Therefore, the absence of 
impact of the 1993 Land Law in South Vietnam does not come as a surprise. By 
and large, tenure security was unlikely to be of great concern. On the other hand, 
in those regions of South Vietnam where part of the land was collectivised (the 
South Central Coast and the Central Highlands), tenure concerns may have been 
greater and may help explain why the point estimate is large. 
2.4.2.3 Finding 3 and 4: Private Property Right Friendly Institutions 
Section 2.1.2.3 explained how formal land institutions (cadastral offices at the 
local level, District or Provincial authorities, People's courts), which represent 
the law enforcement capacity of the State, could influence security of tenure. 
Vietnam is still struggling to put into place functioning institutions and is 
currently making important strides to accelerate the process as evidenced by the 
enactment of the new 2004 Land Law. In section 2.3.3, it was argued that the 
provincial land titling data capture the progress (or lack thereof) in the 
development of local law enforcement institutions that support the 
implementation of the new Land Laws. The history of land property relations in 
Vietnam may lend itself to this 'institutional-private-property rights-friendliness' 
perspective. Indeed, as was just mentioned, Vietnam's agrarian history is marked 
by diverging property right ideologies between North and South Vietnam. By 
making exclusion rights central to the new definition of land rights, the 1993 
Land Law represents a potent shift in the property rights paradigm that used to 
prevail in North Vietnam. In that context, law enforcement institutions could 
play an important role in further strengthening the perceived sense of tenure 
security. This may explain why land titling has a positive effect on investment 
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incentive, and why both land tenure security and land titling are relevant and 
affect investment behaviour additively. 
An opposite institutional environment is found in South Vietnam, where 
perceptions of land rights were historically centred on exclusive property rights, 
and where local authorities have long been supportive of private property rights. 
As a result, formal institutions are unlikely to contribute to strengthen South 
Vietnamese perceived sense of tenure security per se, although they are likely to 
play an important role in facilitating land transaction, decreasing foreclosure 
costs and facilitating land mortgage activities. These long-prevailing perceptions 
of land relations help explain why land titling did not have a significant impact 
on investment incentives in South Vietnam. 
2.5 Conclusion 
The contributions of this chapter are two-fold. First, this chapter probed the 
effects on long-term investment incentives of the strengthening in tenure security 
induced by the 1993 Land Law, and found them to be positive and significant in 
North Vietnam, whilst they were only weakly significant in South Vietnam. 
Second, and more importantly may be, this analysis of the 1993 Land Law 
allowed us to examine the very process of establishing a new property rights 
system. Two distinct aspects of establishing property rights were distinguished 
and tested separately using land tenure data and provincial land titling data 
respectively: (i) the body of public rules that enable individuals to exercise 
rights; (ii) the formal institutions that enforce or protect these rights. Significant 
regional differences in our results indicated a more complex working of land 
relations and were analysed in the light of Vietnam's agrarian history, which 
provides a striking case of diverging property rights ideologies between North 
and South Vietnam. On the whole, this chapter shed light on the role of formal 
institutions in the process of establishing property rights and argued that land 
laws do not operate in a social vacuum but rather need to take into account pre-
existing attitudes towards land property relations (Sikor 2001b). Further 
discussions on the contribution of this chapter and suggestions for future avenues 
of research are provided in the conclusion of this thesis (Chapter 5). 
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2.6 Appendices 
2.6.1 Definition of Variables 
Variables 	 1992 	 1998 
Share of owned land under land tenure 	Share of owned land under land 
category "allocated land" and "auctioned tenure category "contract land". 
land" 
Share of households with titles in the province 
Share of owned land under the land 
	
Share of owned land under the 
tenure categories "long-term use land"; 	land tenure categories: "long- 
"private land" (including 5 percent 	term use land"; "other land" 
garden land); "swidden" and "other land" 
Amount of owned land planted with perennials and fruit trees (m 2) 
Proportion of owned land planted with perennials and fruit trees ( percent) 
Amount of loan from formal sources (bank, cooperatives) (`000 Dong) 
Total amount of cultivated land (m 2) 
Share of annual land of good quality (level 1 and 2 quality) 
Household size 
Number of draft animals in the farm at the start of the year (buffalo, cow) 
Dummy variable identifying households who own a bicycle 
Dummy variable identifying households who own at least one cupboard in 
the house 
Amount of expenses for dowry (VND") 
Value of farm equipment at the start of the year 
Price of fruit in the commune (from commune questionnaire) (VND) 
Price of rice in the commune (from commune questionnaire) (VND) 
Price of Nitrogen in the commune (from commune questionnaire) (VND) 
Distance to nearest market (km) 
Share of perennial land at the commune level (aggregated from household 
survey data - mean proportion at the commune level) 
0/1 dummy which indicates whether new irrigation infrastructures were 
constructed or not (commune questionnaire) 
0/1 dummy which indicates whether a new road constructed or not 
(commune questionnaire) 
Weak Right (%) 
Provincial Titling 
Strong Right (%) 
Perennial land 
Perennial share 
Formal loan 
Land cultivated 
Annual good 
quality land 
Household size 
Draft animals (#) 
Owns a bike (0/1) 
Owns a cupboard 
Dowry 
Value of farm 
equipment 
Fruit price 
Rice price 
N price 
Distance to market 
Commune 
perennial land 
New Irrigation 
New road 
83 VND: Vietnamese Dong. 
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2.6.2 Panel Sample Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2-9: VLSS Panel Descriptive Statistics 
1992 1998 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Perennial land (m2) 3366 1031 3145 0 70200 3366 1845 5765 0 134200 
Perennial land (%) 3235 0.15 0.24 0 1 3191 0.27 0.30 0 1 
Title (% hh in province) 3203 0.04 0.11 0 0.52 3203 0.54 0.30 0 1 
Weak right (% total land) 3366 0.46 0.41 0 1 3366 0.02 0.12 0 1 
Land cultivated (m2) 3366 5699 7391 0 143108 3366 6002 8640 0 134200 
Land total owned (m2) 3366 5503 7208 0 143108 3366 5845 8443 0 134200 
Annual land (m2) 3366 4388 5487 0 97150 3366 3927 5789 0 122000 
Good quality (% annual land) 3366 0.24 0.36 0 1 3366 0.28 0.39 0 1 
Perennial land (% commune land) 3366 0.11 0.16 0 0.92 3366 0.12 0.18 0 0.94 
Loan total (D) 3366 935 2721 0 79671 3366 2310 6144 0 200404 
Formal loan (D) 3366 293 1392 0 54707 3366 1319 3544 0 49645 
Informal loan (D) 3366 642 2287 0 79671 3366 992 4758 0 200404 
HH size 3366 5.10 2.12 1 25 3366 4.85 1.93 1 14 
Dependent ratio 3366 1.16 1.06 0 8 3366 1.23 1.22 0 8 
Education Head HH (years) 3366 5.91 4.04 0 21 3366 6.57 4.12 0 18 
Draft animals (#) 3366 0.55 1.23 0 30 3366 0.67 1.50 0 19 
Owns a bike (0/1) 3366 0.63 0.48 0 1 3366 0.72 0.45 0 1 
Owns a cupboard (0/1) 3366 0.51 0.50 0 1 3366 0.65 0.48 0 1 
Rooms in house (#) 3366 2.07 0.92 1 9 3366 2.33 1.04 1 8 
Dowry (D) 3366 179 889 0 15267 3366 284 1362 0 18909 
Fruit price (D) 3245 3342 2179 626 17640 3336 5466 2507 861 12083 
Nitrogen price (D) 3317 2892 461 1865 3902 3366 2111 406 240 3340 
Rice price (D) 3366 2732 379 1831 3575 3366 3019 359 1738 4118 
Distance to market 3366 1.43 2.55 0 14 3366 2.32 4.24 0 37 
New irrigation (0/1) 3366 0.00 0.00 0 0 3366 0.38 0.49 0 1 
New road (0/1) 3366 0.00 0.00 0 0 3366 0.53 0.50 0 1 
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t t perennial Coef. 	sd Coef. 	sd 
2.6.3 Results 
2.6.3.1 Pantob - Weak right 
1998 dummy 
formal loan (tn. DL 
Weak  right (% of total land) 
ultivated land (m2) 
Good quality land (% annual land) 
Commune perennial land (%) 
Household size 
Household size square 
Value of equipment (th. D) 
Draft animals (#) 
Househol owns bike (0/1) 
Household owns cupboard (0/1) 
Number of rooms 
Dowry (th. D) 
Fruit price (D) 
Rice price (D) 
Nitrogen (N) price 
Distance to market 
New irrigation investment (0/1) 
New road invesment (0/1) 
Disaster 93 (0/1) 
Disaster 98 (0/1) 
obs 
F-test 
Function Value: 
995 	572 	1.74 	849 	751 	1.13 	-36 	597 	-0.06 
0.06 	0.08 	0.72 	-0.05 	0.20 	-0.24 	0.06 	0.09 	0.74 
-1161 	437 	-2.66 	-1341 	771 	-1.74 	-1562 	1136 	-1.38 
 C 0.78 	0.08 	10.09 	0.65 	0.19 	3.46 0.82 	0.07 	12.62 
31 	468 	0.07 697 	436 	1.60 	-1137 	636 	-1.79 
8396 	1891 	4.44 	7694 	3712 	2.07 	11150 	3028 	3.68 
-350 	158 	-2.22 580 	604 	0.96 	-541 	174 	-3.12 
10 	8.58 	1.17 	-81 	60 	-1.35 21 	7 	3.09 
0.1915 	0.11 	1.72 	0.32 	0.65 	0.49 	0.17 	0.11 	1.54 
266 	177 	1.50 62 	88 	0.70 422 	225 	1.87 
-869 	277 	-3.13 	-318 	292 	-1.09 	-1225 	450 	-2.72 
531 	580 	0.92 950 	727 	1.31 -101 	562 	-0.18 
-27 	150 	-0.18 	-361 	242 	-1.49 	68 	215 	0.31 
0.31 	0.36 	0.87 	2.40 	2.98 	0.80 0.00 	0.10 	0.01 
0.02 	0.06 	0.32 0.07 	0.09 	0.79 	0.15 	0.07 	2.12 
0.12 	0.49 	0.24 	-0.04 	0.51 	-0.07 	0.78 	0.46 	1.70 
-0.03 	0.38 	-0.07 	-0.96 	0.52 	-1.86 	0.00 	0.59 	0.26 
10 	63 	0.15 -18 	84 	-0.22 139 	80 	1.74 
-614 	291 	-2.11 	-456 	581 	-0.79 	-768 	444 	-1.73 
-18 	316 	-0.06 	-1563 	631 	-2.48 	1152 	446 	2.58 
-967 	328 	-2.95 	-879 	728 	-1.21 	-1448 	476 	-3.04 
532 	297 	1.79 476 	693 	0.69 445 	574 	0.77 
3226 1851 1375 
481 76 490 
1.18E+10 	 4.67E+09 	6.03E+09 
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2.6.3.2 Pantob - Provincial Titling 
perennial land (m2) Coef. sd t Coef. sd t Coef. sd t 
1998 dummy 826 605 1.37 933 679 1.37 164 867 0.19 
Formal loan (th. D) 0.06 0.08 0,7205 -0.05 0.17 -0.30 0.07 0.08 0.79  
Provincial titling. (%) 	 687 	 480 1.43 2273 1259 1.81 -171 905 -0.19 
Cultivated land (m2) 0.78 0.08 10.14 0.65 0.19 3.51 0.82 0.07 12.63 
Good quality land (% annual land) 58 427 0.14 814 382 2.13 -1120 579 -1.94 
Commune perennial land (%) 8936 1943 4.60 10530 4914 2.14 12140 2679 4.53 
Household size -363 149 -2.44 456 424 1.08 -514 171 -3.01 
Household size square 11 8 1.32 -74 47 -1.59 19.91 7.02 2.84 
Value of equipment (th. D) 0.1978 0.11 1.83 0.31 0.61 0.50 0.17 0.10 1.64 
Draft animals (#) 251 196 1.28 34 85 0.41 468 226 2.07 
Househol owns bike (0/1) -870 318 -2.73 -232 273 -0.85 -1279 422 -3.03 
Household owns cupboard (0/1) 562 594 0.95 1053 746 1.41 -148 616 -0.24 
Number of rooms 0 139 0.00 -199 211 -0.94 73 204 0.36 
Dowry (th. D) 0.31 0.35 0.89 2.46 3.10 0.79 0.00 0.10 -0.02 
Fruit price (D) 0.06 0.05 1.12 0.04 0.07 0.53 0.17 0.07 2.39 
Rice price (D) 0.05 0.53 0.08 -0.37 0.54 -0.69 0.82 0.48 1.70 
Nitrogen (N) price -0.11 0.40 -0.27 -0.40 0.44 -0.91 0.22 0.57 0.38 
Distance to market -7 59 -0.12 -41 65 -0.63 128 84 1.52 
New irrigation investment (0/1) -596 270 -2.21 -304 482 -0.63 -631 464 -1.36 
New road invesment (0/1) 71 309 0.23 -1347 538 -2.50 1116 440 2.54 
Disaster 93 (0/1) -799 337 -2.37 -1022 646 -1.58 -1523 454 -3.35 
Disaster 98 (0/1) 331 301 1.10 444 473 0.94 474 492 0.96 
obs 3063 1713 1350 
F-test 501 115 477 
Function value 1.E+10 5.E+09 6.E+09 
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2.6.3.3 Pantob - Weak Right and Provincial Titling 
perennial Coef. sd t Coef. sd t Coef. sd t 
1998 dummy 539 663 0.81 -160 993 -0.16 151 901 0.17 
Formal loan (th. D) 0.06 0.08 0.72 -0.04 0.13 -0.28 0.06 0.09 0.74 
Weak right (% of total land) -1252 417.80 -3.00 -1475 647 -2.28 -1694 1147 -1.48 
Provincial titling(y0) ._ 863  	 545 1.58 2479 	 1456 1.70 -102 916 -0.11 
Cultivated land (m2) 0.78 0.08 10.12 0.64 0.19 3.37 0.82 0.07 12.62 
Good quality land (% annual land) -1.05 474 0.00 841 396 2.12 -1134 632 -1.79 
Commune perennial land (%) 8879 1961 4.53 11710 4941 2.37 10910 3090 3.53 
Household size -350 159 -2.21 584 576 1.01 -541 176 -3.08 
Household size square 10 9 1.16 -81 56 -1.44 21 7 3.05 
Value of equipment (th. D) 0.19 0.11 1.75 0.34 0.41 0.82 0.17 0.11 1.54 
Draft animals (#) 259 174 1.49 56 147 0.38 421 223 1.89 
Househol owns bike (0/1) -915 299 -3.06 -241 288 -0.84 -1232 453 -2.72 
Household owns cupboard (0/1) 574 597 0.96 1215 779 1.56 -73 609 -0.12 
Number of rooms -20 149 -0.13 -321 237 - 1.36 77 219 0.35 
Dowry (th. D) 0.33 0.36 0.90 2.51 3.03 0.83 0.00 0.10 0.00 
Fruit price (D) 0.04 0.06 0.75 0.05 0.13 0.39 0.15 0.07 2.20 
Rice price (D) 0.15 0.51 0.30 -0.12 0.50 -0.24 0.83 0.47 1.76 
Nitrogen (N) price -0.05 0.40 -0.13 -0.80 0.48 - 1.68 0.14 0.61 0.23 
Distance to market 19.86 63.51 0.31 -7.58 71.19 -0.11 138 86 1.62 
New irrigation investment (0/1) -631 290 -2.18 -221 349 -0.63 -847 479 -1.77 
New road invesment (0/1) 30 325 0.09 -1571 637 -2.47 1122 441 2.54 
Disaster 93 (0/1) -943 332 -2.84 -971 739 - 1.31 -1426 476 -3.00 
Disaster 98 (0/1) 370 338 1.09 461 615 0.75 207 570 0.36 
Number of observations 3063 1713 1350 
F-test 482 105 503 
Function Value: 1.E+10 5.E+09 6.E+09 
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2.6.3.4 Tobit RE - Share of perennial land - Weak Right 
perennial Coef. se z Coef. se z Coef. se 
1998 dummy 0.093 0.027 3.46 -0.036 0,029 -1.21 0.232 0.057 4.10 
Formal loan (th. D) 0.000 0.000 2.27 0.000 0.000 2.11 0.000 0.000 1.30 
Weak right Ky.) -0.296 0.019 -15.49 -0.254 0.020 -12.52 -0.413 0.050 -8.33 
Good quality land (% annual land) -0.285 0.016 -17.63 -0.196 0.016 -12.56 -0.427 0.034 -12.57 
Commune perennial land (%) 0.469 0.090 5.20 0.240 0.098 2.45 0.629 0.185 3.41 
Household size -0.055 0.006 -8.99 -0.079 0.008 -9.47 -0.057 0.011 -5.02 
Household size square 0.003 0.000 6.39 0.006 0.001 7.60 0.003 0.001 3.55 
Value of equipment (th. D) 0.000 0.000 -3.46 0.000 0.000 -1.83 0.000 0.000 -2.37 
Draft animals (#) -0.013 0.004 -3.52 -0.012 0.004 -3.34 -0.017 0.008 -2.07 
Househol owns bike (0/1) -0.036 0.011 -3.17 -0.022 0.010 -2.15 -0.053 0.026 -2.04 
Household owns cupboard (011) 0.027 0.010 2.68 0.034 0.009 3.88 0.008 0.026 0.30 
Number of rooms 0.013 0.005 2.61 0.009 0.005 1.79 0.013 0.011 1.23 
Dowry (th. D) 0.000 0.000 0.39 0.000 0.000 2.96 0.000 0.000 -1.56 
Fruit price (D) 0.000 0.000 1.45 0.000 0.000 1.15 0.000 0.000 3.24 
Rice price (D) 0.000 0.000 4.15 0.000 0.000 4.38 0.000 0.000 2.57 
Nitrogen (N) price 0.000 0.000 0.15 0.000 0.000 -4.78 0.000 0.000 2.33 
Distance to market 0.017 0.003 5.26 0.013 0.003 4.24 0.023 0.007 3.17 
New irrigation investment (0/1) -0.046 0.017 -2.69 -0.012 0.016 -0.76 -0.183 0.040 -4.59 
New road invesment (0/1) -0.027 0.018 -1.54 -0.078 0.016 -5.05 0.035 0.042 0.83 
Disaster 93 (0/1) -0.042 0.017 -2.44 0.003 0.017 0.19 -0.166 0.041 -4.02 
Disaster 98 (0/1) 0.014 0.017 0.79 0.053 0.016 3.23 -0.064 0.040 -1.62 
constant 0.189 0.085 2.22 0.578 0.080 7.26 0.781 0.209 3.75 
/sigma_u 0.073 0.081 0.008 9.71 0.097 
/sigma_e 0.303 0.004 82.42 0.004 50.21 0.424 0.009 48.32 
rho 0.055 0.135 0.027 0.050 
obs 6562 3793 2769 
F-test 4254 2655 1428 
Log likelihood -2877 -459 -1889 
uncensored obs. 4377 2776 1601 
left-censored obs. 1533 861 672 
right-censored obs. 652 156 496 
C41.4.1){.M71:1111 1W6t1II.0711V 
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2.6.3.5 Tobit RE - Share of perennial land - Provincial Titling 
Arixgolatia tioNt13 
  
_ 
perenns Coef. se z Coef. se z Coef. se 
1998 dummy 0.120 0.030 4.02 0.098 0.026 3.74 0.220 0.072 3.05 
Formal loan (th. Di 0.000 0.000 1.57 	 0.000  0.000 	2.18 0.000 0.000 0.97 
Provincial titling (%) 0.095 0.028 3.42 	 0.087 0.023 3.73 0.035 0.070 0.50 
Good quality land ("/0 annual land) -0.268 µ 0.017 -16.20 -0.162 0.016 -10.13 -0.413 0.034 -12.31 
Commune perennial land (%) 0.480 0.091 5.30 0.413 0.094 4.40 0.801 0.185 4.33 
Household size -0.061 0.006 -9.96 -0.084 0.008 -10.04 -0.063 0.011 -5.63 
Household size square 0.004 0.000 7.41 0.006 0.001 8.08 0.003 0.001 4.16 
Value of equipment (th. D) 0.000 0.000 -3.69 0.000 0.000 -2.74 0.000 0.000 -2.30 
Draft animals (#) -0.014 0.004 -3.81 -0.014 0.003 -4.04 -0.016 0.008 -1.92 
Househol owns bike (0/1) -0.036 0.011 -3.17 -0.019 0.010 -1.86 -0.059 0.026 -2.31 
Household owns cupboard (0/1) 0.033 0.010 3.21 0.037 0.009 4.23 0.003 0.026 0.13 
Number of rooms 0.015 0.005 3.07 0.015 0.005 3.23 0.014 0.011 1.30 
Dowry (th. D) 0.000 0.000 -0.60 0.000 0.000 1.80 0.000 0.000 -1.79 
Fruit price (D) 0.000 0.000 4.61 0.000 0.000 1.50 0.000 0.000 4.20 
Rice price (D) 0.000 0.000 1.76 0.000 0.000 3.91 0.000 0.000 2.51 
Nitrogen (N) price 0.000 0.000 -0.77 0.000 0.000 -3.86 0.000 0.000 1.91 
Distance to market 0.009 0.003 2.97 0.008 0.003 2.82 0.015 0.007 2.14 
New irrigation investment (0/1) -0.038 0.017 -2.21 0.013 0.015 0.88 -0.176 0.040 -4.44 
New road invesment (0/1) 0.021 0.017 1.19 -0.042 0.014 -2.88 0.062 0.042 1.48 
Disaster 93 (0/1) -0.021 0.017 -1.18 -0.029 0.017 -1.76 -0.190 0.042 -4.57 
Disaster 98 (0/1) 0.005 0.017 0.30 0.025 0.015 1.60 0.014 0.038 0.36-- 
constant 1.032 0.117 8.84 0.198 0.078 2.55 0.005 0.242 0.02 
/sigma_u 0.078 0.095 0.007 14.47 0.101 
/sigma_e 0.297 0.004 80.36 0.190 0.004 50.08 0.417 0.009 48.07 
rho 0.064 0.199 0.026 0.055 
obs 6236 3517 2719 
F-test 3963 2474 1395 
Log likelihood -2685 -287 -1837 
uncensored obs. 4243 2647 1596 
left-censored obs. 1383 740 643 
right-censored obs. 610 130 480 
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2.6.3.6 Tobit RE - Share of perennial land - Weak Right and 
Provincial Titling 
perennial Coef. se z Coef. se z Coef. se 
1998 dummy 0.041 0.030 1.38 -0.046 0.029 -1.56 0.226 0.072 3.16 
Formal loatilth. D 0.000 0.000 2.37 0.000  0.000 2.37 0.000 0.000 1.31 
Weak right (% of total land) -0.279 0.019 -14.64 -0.231 0.020 -11.70 -0.370 0.049 -7.49 
Provincial titling . (%)  0.119  0.028 	4.30 0.084 0.024 3.53 0.009 0.069 0.13 
Good quality land (% annual land) -0.267 0.016 -16.36 -0.156 0.016 -9.89 -0.418 0.033 -12.58 
Commune perennial land (%) 0.517 0.090 5.77 0.318 0.096 3.33 0.641 0.184 3.48 
Household size -0.056 0.006 -9.28 -0.079 0.008 -9.63 -0.060 0.011 -5.40 
Household size square 0.003 0.000 6.68 0.006 0.001 7.73 0.003 0.001 3.87 
Value of equipment (th. D) 0.000 0.000 -3.48 0.000 0.000 -1.77 0.000 0.000 -2.33 
Draft animals (#) -0.013 0.004 -3.43 -0.012 0.003 -3.49 -0.015 0.008 -1.90 
Househol owns bike (0/1) -0.034 0.011 -3.06 -0.019 0.010 -1.91 -0.056 0.025 -2.21 
Household owns cupboard (0/1) 0.028 0.010 2.69 0.036 0.009 4.18 0.004 0.025 0.15 
Number of rooms 0.014 0.005 2.81 0.011 0.005 2.41 0.011 0.011 1.09 
Dowry (th. D) 0.000 0.000 -0.43 0.000 0.000 1.82 0.000 0.000 -1.59 
Fruit price (D) 0.000 0.000 2.01 0.000 0.000 1.08 0.000 0.000 3.27 
Rice price (D) 0.000 0.000 3.18 0.000 0.000 3.62 0.000 0.000 2.53 
Nitrogen (N) price 0.000 0.000 0.03 0.000 0.000 -4.31 0.000 0.000 2.27___ 
Distance to market 0.018 0.003 5.65 0.016 0.003 5.24 0.022 0.007 3.13 
New irrigation investment (0/1) -0.053 0.017 -3.10 -0.015 0.015 -1.00 -0.180 0.039 -4.58 
New road invesment (0/1) -0.027 0.017 -1.56 -0.080 0.015 -5.27 0.036 0.041 0.88 
Disaster 93 (0/1) -0.044 0.017 -2.54 -0.014 0.017 -0.83 -0.166 0.041 -4.03 
Disaster 98 (0/1) 0.020 0.017 1.14 0.064 0.016 3.95 -0.055 0.039 -1.42 
constant 0.974 0.115 8.45 0.267 0.078 3.41 0.168 0.239 0.70 
/sigma_u 0.073 0.076 0.008 9.48 0.099 
/sigma_e 0.294 0.004 81.17 0.193 0.004 49.09 0.412 0.009 48.20 
rho 0.058 0.135 0.028 0.054 
obs 6236 3517 2719 
F-test 4224 2646 1459 
Log likelihood -2580 -215 -1809 
uncensored obs. 4243 2647 1596 
left-censored obs. 1383 740 643 
right-censored obs. 610 130 480 
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Chapter 3 - Education and Agricultural 
Productivity in Vietnam 
3.0 Introduction 
Between 1947 and 1975, Vietnam fought two wars, against France between 1947 
and 1954, and against America between 1960 and 1975, which cost the lives of 
about 2.8 million soldiers and civilians and saw the destruction of hundreds of 
villages and the displacement of thousands of people. Nevertheless, the legacy of 
20 years of war was not only one of destruction and suffering, but also one of 
important socio-economic changes. In particular, in the midst of tremendous 
economic hardship and political turmoil, Vietnam succeeded in dramatically 
increasing its overall literacy and numeracy levels. As a result, at the start of its 
agricultural liberalisation period in the late 1980s, Vietnam benefited from a 
labour force that was largely literate. 
The 1990s represent a period of very rapid economic changes for Vietnam. 
Agricultural markets were gradually liberalised, import quotas for agricultural 
inputs were lifted and new agricultural technologies became available to farmers 
(Goletti and Minot 1997a; Goletti and Minot 1997b; Goletti, Minot, and Berry 
1997). In turn, Vietnam's unprecedented agricultural growth rates during the 
1990s were largely obtained through greater adoption of yield-increasing 
technology (fertilisers) and more intensive application of labour (Pingali and 
Xuan 1992; Wiens 1998; Benjamin and Brandt 2004). 
The role of education in the process of economic development remains little 
understood. Nevertheless, literacy and numeracy are understood to be important 
pre-conditions for agricultural growth and poverty reduction (Ravallion and Datt 
2002). What role did education play in promoting agricultural growth and 
poverty reduction in Vietnam? In Section 3.1, I examine the channels through 
which education is thought to enhance agricultural productivity and explore 
whether Vietnam's high levels of educational attainment at the start of its 
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agricultural liberalisation period constituted the pre-conditions to attain the 
remarkably high agricultural growth rates it achieved during the 1990s (Goletti 
and Minot 1997b; World Bank 1999). 
The contribution of this chapter is two-fold. First, it sheds light on the 
circumstances that allowed Vietnam to emerge from thirty years of war with 
literacy and numeracy levels that are normally achieved by middle-income 
countries such as Thailand or Indonesia. Secondly, it makes use of exogenous 
variations in education between North and South Vietnam to devise an 
instrumental variable strategy, which controls for the endogeneity of education, 
and estimates the effect of various indicators of educational attainment on rice 
productivity. 
The results found here confirm the importance of literacy and numeracy skills as 
pre-conditions for agricultural growth. Higher levels of skills also matter 
significantly with literacy and holding upper secondary degrees increasing rice 
yields by 38 percent and 31 percent respectively. 
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 explains how the goal of 
achieving universal literacy, announced by Ho Chi Minh in 1945 after Vietnam's 
declaration of independence in 1945, became an integral part of the guerrilla 
tactics put into place by the Viet Minh during the war. I document how in midst 
of tremendous hardship, Vietnam succeeded in bringing about quasi-universal 
literacy in North Vietnam and greater parity in male and female primary 
education levels. The gap in educational attainment between North and South 
Vietnam can be traced back to Vietnam's partition in 1954 and to the 
implementation of differential educational policies between 1954 and 1975. In 
Section 3.3, exogenous variations in various indicators of educational attainment 
due to the partition of Vietnam between North and South Vietnam are exploited 
in order to empirically assess the effect of education on agricultural productivity. 
Results are presented and discussed in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 concludes. 
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3.1 Education and Rural Development 
At the start of its agricultural reform period in the early 1980s, Vietnam 
benefited from a rural labour force that was largely literate. The existence of a 
causal relationship flowing from human capital to economic growth remains 
intensely debated both theoretically and empirically (Topel 1999), and despite 
"fifty years of Mincer earnings regressions" (Heckman, Lochner, and Todd 
2003), how schooling contributes to increase earnings remains little understood. 
Nevertheless, there are several channels through which education is thought to 
enhance agricultural productivity, and may have played an important role in 
generating the increase in agricultural productivity that led Vietnam to become 
the world's third largest rice exporter by 1996 (Goletti, Minot, and Berry 1997). 
Theoretically, macroeconomic models of endogenous growth postulate that 
human capital, together with physical capital and technical progress, are 
components of economic growth 84, with human capita1 85 emerging as a key 
factor in economic development more recently (Lucas 1988), prompting some to 
take the view that "differences in per capita incomes across countries reflect 
differences in the ability to apply technologies that are, in a general sense, 
already broadly known" (Topel 1999). Recent studies of the determinants of 
growth for eight East Asian countries, which experimented unprecedented spells 
of economic growth during the 1960s and the 1970s 86, show that most of the 
growth came from the accumulation of physical and human capital, of which 
growth in (primary) educational attainment was the largest contributor (Young 
1995; Ray 1998: 121). Importantly also, others argued that it is the stock rather 
than the change in human capital that determines growth (Nelson and Phelps 
1966). Hence, initial levels of education condition subsequent patterns of growth. 
At the micro level, education may contribute to efficiency through a variety of 
channels. First, education may have a direct impact on individuals' labour 
productivity, ability for innovation and propensity to adopt new technologies 
84 See the review of growth models presented by Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997). 
85 Cross-country studies show that higher initial levels of education are associated with higher subsequent 
growth rates of per capital GDP. See table 1 in Bils and Klenow (2000). 
86 Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Indonesia 
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(Foster and Rosenzweig 1996a; Knight, Weir, and Woldehanna 2003). Secondly, 
education may also have an indirect impact through positive externalities 
generated through imitation or through the exchange of ideas (Lucas 1988; Lucas 
1993). It is the first effect that is going to interest us in this chapter. 
Specifically, in agriculture, education is expected to enhance growth in several 
ways: (i) by improving technical and allocative efficiency in farming (Fafchamps 
and Quisumbing 1998; Weir 1999; Schultz 2003b and the literature cited 
therein), (ii) by increasing the ability to become early adopters of technology 
(Weir and Knight 2004); (iii) by raising the ability to make better use of 
technology, once technology is adopted 87 . In the latter case, it is primary 
schooling rather than higher levels education that has been found to raise the 
returns to technology (Jamison and Moock 1984; Foster and Rosenzweig 1996b; 
Weir 1999; Weir and Knight 2004). Farm returns to education are also generally 
higher in the presence of technical progress (Jamison and Lau 1982). Likewise, 
education may also impact an individual's choice of economic activities as well 
as the incomes generated by the chosen activities (Taylor and Yunez-Naude 
2000). 
Evidence on the causal impact of education on farm productivity as compiled by 
Lockheed, Jamison and Lau (1980) is mixed with important variations across 
countries and across regions. However, by and large, education seems to have 
had a positive impact on farm productivity in Asia, although the empirical 
evidence is less conclusive in other regions (Africa and Latin America) 88 . 
Empirically, attempts at measuring the impact of education and earnings span an 
enormous empirical literature 89 and have been fraught with methodological 
difficulties90 . The foremost estimation issue has been the failure to control for the 
correlation between education and omitted factors such as individual ability, 
87Also, education generates positive externalities with less educated individuals imitating (more educated) 
first adopters. The existence of positive externalities from human capital as described by Ray (1998); Topel 
(1999) is contested by Heckman and Klenow (1997). 
88 All these results need to be assessed in the light of estimation problems discussed by Heckman and Vytlacil 
(2000) and Angrist and Krueger (1999). 
89 See the extensive review provided by Heckman, Lochner and Todd (2003) called "Fifty Years of Mincer 
Earnings Regressions", who review and critique the extensive body of empirical work on the wage returns of 
human capital using standard Mincerian models that regress the logarithm of wages on years of schooling. 
See also Harmon, Oosterbeek and Walker (2003). 
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family or class background, which themselves affect earnings, generating biased 
estimates of the impact of education on earnings (Card 1999). The endogeneity 
of education is likely to be a particularly salient problem in developing countries, 
where individuals face considerable liquidity and other institutional constraints 
that influence both their levels of schooling and dependent variables such as 
earnings or productivity. These estimation issues are discussed in detail in the 
empirical part of this chapter, in Section 3.3. 
The main findings from a world-wide compilation of Mincerian returns to 
education by Psacharopoulos (1994; 2002) over recent decades are that the 
returns of education on earnings are sizeable (about 6-10 percent), larger in 
developing countries compared to industrialised countries, and that they are 
larger at lower levels of education. In addition, in socialist and formerly socialist 
countries (China and Vietnam, the former USSR), returns are found to be 
considerably lower than in other countries at less than 5 percent, according to 
(Moock, Patrinos, and Venkataraman 2003; de Brauw and Rozelle 2004; Gallup 
2004). 
In Section 3.2, I show that at the start of its agricultural transition period in the 
early 1980s, Vietnam's agricultural labour force was already largely literate. 
Large variations in several indicators of educational attainment across Vietnam 
can be traced back to different education policies put into place between 1945 
and 1975 in North and South Vietnam. To circumvent the above-mentioned 
endogeneity problems, I exploit Vietnam's historical variations in educational 
attainment to tackle a number of econometric issues and test the impact of 
education on efficiency by estimating the impact of various indicators of 
education achievement on rice productivity, measured as rice yields per hectare 
of land owned. 
The focus on rice cultivation is justified by its sheer importance in Vietnam's 
agricultural sector. Rice is the largest agricultural sub-sector, accounting for 
about 65 percent of agricultural land area and 70 percent of total annual land, and 
in 1992 was grown by 84 percent of farmers (Goletti, Minot, and Berry 1997). 
9° See Heckman and Vytlacil (2000); Card (2001); Heckman, Lochner and Todd (2003); Heckman and Vytlacil 
(2003). See Angrist and Krueger (1999) for an alternative view. 
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Over centuries, Vietnam has developed a permanent and intensive system of 
irrigated wet-rice cultivation that is able to support one of the highest population 
densities in the world 91 (Gourou 1965 (1936); Bray 1986; Nguyen Sinh Cuc 
1995b; Le Ba Thao 1998). Bray (1986: 25) explains: 
"Although [...] it is hard to grow, generally requiring more labour than other 
crops, it [rice] is also the highest yielding of all cereals after maize, but has 
superior nutritional value. It is highly adaptable, can be grown under any 
conditions, does not necessarily require fertilisers (although it responds well 
to their use) and will produce as many as three crops a year if there is 
sufficient water, without exhausting the fertility of the paddy field. [...] If 
quick-ripening varieties are used, as many as three crops of rice a year can be 
grown even by farmers who do not have access to chemical fertilisers, for the 
water supply provides nutrients naturally. This means that once rice 
cultivation is established in a region, it will sustain population growth almost 
indefinitely". 
In all regions, most farms are family farms, traditionally organised around the 
production of rice using wet-rice farming techniques. The cycle of works for rice 
cultivation using wet-rice technology includes: the selection of seeds to be 
planted in specially prepared seedbeds; the transplantation of seedlings in 
ploughed and flooded fields; during the maturation period other tasks comprise 
the weeding of fields, the application of fertiliser and spraying of pesticide, the 
monitoring of water levels, and finally the harvesting, threshing and drying of 
rice grains. When carefully executed, all these tasks can make a decisive 
contribution to enhance yields. Overall farm productivity is critically dependent 
on complex decisions regarding the timing of operations and the application of 
the correct type and quantity of fertilisers and pesticides, taking into account the 
variations in soil quality, temperature and water control availability. 
The need for a skilled and experienced labour force together with the importance 
of agricultural technology in the cultivation of rice allows us to examine whether 
Vietnam's high initial levels of education at the start of its agricultural 
91 Gourou (1952); ibid. (1965 (1936)) documents the acute population pressure in the Red River Delta in the 
1930s and across South-East Asia, and describes the labour intensive cultivation methods that were developed 
over time. 
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liberalisation period played a part in generating the remarkably high agricultural 
growth rates of the 1990s. 
The data on education and agricultural production come from the Vietnamese 
Living Standard Survey (VLSS). The agricultural unit in Vietnam is the farm 
household and agricultural decisions are generally taken by household heads 
(who are mostly men). In the VLSS, data on agricultural productivity are 
collected at the household level. Education being a fixed factor for the household 
head, I only make use of the 1992 dataset. Therefore, this chapter focuses on the 
educational attainment of household heads and unless otherwise indicated, all 
data on education presented below pertain to the head of the household. 
In the next section, I explain how the goal of achieving universal literacy 
declared by Ho Chi Minh in 1945 after the declaration of Vietnam's 
independence in 1945 became an integral part of the guerrilla tactics put into 
place by the Viet Minh between 1946 and 1975. I document how in the midst of 
tremendous hardship, Vietnam succeeded in bringing about quasi-universal 
literacy in North Vietnam and greater parity in male and female primary 
education levels. The gap in educational attainment between North and South 
Vietnam can be traced back to Vietnam's partition in 1954 and to the 
implementation of differential educational policies between 1954 and 1975. 
3.2 Vietnam's Education Policies in Times of War (1945-
1975) 
During the twentieth century, Vietnam went through a series of enormous 
political transformations. A year after Vietnam declared its independence from 
French colonial rule in September 1945, war broke out between Vietnam and 
France, with the Viet Minh fighting the war from the high hills of North Vietnam 
where it had taken refuge. The French war was to last until September 1954, 
when the Geneva peace accords decided the partitioning of Vietnam between the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) in the North and the Republic of 
Vietnam (RVN) in the South. National elections to reunify Vietnam were to be 
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held in 1956 but were eventually called off after the RVN refused to hold 
elections which were likely to favour the Viet Minh (Duiker 1996). 
A period of guerrilla warfare ensued between the National Liberation Front, 
supported by the DRV, and the RVN, which received increasing support from 
the US. Open warfare was launched by America in 1964 following the Bay of 
Tonkin incident, when it was alleged that North Vietnamese patrols had attacked 
US destroyers92 . The bombing of North Vietnam started in 1964 and continued 
until late 1968, when peace talks between the United States and Hanoi began93 . 
US air strikes were resumed in early 1970, peaking during 1972 and inflicting 
enormous damage. Warfare continued until 1975 when, after a major offensive, 
the North Vietnamese entered Saigon. Vietnam was officially reunited in June 
1976. 
Vietnam's eventful twentieth-century history can be divided into four defining 
`Periods': the French colonial period until Vietnam's declaration of 
independence in September 1945 (Period I); the period of the war against France 
between 1946 and 1954 (Period II); the period of the partition between North and 
South Vietnam and the war against America between 1954 and 1975 (Period III); 
the reunification of Vietnam under the Communist Party rule since 1975 (Period 
IV). 
Table 3-1: Vietnam's four defining historical periods 
Period I 
	
Before 1945 
Period II 1945-1954 
Period III 
	
1954-1975 
Period IV 
	
After 1975 
Most remarkably, analysis of the VLSS data shows that Vietnam's success in 
bringing about quasi-universal literacy in North Vietnam and greater parity in 
male and female primary education levels was achieved during Period II and 
Period III. Below, I tell the story of Vietnam's progresses in educational 
92 To this day, the reality of the attack on the US destroyers could not be verified and it is likely to have been 
the results of false information. See the account of the Bay of Tonkin Incident by Secretary of Defense Robert 
McNamara (1995) himself, and by Daniel Ellsberg (2002) who worked for the Pentagon at the time when 
reports of the Maddox attack were transmitted to the US government and had first hand account of the 
incident. 
93 American troops, whose numbers peaked at 550,000 in 1969, started to be withdrawn. 
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attainments backward. Section 3.2.1 first presents Vietnam's educational 
attainments in 1992, in the early stage of Vietnam's reform period. Section 3.2.2 
uses the historical periodisation presented above to analyse data from the 
Vietnamese Living Standard Survey on education, and examines the changes in 
education attainments over time. Finally, Section 3.2.3 traces the differentiation 
in educational attainment between North and South Vietnam back to Vietnam's 
1954 partition and the educational policies put into place by the DRV. 
3.2.1 Educational Achievements (1992) 
This section documents Vietnam's educational attainments in 1992, at the start 
of the agricultural liberalisation period. Data on educational attainments used in 
this chapter include the number of years spent in education, the level of 
education attained (primary education, lower secondary education, and upper 
secondary and higher education), and the numeracy and literacy levels of the 
household head, and except for the latter two variables, are mostly derived from 
the 1992 Vietnamese Living Standard Survey. Data on literacy and numeracy 
were only collected in 1998 and are therefore extracted from the 1998 VLSS. 
Numeracy and literacy levels were not self-assessed but externally tested using 
writing and numeracy tests and can therefore be considered good quality data. 
By 1992, rural households heads had received on average six years of education 
(see Table 3-2 below), and literacy and numeracy levels 94 were high at 78 
percent and 70 percent respectively (Table 3-3). Although 40 percent of 
household heads did not receive any degree, 25 percent had completed primary 
school and another 24 percent had completed lower secondary schools. The 
remaining 12 percent had either completed upper secondary school or had 
received technical or vocational high school education (Table 3-4). Hence, 
overall, about 60 percent had at least completed primary education. 
94 Numeracy and literacy levels were not self-assessed but externally tested using writing and numeracy tests 
during the 1998 VLSS survey and can therefore be considered to be of good quality. 
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Vietnam being a patriarchal society, the education level of the male head of 
household is likely to be the highest in the household95 . Nevertheless, women 
also benefited from the expansion in education with an average of 5 years of 
education, split between 5 to 7 years in North Vietnam and 2 to 4 in South 
Vietnam (see Table 3-5). 
Already, it is clear that Vietnam's educational attainments in 1992 were 
remarkable by international standards. Indeed, they were comparable to those 
attained by middle-income countries such as Malaysia or Thailand (HDRO 2002; 
Unicef 2004, Table 5). How could Vietnam achieve such an outcome, when 
shortly after declaring its independence from French domination in September 
1945, it had to fight two wars that lasted nearly 30 years? Sections 3.2.2 and 
3.2.3 tell a story of forceful educational policies implemented by the DRV, and 
which one can trace by analysing educational trends between North and South 
Vietnam, and by mapping changes in educational attainments using the history 
of different cohorts having received their education during distinct historical 
periods. 
3.2.2 The North-South Educational Gap (1992) 
As evident from the tables below, despite high averages, educational attainments 
vary considerably across regions96 . In particular, there seems to be a marked 
division in educational attainments between North 97 and South98 Vietnam. One 
can see this clearly by contrasting the cases of Vietnam's two major rice growing 
regions99 : the Red River Delta in North Vietnam, and the Mekong River Delta in 
South Vietnam loo  
95 In the traditional Vietnamese society, women who have higher levels of education than their husbands are 
frown upon. The Communist Party's universal education policies enabled greater parity in literacy between 
men and women. 
96 Looking beyond regional averages, a breakdown of literacy levels by provinces provided by UNDP Vietnam 
(2001) shows greater local variations in educational attainments. Whether in North or South Vietnam, the 
highest levels of illiteracy are to be found in several provinces located in the highlands, where there is a high 
proportion of ethnic minorities. 
97 North Vietnam includes three regions: the Northern Uplands, the Red River Delta and the North Central 
Coast. 
95 South Vietnam include four regions: the South Central Coast, the Central Highlands, the South East region 
and the Mekong River Delta. 
99 Data are for rural areas only. 
100 Both regions experienced very fast agricultural growth rates during the 1990s. 
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The average number of years of education was 7.4 in the Red River Delta against 
4.2 years in the Mekong River Delta (Table 3-2). Similarly, the numeracy 
(literacy) rate was 82 percent (85 percent) in the Red River Delta against 51 
percent (68 percent) only in the Mekong River Delta (Table 3-3). Finally, as 
shown in Table 3-4, as many as 60 percent of household heads in the Mekong 
River Delta did not hold any degree, against 23 percent of household heads in the 
Red River Delta. The Red River Delta can also boast the highest proportion of 
household heads with a lower secondary degree (38 percent). 
Aggregating regions together (Table 3-6 below), the average number of years of 
schooling was 7.0 in North Vietnam against 4.3 years in South Vietnam. 
Average literacy rate in North Vietnam was 83 percent in the North against 68 
percent in the South. The gap in numeracy levels was even larger (80 percent in 
North Vietnam and 54 percent in South Vietnam). 
Table 3-2: Educational attainments by region and expenditure quintile 
(1992 - rural Vietnam) 
Years of 	Rural Northern Red River North 	South 	Central 	South 	Mekong 
education of 	VN 	Uplands 	Delta 	Central Central Highlands 	East 	River 
household Coast 	Coast 	 Delta 
head 
	
Exp. Quintile 1 5.13 	5.64 	6.61 	6.46 	2.32 	1.77 	2.77 	3.11 
Exp. Quintile 2 5.87 	6.57 	7.22 	6.88 	4.33 	4.52 	3.79 	3.31 
Exp. Quintile 3 6.31 	7.56 	7.45 	7.16 	4.25 	4.93 	5.57 	4.08 
Exp. Quintile 4 6.19 	6.87 	7.68 	8.18 	5.70 	3.95 	4.72 	4.56 
Exp. Quintile 5 6.51 	6.57 	8.98 	8.64 	6.39 	6.14 	6.30 	5.04 
All 	5.96 	6.51 	7.40 	7.17 	4.64 	4.05 	4.95 	4.18 
Table 3-3: Numeracy and literacy levels of household heads by region (1998) 
Numeracy and 	 Rural VN 	Urban VN 
Literacy of Household 
Heads 
(%) 	 Counting Reading Counting Reading 
Northern Uplands 	81% 	83% 	88% 	91% 
Red River Delta 82% 	85% 	89% 	89% 
North Central Coast 	78% 	83% 	87% 	89% 
South Central Coast 	58% 	68% 	76% 	83% 
Central Highlands 	64% 	72% 
South East • 	 64% 	77% 	76% 	84% 
Mekong River Delta 	51% 	68% 	71% 	80%  
Vietnam 	 70% 	78% 	80% 	85% 
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Table 3-4: Completed levels of education by region (1992 — rural Vietnam) 
Rural VN low 	upper 
No 	 secon second techni 
degree primary 	dary 	ary 	cal 
vocational 
high 
school 
under- 
undergrad doctorate 
Northern Uplands 31 26 29 5 5 3 1 0 100 
Red River Delta 23 20 38 5 6 6 1 0 100 
North Central Coast 25 26 29 7 6 6 1 0 100 
South Central Coast 54 26 12 4 2 2 I 0 100 
Central Uplands 54 26 13 2 2 2 I 0 100 
South East 49 30 15 4 0 2 1 0 100 
Mekong River Delta 60 25 10 2 2 1 0 0 100 
Rural VN 39 25 24 4 4 4 1 0 100 
Table 3-5: Years of education of female spouse by region (1992 —
rural/urban) 
Education of female spouse 
(# years) 	 Rural Urban 
Northern Uplands 	5.48 	8.12 
Red River Delta 6.72 	9.26 
North Central Coast 	6.51 	8.88 
South Central Coast 	3.66 	6.60 
Central Highlands 	2.34 
South East 	 4.11 	6.20 
Mekong River Delta 	3.05 	5.00  
Vietnam 	 5.06 	7.13 
Table 3-6: North-South Educational Gap (1992 — Rural Vietnam) 
Rural Vietnam 	Years Educ 	 Counting 	 Reading  
mean 	s.d. 	median 	mean 	s.d. 	mean 	s.d. 	# obs. 
North 	 7.05 	3.92 	8 	80% 	0.40 	83% 	0.37 	2002 
South 4.32 	3.67 	4 	54% 	0.50 	68% 	0.47 	1496  
NB: VLSS 1992 - households heads 
3.2.3 The 1945 Mass Literacy Campaign and the 1954 Partition of 
Vietnam 
Whilst Vietnam's GDP per capita in 1992 positioned it among the poorest 
countries in the world, Vietnam's educational attainments are comparable to 
those of middle-income countries such as Thailand or Indonesia (International 
Literacy Institute 2000). Historical account and the data on education extracted 
from the VLSS indicate that educational attainment during the French colonial 
period was very low, so that most of the advances in education documented 
above must have taken place after Vietnam gained its independence from France 
in 1945. 
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In this section, I examine how, in the midst of enormous hardship and political 
turmoil, Vietnam succeeded in raising average literacy and numeracy skills to 
the remarkable levels indicated earlier, and trace the origins of the educational 
gap between North and South Vietnam to the 1954 partition of Vietnam. In fact, 
most of the progresses in educational attainment were achieved between 1945 
and 1975, that is, during Period II and Period III of Vietnam's history loi  
In order to relate changes in educational attainment to specific educational 
policies, I make use of the history of different cohorts of individuals having 
received their education during distinct historical periods. Individuals 
interviewed in the VLSS are therefore classified according to their year of birth 
and according to whether they received their education during one of the four 
historical periods presented earlier. This classification is made possible by the 
fact that individuals were asked to report in what year they stopped attending 
school 102, and to state the number of years spent in school. 
Table 3-7 presents how household heads distributed themselves across age 
groups and Table 3-8 indicates the year in which on average individuals in each 
age group completed their education. Eighty-five percent of household heads 
were 30 years old or older and on average completed their education before 
1975. In addition, excluding those who on average completed their education 
before 1945, as many as three quarters of household heads completed their 
education between 1945 and 1975. 
It is important to note that the sample size for each cohort may not be 
representative of each cohort in particular. The older cohorts in particular may 
have been under-sampled and a survivor bias may have been introduced as some 
may have died due to ill-health, or have been casualties of war. One relevant 
worry would be that there were differential survival rates in North and South 
Vietnam by education levels. Whilst the existence of a survivor bias can never be 
categorically dispelled, the analysis conducted in the next section and in Section 
3.3, which discusses the instrumental variable strategy adopted for this chapter, 
does not reveal any such bias. 
101 For a reminder of Vietnam's four defining historical periods, see Table 34 on page 94. 
102 "When did you stop attending school?" in Section 2, question 15, of the VLSS 1992. 
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The story of Vietnam's educational policies and how they helped bring about the 
notable levels of educational attainment documented above is told in the two 
following sections. 
Table 3-7: Distribution of households across age group (1992 — rural 
Vietnam) 
Distribution of household heads across age group 
Age group 20-30 30-40 40-50 50-60 60-70 >70 
North Vietnam 18 31 17 15 13 6 
South Vietnam 11 27 22 17 15 8 
Rural Vietnam 15 29 19 16 14 7 
Table 3-8: Mean final year of schooling by age group (1992 — rural Vietnam) 
Mean final year of schooling for household heads by age group 
Age group 20-30 30-40 40-50 50-60 60-70 >70 
North Vietnam mean 1982 1975 1967 1959 1953 1948 
s.d. 3 4 6 8 9 11 
South Vietnam mean 1981 1974 1965 1954 1947 1936 
s.d. 4 5 6 6 9 10 
Rural Vietnam mean 1982 1975 1966 1957 1950 1943 
s.d. 4 5 6 8 9 12 
3.2.3.1 Changes in Educational Attainments Over Time 
In order to appreciate how educational attainments changed over time, and how 
these changes can be related to Vietnam's historical turning points, the 
educational attainment of household heads is graphed against the year in which 
they declared having finished their studies. The three vertical lines in each graph 
mark three key moments in Vietnam's history presented in Section 3.2 above: 
1945, when Vietnam conquered its independence from France; 1954, which 
marks the end of the war against France and the partition of Vietnam between 
North and South Vietnam; and 1975 which marks the end of the war and the 
reunification of Vietnam. 
Figure 3-1 maps the changes in the proportion of household heads having 
completed primary and lower secondary school in the Red River Delta and the 
Mekong River Delta. Figure 3-2 compares the changes in various indicators of 
educational attainment in North and South Vietnam. In all graphs, the upper lines 
either represent the Red River Delta (in) or North Vietnam (in Figure 3-2). In 
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Table 3-9, I verify that the differences in mean educational attainments between 
North and South Vietnam are statistically significant. Differences in means are 
presented for Vietnam's four historical periods. Results are shown for the 
number of years spent in education and the level of education attained, i.e. 
primary education, lower secondary education, and upper secondary and higher 
education. 
Overall, the percentage of adults with primary education increased from 34 
percent for the cohort born and raised during French colonial times, to about 70 
percent for those educated during the time of Vietnam's partition, in North 
Vietnam. By 1975, the year of the reunification of North and South Vietnam, the 
average adult literacy rate had reached 80 percent l°3 . 
Examining Figure 3-1 and Figure 3-2 together with Table 3-9 in detail reveals 
several patterns: 
(i) the gaps in educational attainments between North and South Vietnam are 
insignificant in Period I, i.e. during the French colonial period; 
(ii) they become significant in Period II (i.e. between 1945 and 1954); 
(iii) they significantly widen during Period III (i.e. between 1954 and 1975); 
(iv) that some catching up between North and South Vietnam occurs during 
Period IV (i.e. after the reunification of Vietnam in 1975) is evidenced by 
the narrowing gap between the two lines in each of the four panels (see in 
particular Panel 2 and Panel 3 in Figure 3-2). 
103 By way of comparison, average adult literacy rate was 69 percent in China and 43 percent in India in 1988. 
See Dreze and Sen (1989). 
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Figure 3-1: Educational attainments in primary and lower secondary 
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Figure 3-2: Educational attainments (North Vietnam vs South Vietnam) 
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Figure 3-3: Years of Education — Male vs Female/ North vs South Vietnam 
Table 3-9: North-South Gaps in Educational Attainments by Historical 
Period (p-value)104  
Panel 1: Mean Years of Education 
Rural Vietnam Mean Years of Education  
Period I p-value* Period II p-value* Period III p-value* Period IV p-value* 
	
3.76 	0.247 	4.09 	0.06 	6.91 	0.00 	9.20 	0.00 
3.48 3.69 4.91 7.78 
North Vietnam 
South Vietnam 
p-value of difference in means between North and South Vietnam 
Panel 2: Primary Education 
Rural Vietnam 	 Primary Education 
Period I p-value* Period H p-value* Period III p-value* Period IV p-value* 
North Vietnam 	34% 	0.235 	41% 	0.04 	73% 	0.00 	95% 	0.00 
South Vietnam 27% 31% 49% 78% 
p-value of difference in means between North and South Vietnam 
Panel 3: Lower Secondary Education 
Rural Vietnam 	 Lower Secondary Education 
Period I p-value* Period H p-value* Period HI p-value* Period N p-value* 
North Vietnam 	4% 	0.69 	8% 	0.04 	45% 	0.00 	75% 	0.00 
South Vietnam 3% 3% 16% 45% 
p-value of difference in means between North and South Vietnam 
Panel 4: Upper Secondary Education 
Rural Vietnam 	 Upper Secondary Education 
Period I p-value s Period H p-value* Period HI p-value* Period IV p-value * 
North Vietnam 	1% 	0.18 	3% 	0.28 	16% 	0.00 	26% 	0.00 
South Vietnam 0% 1% 5% 16% 
p-value of difference in means between North and South Vietnam 
104 As a historical pointer, the reader is reminded that Period I refers to the period prior to 1945 (the French 
colonial period), Period II refers to 1945-1954 (the French War), Period LII refers to 1954-1975 (the American 
War), and Period IV refers to the post-1975 period (after the reunification of Vietnam). 
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3.2.3.2 Mass Literacy Campaign and Guerilla Warfare Tactics (1945-
1975) 
On September 2, 1945, upon declaring Vietnam's independence from French 
colonial, rule, Ho Chi Minh (1945) famously stated that the French had "built 
more prisons than schools". Indeed, historians not only recount that investments 
in education during the French colonial period were negligible l°5 , they also 
explain that education policies during colonial times were devised to tame the 
influence of Vietnamese scholars and to disrupt a Vietnamese traditional 
education system that may have bred resistance against the French occupation. 
The colonial education system was only meant to provide the Vietnamese with 
" a simple education, reduced to essentials, permitting the child to learn all 
that will be useful for him to know in his humble career of farmer or artisan 
to ameliorate the natural and social conditions of his existence" (Kelly 1978: 
100). 
As a result, the curriculum taught in the French education system was 
purposefully limited to avoid imparting scientific knowledge or even a greater 
knowledge of Europe's history and culture to the Vietnamese (US Library of 
Congress; Kelly 1978; Woodside 1983). 
Bringing about universal literacy and nurneracy had been a priority for the Viet 
Minh government from the very beginning. A few weeks before it successfully 
seized power and declared the foundation of the Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam (DRV) in September 1945, the Viet Minh had adopted a 10-point 
programme, which stated that one top priority was, 
"to develop a national education system: to struggle against illiteracy and 
introduce compulsory elementary education" (Nguyen Khac Vien 1981: 108 
- see point 9; Woodside 1983: 404405) 106 . 
105 Hick (1982: 110) reports (dubious) figures from Unesco stating that 80-85 percent of the population was 
literate in the middle of the 19 ,1, century, before the arrival of the French, and that the literacy rate had fallen to 
15-20 percent when the French left in 1954. 
106 Woodside (1983: 404) writes "the Vietnamese communists' dedication to mass education is still one of the 
central missionary themes of their revolution. The recollections of Tran Phu and others have made it clear that, 
a early as 1927-1928, when he was in Siam, Ho Chi Minh was planning an independent national school system 
for Vietnam, as a means of escape from a colonial culture which 'kept the people stupid'". 
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Ho Chi Minh himself made a nation-wide appeal to "destroy illiteracy as an 
enemy" and a mass education decree was enacted on September 8, 1945, setting 
up the target of achieving universal literacy within a year and decreeing that 
evening classes be set up in all villages and towns within six months. 
In order to achieve such an ambitious target in such a short period of time, a 
guerilla model of education was put into place: night classes were organized in 
makeshift facilities and voluntary teachers were enlisted to teach basic literacy 
and numeracy skills to the mass of illiterate people. 
The mass literacy campaign was an integral part of the political and armed 
struggle in which the Viet Minh was engaged (Nguyen Khac Vien 1981) 107 . 
After the war against France started, given the imbalance in firepower to which it 
was confronted, the Viet Minh launched the so-called People's war, a guerilla 
warfare strategy whose success depended on the support of the population. To 
entice the local population to participate in the war effort, the Viet Minh 
promoted the messages of national salvation and social revolution. Ho Chi 
Minh's call for resistance against French occupation found a particular echo 
among the common people, which had been particularly ill-treated by the 
colonial administration and during the French military operations. Whilst calls 
for resistance against French oppression appealed to the richer classes, 
redistributive socio-economic policies (lower taxes, pro-poor spending, and land 
redistribution) were used as incentives to recruit the rural masses. Duiker (1995: 
148) reprinted the following testimony from a villager in Central Vietnam: 
"The Liberation had answers for all the most important problems that we all 
knew. They had an answer about land reform, which was they would give 
land to the poor people. They had an answer about high taxes. They said that 
the Liberation would spend the taxes only for the people, and would collect 
them without corruption. They also said that they would help the poor, and 
this was something else that made them popular, because many people in the 
village were very poor." 
The guerrilla tactics required that each village under the control of the Viet Minh 
be organised in order to be able to provide for a long war effort. Effort was made 
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to support agricultural production by building new irrigation and drainage 
infrastructures and improving roads ms . During the war against France, the Viet 
Minh's educational policy held sway thanks to its remarkable ability to mobilise 
and organise the population at the village level 109 . In an enthusiastic account of 
the achievements of the Viet Minh during the early years of war, Vietnam's 
foremost historian, Nguyen Khac Vien (1981: 115 and 208) details how, 
following the government's call to fight illiteracy: 
"Almost 100,000 people came forth to serve as benevolent teachers and over 
70,000 classes were opened in pagodas, communal houses, temples, 
factories, hospitals, beneath shady banyan trees, in market places, and next to 
rice fields" [... to achieve] "the complete liquidation of illiteracy and the 
rapid popularization of education. From 1958, all adults in North Vietnam 
could read and write and after 1960, even during the US bombings, one out 
of three North Vietnamese was studying." 
Practically, at the village level, village organisations 11° were called upon to 
persuade the rural masses to participate in the literacy program. In his fascinating 
account of village life in Son-Duong village (in North Vietnam) between 1925 
and 1988, Hy Van Luong (1992) explains how various means of persuasion were 
used to entice villagers to join the mass literacy campaign, including nationalistic 
exhortations ("it is patriotic to become literate"), and social pressures (examples 
mentioned include beating drums to invite a specific household to participate in 
the literacy campaign or conducting literacy tests at the village gate to embarrass 
villagers) 111 . When the Franco-Viet Minh war against France started in 1946, the 
107 Nguyen Khac Vien (1981) write that even during war times, the Viet Minh's party line was that "in spite of 
the war, education was to be developed to help the war effort, but also to meet the need of the future". 
108 As narrated by Kolko (1985) and Duiker (1995), the need to mobilise the peasantry in the context of war was 
the main thrust behind the various land reforms implemented between 1953 and 1975. In the earlier phase of 
the war effort, the Viet Minh held back from proposing more radical land reforms for fear of alienating the 
wealthier classes from the war effort. The policy was to reduce taxes and interest rates, or to distribute grains 
during times of famine. The final push to win the support of the rural poor was made in 1953, when the 
revolutionary land reforms were implemented: land was confiscated from families classified as landlords and 
redistributed to landless and poor farmers. 
109 Duiker (1996: 142) recounts: "In areas where the Viet Minh rule held sway, a revolutionary administration 
began to appear. For convenience, all administrative, united front, and military functions were combined into 
a single Committee of Resistance and Administration (CRA). The ability of the Viet Minh to expand their rule 
at the village level was undoubtedly a testimony to the general effectiveness of the Party's rural program, as 
well as to its strategic and organizational abilities." 
110 The cuu quoc (national salvation) organisations. 
111 According to Hy V. Luong (1992: 173), within a year, the mass literacy campaign succeeded in setting up 50 
classes enrolling 1250 students including women and the elderly by 1958-1959, the village school offered lower 
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inexpensive and flexible guerilla model of education was particularly suited to 
war conditions and allowed schools to continue to function in areas controlled by 
the Viet Minh and even to operate clandestinely in areas under French control 112 - 
During the American war, confronted with an infinitely larger military power, 
North Vietnam was preparing itself for a long war and organised the life of the 
population accordingly (Van Dyke 1972). School buildings were particularly 
vulnerable to the heavy US bombing campaign between 1965 and 1968, and in 
1972, the Vietnamese historian Nguyen Khac Vien explains that: 
"schools and colleges in the cities had to disperse to forests and villages, and 
village schools had to break up into small units. Each evacuated or dispersed 
school had to build new premises, shelters and trenches, house teachers and 
pupils, and set up libraries and laboratories either in people's houses or in 
temporary compounds." (Nguyen Khac Vien 1981: 210) 
William Duiker (1995: 200) also reports that, 
"During his visit to North Vietnam in 1966, journalist Harrison Salisbury 
visited one school near Hanoi attended by children of the party and 
government elite. Students moved from building to building by means of a 
trench network dug in the schoolyard. The entrances to classrooms were 
buttressed by shoulder-high mud walls reinforced by bamboo. Under each 
school desk was a foxhole for the student, who was provided with a plaited 
straw helmet in case of an air attack." (Duiker 1995: 200) 
Whether the school mentioned by Duiker was typical of the majority of schools 
in peri-urban or rural areas or not, this testimony is nevertheless indicative of the 
enormous amount of organisational effort that was put into place in order to 
sustain the education effort despite the difficulties of war. 
After the partition of Vietnam in 1954, the Viet Minh continued its policy to 
expand access to education in North Vietnam (the Democratic Republic of 
secondary education. By 1987, it offered 12 grades to 1001 male and female students. This is in contrast with 
the situation in 1945, when the school offered only three grades, mostly to male students. 
112 Hick (1982: 112) explains: "popular education was seen as an expression of patriotic nationalism, and each 
class became in its way a cell of resistance to the French colonial aspirations, and every teacher a propagandist 
for the cause". 
113 Similar accounts of how schools had been rebuilt are also found in Van Dyke (1972: 134-142). 
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Panel 1 
Year When School Was Built in Commune - 1998 
North and South Vietnam 
Panel 2 
Year When School Was Built in-Commune 
By Region 
North 
south 
1,94 	954 1,975 	1,986 . 
Vietnam — DRV), unifying the schooling system around a 10-grade system and 
aiming at building primary schools in each village and a senior high school in 
each district (Nguyen Khac Vien 1981: 209). By 1964, a complete education 
system, from kindergartens to universities had been established in the DRV. 
The effort that was made since 1954 to build a new schooling infrastructure 
across Vietnam can actually be traced using data from the Vietnamese Living 
Standard Survey questionnaire on schooling infrastructure. Commune authorities 
were asked to report the year in which the communal schools had been built. 
This means that schools constructed before the year indicated for each commune 
but subsequently destroyed during the war would not be recorded. However, 
historical records indicate that very few schools were built under the colonial 
period. Moreover, as evidenced in Figure 3-4, almost all schools were built after 
1954. In North Vietnam, about 50 percent of (existing) schools were built 
between 1954 and 1975 whilst in South Vietnam the bulk of schools was 
constructed after 1975 (see the two box plots of Panel 1 in Figure 3-4 114 ; Panel 2 
provides a breakdown by region) 115 . 
Figure 3-4: Year of Construction of Communal Schools 
Access to education also expanded in South Vietnam between 1954 and 1975. 
The Government of South Vietnam can be credited for expanding educational 
opportunities for the masses "despite the shortage of teachers, textbooks, 
114 The line in the middle of the box indicates the median. The left-hand (right-and) side of the box represents 
the 25 0, (75 ,h) percentile. The extremities represent the upper and lower adjacent values. 
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equipment, and classrooms and despite the disruptions of war in the 1960s and 
early 1970s" (US Library of Congress), as evidenced in the steady upward trend 
in Figure 3-2 above and Figure 3-5 below. 
The alleged success of mass literacy campaign (Nguyen Khac Vien 1981; 
Woodside 1983) 116 finds confirmation in the data presented here 117 . Most of the 
increase in educational attainments for the adult population was achieved during 
Period II and III, and the difference between North and South Vietnam in several 
indicators of educational attainments accentuated itself during Period HI, i.e. 
during the partition of Vietnam, when North and South Vietnam were 
administered by two different governments 118 . 
Nevertheless, steady efforts at expanding education were also under way in 
South Vietnam during Vietnam's partition. As a result, the gap in literacy and 
numeracy between North and South Vietnam are much less accentuated, as 
evidenced in Figure 3-6 below. 
Figure 3-5: Changes in education attainments in South Vietnam (1954-1975) 
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115 In Panel 2, the digits on the y-axis correspond to region 1 (Northern Uplands), region 2 (Red River Delta), 
region 3 (North Central Coast), region 4 (South Central Coast), region 5 (Central Highlands), region 6 (South 
East), and region 7 (Mekong River Delta) 
116 Woodside is suspicious of the standard "claim that 95 percent of all people between the ages of eight and 
fifty were illiterate in 1945". This analysis of education data from the VLSS by cohorts provides some 
corroboration to this standard claim. 
117 See also a similar corroboration in the longitudinal analysis of educational attainments performed by the 
Viet Nam General Statistics Office (1996), using the Vietnam's 1994 Inter-Censal Demographic Survey. 
118 Woodside (1983) also points at a discrepancy in educational attainment between North and South Vietnam. 
In 1980, 90 percent of 6-year old children in North Vietnam were enrolled into schools against 70 percent in 
South Vietnam. 
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Figure 3-6: North-South Gap in Literacy and Numeracy 
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It has to be noted that although basic literacy could be expanded relatively 
inexpensively in ethnically homogeneous and densely populated regions, the 
guerilla model of education did not meet with equal success in more ethnically 
and linguistically diverse regions, and where the population was geographically 
dispersed such as in the remote areas of the Mekong River Delta and in 
mountainous regions (Woodside 1983: 407). This inequality in the supply of 
education is reflected in the lower rates of educational attainments in the 
Northern Uplands, the Central Highlands, and the Mekong River Delta in Table 
3-2 to Table 3-5 (see above page 97). 
Despite the setbacks encountered during the implementation of the literacy 
campaign119, by international standards, Vietnam's overall achievements in 
terms of basic literacy and numeracy have been truly remarkable. By 
comparison, in Bangladesh, whose GDP per capita was comparable to that of 
Vietnam in the early 1990s, the male adult literacy rate had reached only 44 
119 After 1950, schools were constructed and teachers started to be paid, as opposed to using volunteer teachers 
and makeshift facilities. 
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percent. Vietnam's educational achievements are comparable to those attained by 
middle-income countries such as Malaysia (87 percent) or Thailand (90 percent) 
(HDRO 2002; Unicef 2004, Table 5). In 2002, the average Education Index for 
middle-income countries calculated by the Human Development Report Office 
of the United Nations was 0.84. The average Education Index for low-income 
countries was 0.59. Vietnam's 2002 Education Index was 0.82 120 . 
3.3 Econometric model and estimation strategy 
The previous section showed how large variations in educational attainment 
could be attributed to education policies put into place between 1945 and 1975 in 
North and South Vietnam. In this section, I argue that it is possible to exploit 
Vietnam's historical variations in educational attainment to devise an 
instrumental variable (IV) strategy and deal with the endogeneity problem that 
has plagued most studies of the returns to education. Using the IV estimation 
strategy, one specific channel through which education could have contributed to 
agricultural growth is tested. The model presented here estimates the impact of 
various indicators of educational attainment on rice productivity, measured as 
rice yields per hectare of land owned 121 . 
The agricultural unit in Vietnam is the farm household and agricultural decisions 
are generally taken by household heads (who are mostly men). In the VLSS, data 
on agriculture are collected at the household level. Therefore, this analysis 
focuses on the educational attainment of household heads and looks at the impact 
of the education of the household head on the outcomes described above. Most 
household heads were born before 1975 and educated during the three historical 
periods presented earlier. 
120 The Education Index is based on the adult literacy rate and the combined gross enrolment ratio for primary, 
secondary, and tertiary schools. Vietnam's high Education Index reflects both high literacy rates and high 
school enrolment rates. See data from HDRO (2002). 
120 As Michael Lipton remarked (personal communication), since it is likely that education encouraged shifts 
of land out of rice, estimating the impact of educational attainment on rice yields gives a lower-bound 
estimate of its impact on agricultural (and total) net income. However, land shifted out of rice may not be 
typical in its rice yields, which is likely to complicate inferences. 
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The standard model used to evaluate the returns to education is the OLS 
Mincerian model, which typically regresses an outcome on years of schooling, as 
modelled in Equation 3-1: 
Equation 3-1: In y, = a, + AS,+aX,+c, 
with y, measuring the outcome of interest , and S, measuring the number of 
years spent in education by individual i. This model assumes homogeneous 
returns across individuals (there is no subscript to the coefficient /3 ) and uses an 
aggregate measure of human capital (number of years of education). To measure 
the causal effect of S on y consistently, it is assumed that S, is exogenous (i.e. 
cov(S,, c, )= 0 ). 
Moreover, there are six levels of education in the Vietnamese education system, 
which can be grouped under three sub-categories: (1) primary education, (2) 
lower secondary education, and (3) upper secondary and higher education. The 
model in Equation 3-1 can be expanded to include heterogeneity across different 
levels of education as follows: 
Equation 3-2: In y, = a, + AS, / + A2 S2 ,+ 163 53, + aX + s, 
with S„ being a binary variable indicating whether individual i has successfully 
achieved education level (1) primary education, (2) lower secondary education, 
and (3) upper secondary and higher education. 
The estimation of the impact of education on earnings has been fraught with 
methodological difficulties I22 . The failure to control for the correlation between 
education and omitted factors such as individual ability, family or class 
background, which themselves affect earnings (i.e. cov(c,,s,)# 0 ), generated 
biased estimates of the economic returns of education (Card 1999). The problem 
of omitted variables has been commonly addressed by introducing proxy 
variables, such as test scores prior to entering education, in order to control for 
unobserved ability (Bowles, Gintis, and Osborne 2000). The endogeneity of 
education is likely to be particularly important in the context of rural Vietnam, 
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where individuals face liquidity and other constraints that influence both their 
levels of schooling and dependent variables such farm productivity. The size and 
importance of the unobserved ability bias remains disputed (Heckman, Lochner, 
and Todd 2003). However, it is found to be important by Carneiro, Heckman and 
Vytlacil (2003), according to whom "most of the standard instrumental variables 
used to estimate returns to schooling are not valid if ability is not properly 
accounted for". Other constraints that may also influence both education levels 
and agricultural productivity are community characteristics (e.g. state of rural 
infrastructure development). 
An alternative estimation strategy that allows one to control for the endogeneity 
of education has been to find instrumental variables that determine education but 
have no independent effect on the dependent variable. Let us call Z the set of 
IVs, and let us define the instrumentation strategy as follows: 
Equation 3-3: S, = Z:71" u, 
where E(v, Z,) , 0 , with Cov(Z, u) = 0 and Cov(Z, S) # 0 . A consistent 
estimate of g can be obtained using OLS. Note that homogeneity across 
individuals is still assumed. 
Other estimation biases are caused by the existence of heterogeneous returns to 
education across individuals (i.e. in Equation 3-1 the /3 are allowed to vary 
across individuals - P, ) and by selection bias. In recent years most particularly, 
estimation methods used to measure the existence and the magnitude of the 
returns to education have come under increased scrutiny from many 123 and 
considerable criticism by some 124, although the bulk of evidence seems to 
indicate that education has a positive impact on productivity and earnings 
(Schultz 2003b). In fact, what a comparison of OLS results with other estimation 
methods reveal is that although the non-OLS coefficients are generally larger, 
they are not significantly different from each other, which according to Card 
122 See Heckman and Vytlacil (2000); Card (2001); Heckman, Lochner and Todd (2003); Heckman and Vytlacil 
(2003). See Angrist and Krueger (1999) for an alternative view. 
123 See Psacharopoulos (1994); Card (1999); Topel (1999); Acemoglu and Angrist (2000); Blundell, Dearden and 
Sianesi (2001); Card (2001); Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2002); Harmon, Oosterbeek and Walker (2003); 
Schultz (2003a); Denny, Harmon and O'Sullivan (2004); Heckman and Li (2004); Machin (2004). 
124 See in particular Heckman, Lochner and Todd (2003); Heckman and Li (2004). 
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(2001) indicates that the various biases balance themselves off. On the other 
hand, particularly strong critiques have come recently from Heckman (e.g. 
Heckman and Vytlacil 2003), who argues that substantial estimation problems 
remain when using IV methods. IV estimation is inconsistent in the presence of 
heterogeneity in returns and self-selection into schooling (Heckman and Li 
2004) 125 . 
In the following sections, I explain what instrumental variables will be used in 
the model. I then address a number of specification issues that arise from the 
choice of instrumental variables. 
3.3.1 Finding an IV: Exploiting Vietnam's North-South 1954 Partition 
As shown earlier, the partition of Vietnam between 1954 and 1975 effectively 
created two states that implemented different educational policies and caused the 
educational gap between North and South Vietnam to widen. The North-South 
gap in educational attainment starts narrowing down as a result of a universal 
literacy programme implemented in South Vietnam between 1975 and 1978 (see 
Figure 3-6 above). Nevertheless, the education gap persists for several measures 
of educational attainment such as years of schooling completed and levels of 
education attained (recall the trends in Figure 3-2 above). 
I exploit this historical divide between North and South Vietnam and build an 
identification strategy that rests on whether an individual 
lived in regions of Vietnam that were under the control of the Viet 
Minh (i.e. North Vietnam), and 
(ii) 	was of education age during one of the key historical periods 
described in Section 3.2. The instrument variables consist in the 
interactions of two variables. 
The first variable uses data in the Vietnamese Living Standard Survey that 
specify the region in which each individual was born. A dummy variable is 
created indicating whether the individual was born in North Vietnam (birthN). 
The second variable uses the historical periodisation presented under Section 3.1 
125 Heckman and Li (2004) present an estimation strategy that identifies the heterogeneous return to education 
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in Table 3-1 (see page 94) to categorise individuals depending on the historical 
periods during which they received their education. 
Seven 'Education Phases' are identified. Education Phase 1 includes individuals 
who were of education age during the colonial period, i.e. during Period 1 of 
Vietnam's recent history. Similarly, Phase 2, Phase 3 and Phase 4 identifies 
individuals of education age during Period 2 (i.e. between 1945 and 1954), 
Period 3 (i.e. between 1954 and 1975) and Period 4 (i.e. after 1975) respectively. 
Individuals whose education spanned two Periods are classified under the 
remaining categories as is self-explanatory in Table 3-10 below. 
Table 3-10: The 7 Education Phases  
Finishing percent of 
Historical Starting school school during household 
Period during Period: Period: heads  
Phase 1 	I 	 I 	18 
Phase 2 II II 5 
Phase 3 	III 	 III 	36 
Phase 4 IV IV 4  
Phase 5 	I 	 II 	 9 
Phase 6 II III 12 
Phase 7 	III 	 IV 	16 
Allocating individuals to each Education Phase is problematic. As shown in 
Table 3-11 below, the age at which children start going to school in Vietnam 
varies considerably, particularly for older cohorts of children who started school 
at a relatively late age. Only the cohorts educated in the post-1975 period started 
school at the average age of 7. To avoid endogeneity problems due to different 
starting school age across cohorts, education age is fixed between the age of 8 
and 15 126 . This allocation results in household heads being distributed across the 
seven Education Phases as shown in the third column of Table 3-10 above. 
Each of the seven dummies (Phase_l to Phase_ 7), representing the Education 
Phase in which the individual was of education age, are interacted with the 
birth_north dummy, providing us with a set of instrumental variables for 
(various indicators of) education. 
with marginal treatment effects (rather than average treatment effect) - local IV method. 
126 An additional motivation to fix education age between the age of 8 and 15 is to limit the endogeneity bias 
due to migration. See the following section for a detailed explanation. 
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In the next sub-section, I discuss how defining children's education age between 
the age of 8 and 15 allows to control for one potential source of bias: the self-
selection bias originating from soldiers who joined the army at an early age (at 
16 and 17 year-old), and who may have benefited from preferential education 
treatment during and after their conscription duty. 
Table 3-11: Age of starting and finishing schools (VLSS 1992) 
Rural VN Age in 1992 
Median Age <20 20-30 30-40 40-50 50-60 60-70 70+ All ages 
Northern Uplands Starting school 6 8 9 10 14 18 24 10 
s.d. 3 2 4 5 6 7 11 6 
Finishing school 15 16 17 18 19 24 30 17 
s.d. 1 3 4 5 7 8 11 6 
Red River Delta Starting school 9 7 8 9 14 17 28 9 
s.d. 2 2 3 5 6 9 10 7 
Finishing school 14 16 17 18 21 21 28 17 
s.d. 1 3 3 6 8 9 10 6 
North Central Coast 
Starting school 7 8 9 10 12 20 27 10 
s.d. 2 4 4 7 9 11 7 
Finishing school 14 17 17 18 17 24 31 18 
s.d. 3 4 5 9 10 12 8 
South Central Coast Starting school 9 9 10 12 16 16 11 
s.d. 3 4 5 6 6 8 6 
Finishing school 17 18 17 17 20 21 17 
s.d. 4 5 5 6 7 9 6 
Central Uplands Starting school 8 9 10 12 13 9 
s.d. 2 3 2 3 3 3 
Finishing school 17 16 16 16 17 16 
s.d. 3 2 4 3 4 3 
South East Starting school 8 8 9 11 10 11 9 
s.d. 2 3 5 5 8 8 5 
Finishing school 14 16 16 15 14 14 15 
s.d. 3 4 6 6 8 8 5 
Mekong River Delta Starting school 9 9 10 10 11 12 12 10 
s.d. 3 3 4 5 4 9 8 5 
Finishing school 15 16 15 16 15 16 15 15 
s.d. 1 4 4 5 5 10 8 6 
Rural VN Starting school 7 8 9 10 12 16 17 
s.d. 2 3 3 5 6 8 11 
• Finishing school 15 16 17 17 17 19 21 
s.d. 1 3 4 5 7 9 11 
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3.3.2 The Endogeneity of Migration 
During its turbulent history, Vietnam experienced important movements of 
migration. Data from the VLSS 127 allow us to capture the magnitude of 
migration that affected the generations which lived through and survived the two 
wars 128 . On average, as many as 36 percent of the households interviewed in 
rural areas had migrated at some point in their lives (see Table 3-12). As a result, 
there may be concern that endogenous migration may bias the effect of education 
upward. 
Table 3-12: Migration from birth place ( % of household heads — VLSS 
1992) 
Migration from birth place 	Rural 	Urban 
Northern Uplands 	 38 17 
Red River Delta 57 	29 
North Central Coast 	 46 	28 
South Central Coast 27 16 
Central Uplands 	 2 
South East 	 5 	5 
Mekong River Delta 	 25 15  
Total 	 36 	17 
This may be the case for example if families migrated to a particular region so 
that their children could benefit from better access to education. Although the 
Viet Minh government ordered compulsory draft in 1949 129, material 
inducements were also used to entice men to join the army. In particular, literacy 
classes were offered to soldiers, who also received promises of access to 
education after their times as soldiers. As a veteran soldier of Son-Duong village 
remembered, after joining the Viet Minh army in 1948, 
"despite the occasional confrontation with French troops, I managed to take 
literacy classes during my four years as a soldier, finishing the equivalent of 
three grades and learning how to do calculations." (Hy V. Luong 1992: 153) 
127 See section 5 "Migration" in the VLSS questionnaire. Question s5q03 asks "in what province were 
you born?" Question s5q05 "how old were you when you left your place of birth for the first time to live 
somewhere else?" Question s5q06 "for what reason did you leave you place of birth?" Question s5q08 "what 
was the main reason you came to your present residence?" 
128 There is obviously a survivor bias here. 
129 According to Van Dyke (1972), registration for conscription started at the age of 18. The first draft into the 
army lasted for a period of two years within the next 1.5 years unless it was specially deferred. The draft was 
limited to people aged between 18 and 25 year-old and was later expanded to those aged 16-45 year-old. 
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Another one recalled, 
"I joined the People's Army in 1949, when the Viet Minh came to our class 
and urge us to make our contributions [to the cause of anti-colonial 
resistance]. Teachers and students, we all went." (Hy V. Luong 1992: 154) 
Similarly, a Rand corporation study of Communist revolutionary warfare in 
Vietnam also found that the army provided basic schooling to many illiterate 
recruits and that conversely, as many as half the recruits of the Viet Minh army 
were already literate and had decided to join out of patriotism or communist 
beliefs 130 (Tanham 1961: 57) 131 . 
This latter anecdote finds some confirmation in the VLSS data, which collected 
data on the reason why individuals decided to leave their place of birth' 32 . 
Answers are presented in Table 3-13 133 and show that the two most important 
reasons for migration were enrolment in the army and war displacements, 
together accounting for 70 percent of migration 134 . 
The percentage of household heads who joined the army during the French and 
the American war respectively is shown in Table 3-14 below. A relatively large 
proportion of individuals actually received their education after joining the army 
(44 percent and 34 percent on average for the French and the American war 
respectively). Conversely, the proportion of educated, literate individuals joining 
the army was equally large, at about 56 percent and 66 percent respectively. 
130 Tanham (1961) reports that some surveys of the social composition of Viet Minh forces showed that 46 
percent of the army were composed of peasants and labourers, and 48 percent were composed of so-called 
"petty officials". 
131 Van Dyke (1972) also explains that joining the army often meant receiving a regular income and other 
benefits such as free medical care and veteran allowances, additional quantities of rationed goods, as well as 
promises of further education. 
132 Question s5q06 in the VLSS 1992 questionnaire asked, "for what reason did you leave your place of birth?" 
133 Note that a survivor bias may be impacting the picture presented in the tables below. 
134 Results for the Central Highlands region should be viewed with caution, as the sample size is very small. 
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Table 3-13: Reasons for migrating from birth place (VLSS 1992) 
Reasons for 
migration 
Rural VN Northern 
Uplands 
Red River 
Delta 
North 
Central 
Coast 
South 
Central 
Coast 
Central 
Uplands 
South 
East 
Mekong 
River 
Delta 
All Rural 
VN 
family 1 2 2 2 4 0 0 3 2 
work 12 6 15 15 8 0 6 9 9 
marriage 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 2 1 
school 12 7 8 8 9 50 6 10 9 
army 67 72 65 65 34 50 29 31 61 
NEZ 1 2 1 1 4 0 0 0 2 
relocation 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
war 3 1 5 5 26 0 41 33 9 
disaster 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
chance 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
famprob 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
newjob 1 7 2 2 9 0 12 11 6 
no habit 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
other 0 1 2 2 5 0 6 2 1 
Army + war 70 73 69 69 61 50 71 64 70 
NB: main reason to migrate from birth place 
Table 3-14: Education and the Army 
Vietnam - French War 	Vietnam - American War 
% joined 
army 
educated 
before 
joining 
army 
educated 
after 
joining 
army 
% joined 
army 
educated 
before 
joining 
army 
educated 
after 
joining 
army 
Northern Uplands 13 64 36 29 61 39 
Red River Delta 21 52 48 45 63 37 
North Central Coast 23 61 39 30 77 23 
South Central Coast 4 33 67 12 67 33 
Central Uplands 0 0 0 2 100 0 
South East 0 0 0 2 100 0 
Mekong River Delta 6 63 38 9 71 29 
Table 3-15, Table 3-16 and Table 3-17 show the breakdown of educational 
attainments for three categories of individuals: (i) soldiers who received their 
education before joining the army (Table 3-15); (ii) soldiers who received their 
education after joining the army (Table 3-16); (iii) individuals who did not join 
the army (Table 3-17). 
Most strikingly, and in contrast to the experience of a number of European 
countries during World War II (Ichino and Winter-Ebmer 1999), those who 
joined the army were not worse off in terms of educational attainments. On the 
contrary, a large proportion of soldiers had already completed their education 
before joining the army and was relatively well educated and literate. During the 
Franco-Viet Minh war, those soldiers had received an average of 4 to 8 years of 
schooling and many of them had completed primary education (see the top panel 
in Table 3-15). During the American war, they had attended school for an 
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average period of 5 to 11 years and a very large percentage had even completed 
secondary schooling. These statistics provide some evidence that the 
mobilisation strategies adopted by the Viet Minh were successful in enlisting the 
educated elite, who also played a key role in the success of the mass literacy 
programme launched by the Viet Minh in 1945. 
Also, the large proportion of soldiers who were educated after the war were not 
worse off. As shown in Table 3-16, they started schooling at a later age (18-30 
year old during the French War, and 15-19 year-old during the American War) 
with a majority of them eventually completing primary or secondary education. 
These educational attainments should not be emphasized however, since it is 
known that the promise of a degree 135 was part of the incentives used by the Viet 
Minh to persuade people to join the army. Nevertheless, the level of literacy and 
numeracy among those soldiers is high (see columns (4) and (5) in Table 3-16) 136 
 and is evidence that the education they received did provide them with basic 
literacy and numeracy skills. Finally, those who did not join the army were not 
more educated than their counterparts (Table 3-17). 
How does soldiers' preferential access to education affect our identification 
strategy? Individuals who joined the army before the age of 18 (the conscription 
age) represent about 10 percent of the VLSS sample of veteran soldiers, of which 
7.5 percent joined at age 17, 2.1 percent joined at age 16, and 0.6 percent before 
the age of 16 (see Table 3-18). Education age is therefore defined, for 
identification purpose, as taking place between the ages of 8 and 15. Curtailing 
education age at age 15 for the construction of our IV helps minimise the 
likelihood of self-selection bias stemming from individuals who may have joined 
the army in order to obtain education. 
133 In Vietnam, obtaining a degree bestows a considerable amount of prestige on the degree-holder. 
136 Recall that the ratios for literacy and numeracy were externally assessed through tests rather than self-
assessed. 
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 Educated after joining the army (French War) 
Rural Vietnam 
mean 
mean age 	 mean 	low 	mean 
# years mean age finishing primary second 	upper 
education starting 	school 	reading counting school 	school 	second 
(1) 	school (2) 	(3) 	(4) 	(5 ) 	(6) 	(7) 	school (8) 
Northern Uplands 	7.8 	18 	26 	75% 	75% 	100% 	50% 	0% 
Red River Delta 4.7 	22 	28 	83% 	83% 	53% 	20% 	0% 
North Central Coast 	8.3 	22 	30 	86% 	86% 	86% 	71% 	57% 
South Central Coast 	4.5 	23 	32 	100% 	50% 	50% 	50% 	0% 
Central Uplands 
South East 
Mekong River Delta 	2.7 	30 	34 	50% 	50% 	0% 	0% 	0%  
Educated after joining the army (American War) 
education 	starting 	school reading counting school school second 
(1) 	school (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) school 
Northern Uplands 7.5 16.3 25.0 83% 83% 79% 54% 29% 
Red River Delta 10.9 14.7 25.6 97% 95% 100% 91% 57% 
North Central Coast 9.3 15.9 25.1 100% 100% 100% 81% 38% 
South Central Coast 5.8 17.0 25.8 67% 50% 50% 50% 17% 
Central Uplands 
South East 
Mekong River Delta 5.4 19.1 24.5 89% 67% 60% 10% 0% 
(8) 
mean 
mean age 	 mean 	low 	mean 
# years mean age finishing second 	upper primary Rural Vietnam 
Table 3-15: Educational attainments of soldiers educated before joining the 
army (during the French war and the American war) 
Rural Vietnam 
Educated before joining the army (French War) 
% joined # years 
army education 
(1) 
mean 
mean age 	mean age 	 primary 
starting 	finishing counting 	school 
school (2) 	school (3) reading (4) 	(5) 	(6) 
mean 
low 
second 
school 
mean 
upper 
second 
school 
Northern Uplands 
Red River Delta 
North Central Coast 
South Central Coast 
Central Uplands 
South East 
Mekong River Delta 
13 	3.7 
21 	6.3 
23 	4.6 
4 	4.0 
0 
0 
6 	4.6 
12 
13 
12 
9 
9 
16 	86% 
20 	93% 
16 	55% 
13 	100% 
14 	75% 
86% 
93% 
55% 
100% 
50% 
43% 
75% 
73% 
0% 
20% 
0% 
25% 
9% 
0% 
20% 
0% 
6% 
9% 
0% 
20% 
Total 12 
Educated before joining the army (American War) 
Rural Vietnam % joined army 	# years mean age mean age 
mean 
primary 
mean 
low 
second 
mean 
upper 
second 
education starting finishing counting school school school 
(1) school (2) school (3) reading (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Northern Uplands 29 	7.2 9.2 16.4 	97% 97% 81% 51% 3% 
Red River Delta 45 	8.0 8.7 16.7 	95% 91% 92% 66% 12% 
North Central Coast 30 	7.3 9.6 16.9 	96% 92% 88% 46% 8% 
South Central Coast 12 	5.5 9.3 14.8 	92% 69% 77% 15% 0% 
Central Uplands 2 	2.0 12.0 14.0 	0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
South East 2 	6.3 9.3 9.3 	100% 67% 33% 33% 0% 
Mekong River Delta 9 	4.7 10.0 14.7 	85% 60% 48% 13% 9% 
Table 3-16: Educational attainments of soldiers educated after joining the 
army (during the French war and the American war) 
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Rural Vietnam 
Did not join the army (French War) 
% did # years mean age mean age 
mean 
mean low 
primary second 
mean 
upper 
second 
not join education starting finishing counting 	school school school 
army ( 1 ) school (2) school (3) reading (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Northern Uplands 87 3.4 18 22 	57% 59% 30% 5% 4% 
Red River Delta 79 3.9 17 23 	56% 50% 35% 18% 10% 
North Central Coast 78 5.5 16 22 	68% 65% 53% 24% 16% 
South Central Coast 96 2.5 16 19 	55% 45% 19% 4% 1% 
Central Uplands 100 1.5 12 16 	58% 42% 21% 7% 7% 
South East 100 2.9 13 17 	60% 44% 30% 4% 0% 
Mekong River Delta 94 2.4 13 17 	49% 41% 19% 4% 2% 
Total 88 
Rural Vietnam 
°A did not join army (American War) 
% did # years mean age mean age 
mean 
mean low 
primary second 
mean 
upper 
second 
not join education starting finishing counting 	school school school 
army (1) school (2) school (3) reading (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Northern Uplands 71 6.9 11.7 19.3 	83% 80% 69% 42% 24% 
Red River Delta 55 7.8 11.2 19.4 	84% 81% 80% 57% 28% 
North Central Coast 70 7.8 10.8 19.0 	85% 79% 80% 55% 25% 
South Central Coast 88 5.1 11.1 17.2 	71% 59% 49% 22% 13% 
Central Uplands 98 3.8 10.6 16.3 	63% 49% 46% 12% 6% 
South East 98 5.5 10.3 16.7 	77% 59% 56% 29% 9% 
Mekong River Delta 91 4.5 11.3 16.4 	70% 51% 43% 16% 4% 
Table 3-17: Education of men who did not join the army (during the French 
war and the American war) 
Table 3-18: Age of joining the army (VLSS 1992) 
Age of migration when reason is to join the army 
Percentiles Smallest Largest 
1% 16 10 36 
5% 17 14 38 
10% 17 14 38 
25% 18 15 43 
50% 19 Mean 20 
75% 21 Std. Dev. 3 
90% 24 Variance 11 
95% 26 Skewness 2 
99% 34 Kurtosis 11 
3.3.3 Specification Issues: Interpretation of IV Results and Control 
Variables 
In Section 3.3.1, I have presented what will be used as the instrumental variable 
for education: the interaction between (a) the historical phase during which an 
individual reached education age, and (b) a dummy variable indicating whether 
the individual was born (and was therefore implicitly educated) in North 
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Vietnam. The endogeneity bias due to migration was discussed in Section 3.3.2. 
By construction, the IV strategy should allow for arbitrary cohort effects and 
relies on exogenous variations in educational attainment between North and 
South Vietnam to identify the returns to education. 
Recalling the formulation of the basic model, Equation 3-1 to Equation 3-3 (see 
page 112 and 113), three key conditions need to be met for the IV estimation 
strategy to yield consistent results: (1) the IVs need to be correlated with 
educational attainments (Cov(Z, S) # 0); (2) the IVs need to be uncorrelated with 
latent characteristics that may impact individuals' productivity or earnings 
(Cov(Z, u) = 0 ); (3) the returns to education are homogenous across individuals. 
Condition (1) is tested directly by regressing the set of IVs on various indicators 
of educational attainment. Tests for the validity of instruments are systematically 
provided in Section 3.4. Conditions (2) would not be met if systematic variations 
between North and South Vietnam in the outcome of interest (e.g. agricultural 
productivity) were linked to investment (e.g. the construction of irrigation and 
drainage infrastructure) coinciding with one of the key Education Phases during 
which a high number of schools were also constructed (Nguyen Khac Vien 
1981). 
In North Vietnam, large-scale irrigation projects were initiated in the 1960s and 
1970s, bringing 500,000 ha of land under irrigation. In our model, which 
estimates the impact of education on agricultural productivity, three variables are 
added in order to control for systematic differences between North and South 
Vietnam in access to irrigation and soil quality: (a) the proportion of good 
quality annual land, (b) the proportion of bad quality annual land, and (c) the 
proportion of annual land under irrigation. 
Condition (2) would also be violated if there existed systematic differences in 
preferences for education and in abilities between Northern and Southern 
Vietnamese, or if individuals purposefully migrated in order to seek education. 
This would bias the effect of education upward. As Table 3-13 above shows, 
schooling represented about 9 percent of total migration movements (to compare 
with 70 percent for migration caused by war displacement or having to join the 
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army). Curtailing education age at age 15 for the construction of the IV as 
explained earlier does not address either source of endogeneity bias. 
Unfortunately, it has not been possible to tackle these last two redoubts of 
endogeneity conclusively. However, both the magnitude of the divergence in 
education between North and South Vietnam brought about by differential 
educational policies, and the modest proportion of migration motivated by 
schooling, should help mitigate this endogeneity bias. 
Lastly, condition (3) would be violated if the returns to education were to vary 
across individuals. Consequently, the IV strategy would not estimate the average 
marginal return to education in the population, but rather a weighted average of 
the marginal returns of the subset of individuals, whose education choices were 
affected by the instrument — or what has been labelled the local average 
treatment effect (Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin 1996; Ichino and Winter-Ebmer 
1999; Angrist and Krueger 2001; Card 2001; Heckman and Vytlacil 2003) 137 - 138 . 
3.3.4 Summary of the Econometric Specification 
This chapter aims at measuring the effect of education on rice productivity 
measured as rice yields per hectare of rice land owned. Four indicators of 
educational attainment are used: (i) the number of years of schooling; a dummy 
variable indicating whether the individual attained a high level of (ii) literacy and 
(iii) numeracy; and (iv) three dummy variables indicating the level of education 
attained (primary, lower secondary and upper secondary levels). 
The first-stage reduced form equation for education (Equation 3-4) is estimated 
by OLS: 
137 Two main criticisms have been leveled at Angrist and Krueger, who exploited compulsory schooling rules 
and quarters of birth as IVs. One is the use of weak TVs, and the other is that quarter of birth may be correlated 
with unobserved ability differences (correlation with family background). According to Angrist, Imbens and 
Rubin (1996), the estimates of the returns to schooling are sensitive to the choice of instruments and the estimated 
parameters are defined only for the subset of the population that has been affected by the instrument (in their 
own terminology, the 'compliers'). 
138 Given the scale of the population affected by the education policies and the scale of the changes in 
educational attainments during the historical phases identified above, the population of "defiers" and the 
differences between always-takers and the compliers small is likely to be small (Angrist, Imbens and Rubin 
(1996)). 
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Equation 3-4: S1 =Z;7"C +VI 
7 
with Z,=EPhase _j,•birth _north, 
j=2 
Equation 3-1 (see page 112) is estimated using OLS and two-stage least square 
(IV) estimators. In order to ensure that the exclusion restrictions for the IVs are 
met, the specification includes a set of control variables described in section 
3.3.3. The control variables include: region of birth (i.e. North or South), the 
working experience of the household head (calculated as the number of years 
worked since completing school) 139 and its square, the size of annual land owned 
(in hectares) 14° , the proportion of good and bad annual land (the omitted category 
is medium quality land), and the percentage of annual land under irrigation. 
Commune dummies are introduced in the OLS estimation in order to control for 
as many omitted variables as possible. Robust standard errors are computed for 
both OLS (corrected for commune level clustering) and IV regressions. Both 
OLS and two-stage least square (IV) estimands are reported in order to assess the 
sensitivity of the results to the specification issues discussed earlier. 
3.4 Education and Agricultural Productivity: Results and 
Interpretation 
With the liberalisation of agricultural markets in the early 1990s, Vietnamese 
farmers were suddenly confronted with considerable changes in farming 
environment: quotas on input and output markets were gradually lifted, prices 
were liberalised and agricultural technology became more affordable (Benjamin 
and Brandt 2004). In times of rapid economic changes, mere literacy and 
numeracy skills may not be sufficient and one may expect higher levels of 
formal education to have a substantial impact on farming efficiency 141. Special 
effort has therefore been made to distinguish primary schooling with higher 
139 In keeping with Mincer regression, experience of the household head as a rice farmer and the square of that 
variable are also included as control variables. 
149 As demonstrated in Chapter 2 of this thesis, annual land size in 1992 can be considered as largely 
exogenous to households' decisions. 
141 For example, there is abundant evidence of overuse of chemical fertilisers (in particular of Nitrogen), with 
deleterious long-term consequences on soil quality and on farmers' health. 
125 
levels of education (lower secondary and upper secondary education), 
particularly since access to primary education in Vietnam is relatively 
widespread (see Table 3-4 above and the descriptive statistics in Table 3-19 
below). 
Given the scale and speed of economic transformations occurring in Vietnam, 
most of the mechanisms connecting education to agricultural productivity 
described in Section 3.1 may have been at play. Empirical evidence on returns to 
education in Vietnam remains sparse. Studies that tried to estimate labour market 
outcomes using standard Mincerian regression models (Moock, Patrinos, and 
Venkataraman 2003; Nguyen Nguyet Nga 2004) have found relatively low 
returns to education (below 5 percent, to compare with wage returns of 8-10 
percent in other developing countries). This result is in keeping with returns to 
education in other socialist or ex-socialist countries such as rural China 
(Psacharopoulos and Patrinos 2002; de Brauw and Rozelle 2004). However, 
revised estimates provided by de Brauw and Rozelle (2004) show that estimates 
for China were systematically underestimated because nonlinearities in returns to 
education as well as selection and measurement error bias had not been 
accounted for. 
The impact of education on agricultural productivity was studied by Dominique 
van de Walle (2003). Three major results come out of her study of irrigation and 
agricultural productivity in Vietnam: (i) firstly, education of the household head 
and other family members makes a significant contribution to farm profitability; 
(ii) additionally, there also seems to exist important complementarities between 
education and irrigation, thereby giving some indication that education does help 
,• • •\ Vietnamese farmers make better use of agricultural technology 142 ; (iii) finally, 
primary education, but not higher levels of education, have a significant impact 
on farm profitability. 
Descriptive statistics are presented in the Appendices of this Chapter, Section 
3.6. Table 3-19 shows that at the mean, there is little variation in the proportion 
142 Irrigation decisions are made at the communal level. This would concern only the use of private irrigation 
devices. 
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of household heads with primary education. A greater contrast between North 
and South Vietnam persists with respect to secondary education. 
Table 3-19: Rice productivity and educational attainment - a comparison by 
region (1992) 
Rural Vietnam years of 
rice yield 	schooling 
% Prim. 
School 
% low 	% upper 
secondary secondary 
school 	school 
Northern Uplands 2.70 6.61 0.27 0.28 0.15 
Red River Delta 3.79 7.31 0.20 0.40 0.17 
North Central Coast 3.00 7.14 0.25 0.30 0.20 
South Central Coast 2.84 4.58 0.25 0.11 0.09 
Central Uplands 3.04 3.96 0.25 0.13 0.07 
South East 2.58 4.72 0.29 0.14 0.05 
Mekong River Delta 3.13 4.09 0.25 0.10 0.04 
Total 3.13 5.88 0.25 0.24 0.12 
Table 3-20 below reports the results for all four measures of educational 
attainment. Panel A presents the results for years of schooling, Panel B and C 
present the results for numeracy and literacy levels, and Panel D shows the 
results for differing levels of educational attainment. In each panel, OLS results 
are shown in columns 1 and 2 and IV results are reported in column 3. Estimates 
that are significant at the 5 percent level are highlighted in bold characters. The 
instrument variable strategy should allow us to control for the potential 
correlation between educational attainments on the one hand, and innate abilities 
or family background on the other hand, and should therefore yield most robust 
results. 
The over-identification test (the Sargan/Hansen statistics) is passed in all cases. 
The Staiger and Stock test of weak instruments is examined with the Shea partial 
R-square and the associated F-test (an F-test above 10 is routinely recommended 
(Baum, Shaffer, and Stillman 2003) for robustness) and fails in one instance: the 
F-test of the instruments for primary education is below 5 (see Panel B). The 
results in each Panel are now analysed in turn. 
3.4.1 Years of schooling 
Similarly to Van de Walle (2003), years of schooling are found to have a 
significant impact on rice productivity, albeit it is a small one. One additional 
year of education yields an increase in rice yields of 1.3 percent (Panel A). 
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However, as indicated in subsequent panels, this result may be due to 
misspecification issues, as non-linearities in years of schooling are not accounted 
for. Research on education shows that completion of 6 to 10 years of primary 
education is needed for basic competencies to be acquired (Birdsall, Ibrahim, and 
Gupta 2004). The fact that numeracy and literacy skills have a large impact on 
rice yields (see below) suggests that the low 1.3 percent return to one more year 
of schooling is indeed due to mis-specifying linearities. 
3.4.2 Literacy and numeracy skills 
Panel B and C confirm the importance of literacy and numeracy in agriculture. 
Interestingly, the IV estimates are considerably larger than the OLS results 
(similar gaps between OLS and IV estimates are also found by Ichino and 
Winter-Ebmer 1999). There are two important sources of bias: measurement 
errors that bias the OLS estimates downward and omitted abilities that cause an 
upward bias in the OLS estimates. In addition, this result may be an artefact of 
the IV estimates retrieving the weighted average returns for individuals whose 
education choice was affected by the instrument and whose returns to education 
were larger than the average marginal returns in the population. Card (2001) 
confirms that to date, the IV literature for education generally found that IV 
estimates were larger than OLS estimates. 
Data on numeracy and literacy skills are generally subject to considerable 
measurement errors. In this case, numeracy and literacy levels were not self-
assessed but evaluated externally through simple writing and numeracy tests. 
However, Panel B and C show that OLS estimates are considerably smaller than 
IV estimates. With the caveat that the IV estimates may capture local average 
treatment effects rather than population average returns, these results also 
indicate that, even though the method of data collection should have helped 
minimise measurement errors, the latter still constitute the most important source 
of bias. As a result, OLS considerably underestimate the contribution of basic 
literacy and numeracy skills to agricultural productivity: the IV returns to 
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literacy and numeracy are 38 percent and 27 percent respectively 143 , instead of 
7.6 percent and 6.4 percent using OLS. 
3.4.3 Levels of education 
Panel D, which shows the returns to three levels of educational attainment, i.e. 
primary education, lower secondary education, and upper secondary and higher 
education, yields the most provoking results. 
OLS estimates for all three levels of education are relatively large and 
significant, at around 5-7 percent. Looking at Column 3 in Panel D, IV estimates 
for primary and lower secondary levels of education lose significance whilst the 
returns to upper secondary education remain statistically significant at the 5 % 
level and increase substantially from 5 percent to 31 percent 144 . 
As noted earlier, following Staiger and Stock's test of weak instrument, the IVs 
for primary education are weak (F-test of 5). Therefore, one should be careful in 
drawing inference from the IV results on primary education. Moreover, at the 
mean, North and South Vietnam differ least in terms of primary education and 
most in terms of upper secondary and higher education. Therefore, the absence 
of impact of primary education once it is instrumented (and the fact that the 
instrument is found to be weak) does not come as a surprise. 
Nevertheless, the IVs for both lower secondary education and upper secondary 
education pass the tests for instruments. The discussion here will focus on the 
latter variables. Changes between OLS and IV estimates seem to indicate that (1) 
the most important problem in estimating the returns to lower secondary 
education using OLS comes from the inability to control for innate abilities, 
causing an upward bias; (2) the OLS returns to upper secondary and higher 
education are substantially underestimated because of large measurement errors. 
What is it that pertains to different levels of schooling, which allows one to 
obtain higher returns from education? That higher levels of education matter 
more than lower ones has been found in cross-country analysis, which show a 
143 Calculated as exp((3)-1. 
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strong association between female secondary education and lower fertility and 
mortality. Wage returns to education also vary by levels of schooling, and by 
gender: returns to primary education are higher for men than for women, and 
women have higher returns to secondary education than men have (Card 2001; 
Psacharopoulos and Patrinos 2002; Birdsall, Ibrahim, and Gupta 2004: 18). 
Research suggests that completion of 6 to 10 years of primary education may 
constitute critical thresholds for basic competencies such as literacy and 
numeracy to be acquired on a permanent basis. Moreover, once mastered, these 
skills may not be sustained over time if they are not required in one's daily 
environment (Birdsall, Ibrahim, and Gupta 2004). 
In the context of Vietnam, no information is available on the knowledge content 
imparted at different levels of education. Moreover, the exceptional conditions 
during which Vietnam's mass education policies were implemented, i.e. during 
times of war, with education being used as a tool to mobilise the population in 
political and armed struggles (for the older cohorts of individuals) complicate 
matters further. 
On the one hand, the absence of impact of lower secondary education (vis-à-vis 
no education), together with the strong impact of upper secondary education 
(vis-à-vis no education) on rice yields, raise questions as to whether lower 
secondary education did come with any appreciable learning, or whether there 
are skills specific to upper secondary education that matter for farming 
efficiency. 
On the other hand, the fact that literacy and numeracy levels have a strong 
impact on rice yields indicates that basic education skills do matter for 
efficiency. Recall that literacy and numeracy levels documented in this chapter 
were externally assessed, using reading, writing and numeracy tests, so that there 
is no denying that Vietnam's mass education policies did achieve their objectives 
to impart basic cognitive skills. 
Research on agriculture shows that returns to schooling are greater where 
technological progress is present (Lipton and Longhurst 1989; Foster and 
144 Calculated as exp(()-1. 
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Rosenzweig 1996b; Birdsall, Ibrahim, and Gupta 2004). The 1990s represent a 
period of very rapid economic changes for Vietnam., with Vietnam's 
unprecedented growth rates in rice yields obtained through greater adoption of 
yield-increasing technology (Benjamin and Brandt 2004). Moreover, as 
explained earlier, wet-rice farming techniques are particularly responsive to the 
skilful application of labour. In such a new and rapidly changing environment, 
there may be a particular premium to be gained from having completed upper 
secondary education. 
Table 3-20: Impact of Education on Rice Productivity 
Panel A: Years of Schooling 
In(rice yields) 
A- YEARS OF SCHOOLING 
	
OLS 	 OLS 	I 	IV 
1 2 I 3  
Coef s.e. 	t 	Cod s.e. 	t 	Coef 	s.e. 	t 
 
Education (rears) 	0.015 0.004 3.55 0.007 0.003 2.46 1 0.013 	0.005 	2.61 
Control variables* 	 YES 
Region dummies YES 
Communies dummies 
No. Obs 	 2820 
R-Square 0.31 
F-Test 	 15.42 
OVERID Test 
2820 
0.54 
2820 
0.31 
  
Sargan/Hansen J stat 	 j 10.01 
Chi-sq/P-value 0.53 
Shea Partial R-square 	 0.43 
F-test i 176.17 
* Control variables include (a) annual land size, (b) the proportion of good quality annual land, (c) the proportion of bad quality 
annual land, and (d) the proportion of annual land under irrigation, (e) experience of the household head as a farmer, (e) experience 
squared 
Panel B: Numeracy 
In(rice yields) 	 OLS 	 OLS 	I 	IV 
C- NUMERACY 1 2 I 3  
Coef s.e. 	t 	Coef s.e. 	t 	Coef 	s.e. 	t 
Counting (0/1) 	 0.114 0.031 3.7 0.062 0;01 73.57 1  0241 	0.070 	3.44 
Control variables* 	 YES 
Region dummies YES 
Communies dummies 
YES YES 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES YES 
YES 
 
YES 
 
No. Obs 	 2820 	 2820 
R-Square 0.31 0.54 
F-Test 	 16.39 	 25.81 
OVERID Test 
2820 
0.30 
 
Sargan/Hansen I stat 	 9.49 
Chi-sq/P-value 0.58 
Shea Partial R-square 	 0.08 
F-test 20.59 
* Control variables include (a) annual land size, (b) the proportion of good quality annual land, (c) the proportion of bad quality 
annual land, and (d) the proportion of annual land under irrigation, (e) experience of the household head as a farmer, (e) experience 
squared 
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Panel C: Literacy 
In(rice yields) 	 OLS 	 OLS 	 IV 
D- LITERACY 1 2 I 	 3  
Coef 	s.e. 	t 	Coef 	s.e. 	t 	I Coef 	s.e. 	t 
Reading (13/1) 	 0.107 0.030 3.59 0.074 0.019 3.96 	o323 	0.088 	3.69 
Control variables* 	 YES 	 YES 	 YES 
Region dummies YES I YES 
Communies dummies 	 YES 
No. Obs 	 2820 	 2820 	 2820 
R-Square 0.31 0.54 0.28 
F-Test 	 17.11 	 25.86  
OVERID Test 
	
Sargan/Hansen J stat 	 7.52 
Chi-sq/P-value 0.76 
Shea Partial R-square 	 0.06 
F-test j 	15.11 
* Control variables include (a) annual land size, (b) the proportion of good quality annual land, (c) the proportion of bad quality 
annual land, and (d) the proportion of annual land under irrigation, (e) experience of the household head as a farmer, (e) experience 
squared 
Panel D: Levels of Education 
In(rice yields) 
B- LEVELS OF EDUCATION 
OLS 
1 
OLS 
2 I 
IV 
3 
Coef s.e. t Coef s.e. t Coef s.e. t 
Primary Education only 0.101 0.033 3.06 0.065 0.019 3.40 	I 0.013 0.192 0.07 
Lower Secondary Education only 0.142 0.037 3.78 0.073 0.024 3.11 -0.057 0.175 -0.33 
Upper Secondary Education only 0.127 0.041 3.12 0.051 0.027 1.87 0.269 0.102 2.63 
Control variables* YES YES YES 
Region dummies YES YES 
Communies dummies YES 
No. Ohs 2820 2820 2820 
R-Square 0.31 0.54 0.27 
F-Test 13.79 25.39 
OVERID Test 
Sargan/Hansen J stat 
	 7.85 
Chi-sq/P-value 0.55 
Shea Partial R-sq. F-Test 
primary education 0.02 4.94 
lower secondary education j 0.02 10.48 
upper secondary education 0.10 41.46 
* Control variables include (a) annual land size, (b) the proportion of good quality annual land, (c) the proportion of bad quality 
annual land, and (d) the proportion of annual land under irrigation, (e) experience of the household head as a farmer, (e) experience 
squared 
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3.5 Conclusion 
The contribution of this chapter is two-fold. First, it sheds light on the 
circumstances that allowed Vietnam to emerge from thirty years of war with 
literacy and numeracy levels that are normally achieved by middle-income 
countries such as Thailand or Indonesia. It explained how the goal of achieving 
universal literacy, announced by Ho Chi Minh upon declaring Vietnam's 
independence from French rule in 1945, became an integral part of the Viet 
Minh's guerrilla warfare tactics that were put into place during the war against 
France between 1946-1954. Finally, the gap in educational attainment between 
North and South Vietnam was traced back to the 1954 partition of Vietnam and 
to the differential implementation of education policies between 1954 and 1975. 
The second contribution of this chapter pertains to the literature on education and 
economic growth. When land was redistributed and agricultural markets were 
liberalised at the end of the 1980s and in the early 1990s, Vietnamese farmers 
were faced with a new and rapidly changing environment. Meanwhile, the 
agricultural sector grew at unprecedented rates during the 1990s, transforming 
Vietnam into a major player in world agricultural export markets. This chapter 
examined the contribution of Vietnam's high initial levels of educational 
attainment to agricultural growth. 
I have used exogenous variations in education brought about by the partition of 
Vietnam in 1954 and the implementation of differential education policies 
between North and South Vietnam to devise an instrumental variable strategy 
that controls for the endogeneity of education and estimate the effect of various 
indicators of educational attainment on rice productivity. A word of caution is 
necessary since, as explained in section 3.3.3, two redoubts of endogeneity (i.e. 
systematic differences in preferences for education and in abilities between 
North and South Vietnam, and purposeful migration in order to seek education) 
remain. However, both the magnitude of the historical divergence in education 
between North and South Vietnam brought about by differential educational 
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policies, and the modest proportion of migration motivated by schooling, should 
help mitigate this endogeneity bias. 
Whilst the role of education in the process of economic development remains 
much of a black box, the results found here confirm the importance of literacy 
and numeracy skills as pre-conditions for agricultural growth. Higher levels of 
skills also matter significantly. The returns to literacy and to holding upper 
secondary degrees on rice yields are 38 percent and 31 percent respectively. In 
many instances, IV estimates were found to be considerably larger than OLS 
estimates, indicating that measurement error may be more of a problem than 
omitting to control for innate abilities. 
In keeping with the literature, years of schooling are also found to have a 
significant impact on rice productivity, with one additional year of education 
yielding an increase in rice yields of 1.3 percent. Since basic literacy and 
numeracy skills, which can only be acquired after completing several years of 
education, have a large and significant impact on farm efficiency, these low 
returns to years of schooling are probably due to mis-specifying linearity. 
In contrast with findings in the empirical literature, primary education is found to 
have no effect on rice yields. However, care is required in drawing any inference 
from the IV results on primary education because of weak instrumentation. 
More provoking are findings that, after instrumentation, lower secondary 
education has no impact on rice yields, whilst large and significant impacts are 
found for upper secondary and higher education. This latter result combined with 
the fact that numeracy and literacy levels also have a large impact on rice yields, 
suggest that the specific circumstances in which Vietnam found itself at the end 
of the 1980s, when it liberalised its agriculture, provided a particular advantage 
to those with basic competencies and higher skills. However, all in all, in order 
to determine the impact of different levels of schooling on productivity, one 
would need to ascertain the specific knowledge or cognitive content attached to a 
particular schooling level. 
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In its endeavour to build a labour force that can respond to the new challenges of 
industrialisation and urbanisation, Vietnam can also probably look to the 
experience of Taiwan, which engaged in a purposeful accumulation of human 
capital. Since the 1960s, Taiwan's educational expansion has been guided by a 
specially designed plan, based on economic projections of occupational 
requirements for various levels of education levels. Emphasis was given to 
vocational education as opposed to general education, with a ratio of vocational 
to senior high school education of 52/48 in 1972 and targeted at 70/30. 
According to Yunez-Naude and Taylor, 
"this policy was designed specifically to meet the greater economic demand 
for semiskilled labor. It was a deliberate and carefully planned effort to 
match educational output with economic need." (Yunez-Naude and Taylor 
2001: 1033) 
The exceptional circumstances that allowed Vietnam to attain the high levels of 
literacy and numeracy documented here under severe resource constraints were 
tied to Vietnam's eventful twentieth-century history. As Vietnam develops 
further, it faces the challenge of accumulating further human capital as demand 
for higher-skilled labour force increases. Vietnam has recently renewed its 
pledge to further universal literacy and higher education levels with the 
enactment of a new Education Law on December 2, 1998, with a particular focus 
on its higher education system. Educational programmes include universal 
literacy, obligatory primary education, support for education in remote and 
mountainous areas, and school building. The target for obligatory secondary 
education is set for 2010 and 2020, whilst the target to build a sufficient number 
of schools is set to 2010 145 . 
Studies of the growth experience of South East Asian countries that grew to 
become industrialised nations very fast show that considerable investments in 
primary schooling might have been key determinants of subsequent growth. 
Mingat (1998) explains that providing literacy and numeracy skills allows 
individuals to function and adapt better to changing circumstances. 
145 Areas where access to school was identified as difficult are also specifically targeted such as remote areas of 
the Mekong River Delta, coastal areas, and newly occupied regions of the Central Highlands. 
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"This is true in spite of the specialized nature of these occupations and the 
apparent weak relationship between what is learned in school and what is 
used by those earning their livings from activities in the informal sector. This 
points to the general usefulness of basic knowledge in making people more 
able to adapt to their environment efficiently." (Mingat 1998: 701) 
In that respect, Vietnam did emerge from 30 years of war with favourable 
conditions both for economic growth, and as will be argued in the next Chapter, 
for pro-poor agricultural growth. 
Further discussions on the contribution of this chapter and suggestions for future 
avenues of research are provided in the conclusion of this thesis (Chapter 5). 
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3.6 Appendices 
3.6.1 	Sample Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3-21: Mean statistics 
1992 Obs Mean s.d Min Max 
ln(rice yields) 2977 1.05 0.51 -4 3 
Education (years) 2977 5.89 3.93 0 21 
Birth in North 2977 0.64 0.48 0 1 
Experience 2977 29.03 16.81 0 82 
Experience Sq. 2977 1125.32 1145.04 0 6724 
annual land 2977 0.48 0.56 0 10 
Good annual land (%) 2880 0.28 0.37 0 1 
Bad annual land (%) 2880 0.19 0.34 0 1 
Irrigated annual land (%) 2914 0.61 0.44 0 1 
Phase 2 2977 0.05 0.22 0 1 
Phase 3 2977 0.36 0.48 0 1 
Phase 4 2977 0.04 0.19 0 1 
Phase 5 2977 0.09 0.29 0 1 
Phase 6 2977 0.12 0.32 0 1 
Phase 7 2977 0.17 0.38 0 1 
Phase 2 * Born in North 2977 0.03 0.18 0 1 
Phase 3 * Born in North 2977 0.23 0.42 0 1 
Phase 4 * Born in North 2977 0.03 0.17 0 1 
Phase 5 * Born in North 2977 0.05 0.22 0 1 
Phase 6 * Born in North 2977 0.07 0.25 0 1 
Phase 7 * Born in North 2977 0.13 0.34 0 1 
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3.6.2 Results (Complete Tables) 
3.6.2.1 Rice Yields / Years of schooling (OLS vs. 2SLS-IV) 
In(rice yield 1992) 	 I Coef s.e. I 	Coef 	s.e. Coef s.e. 
2 
OLS (robust s.e.) 
3 
OLS (robust s.e.) 
5 
2SLS IV 
Education 	ears) 0.015 0.004 3.55 0.007 0.003 2.46 0.013 0.005 2.57 
Birth in North -0.05 0.05 -1.03 
Experience -0.00 0.00 -1.08 -0.00 0.00 -1.26 -0.00 0.00 -1.19 
Experience Sq. 0.00 0.00 1.42 0.00 0.00 0.95 0.00 0.00 1.42 
annual land -0.04 0.03 -1.42 0.01 0.02 0.39 -0.03 0.03 -1.16 
Good annual land (%) 0.20 0.04 5.28 0.12 0.03 4.52 0.22 0.04 5.44 
Bad annual land (%) -0,38 0.08 -5.09 -0.10 0.04 -2.42 -0.40 0.08 -5.36 
Irrigated annual land (%) 0.25 0.06 4.31 0.09 0.04 2.63 0.25 0.06 4.49 
Constant 0.81 0.07 11.29 0.04 0.13 0.31 0.91 0.07 12.78 
Regional dummies YES NO 
Commune dummies NO YES 
Obs 2820 2820 2820 
Centered R-Square 0.31 0.54 0.30 
Uncentered R-Square 0.87 
F-test 15.42 
P-value 
Endogenous variable: Education (years) 
Shea Partial R-square 0.43 
F-test 176.67 
OVERID test of all IVs 
	
Sargan/Hansen J stat 	 10.60 
Chi-sq/P-value 0.48 
1-st stage regression 
education (years) 
Phase 2 -4.29 0.39 -11.09 
Phase 3 -11.14 0.35 -31.43 
Phase 4 -20.40 0.65 -31.51 
Phase 5 -3.28 0.29 -11.21 
Phase 6 -6.56 0.33 -20.04 
Phase 7 -16.35 0.45 -36.34 
Phase 2 * Born in North 0.90 0.43 2.08 
Phase 3 * Born in North 0.70 0.25 2.79 
Phase 4 * Born in North 0.74 0.57 1.30 
Phase 5 * Born in North 0.90 0.34 2.63 
Phase 6 * Born in North 1.89 0.32 5.97 
Phase 7 * Born in North 0.54 0.31 1.71 
138 
3.6.2.2 Rice -Yields / Levels of schooling attained (OLS vs. 2SLS-IV) 
Coel 
0.10 
0.14 
0.13 
9 
OLS 
0.03 
0.04 
0.04 
3.06 
3.78 
3.12 
Coef 
0.07 
0.07 
0.05 
s.e. 
1 0 
OLS 
	
0.02 	3.40 
0.02 	3.11 
0.03 	1.87 
Coef 
0.00 
-0.08 
0.28 
s.e. 
12 
2SLS IV 
0.20 
0.18 
0.11 
-0.02 
-0.43 
2.61 
In(rice yield 1992) 
Primary Education (0/1) 
Lower Secondary Education (01/) 
Upper Secontlary Education (OA) 
Birth in North -0.03 0.03 -1.04 
Experience 0.00 0.00 -1.27 0.00 0.00 	-1.29 0.00 0.00 -1.31 
Experience Sq. 0.00 0.00 1.48 0.00 0.00 	1.10 0.00 0.00 0.97 
annual land -0.04 0.03 -1.44 0.01 0.01 	0.38 -0.03 0.02 -1.48 
Good annual land (%) 0.20 0.04 5.25 0.11 0.03 	3.84 0.24 0.03 8.96 
Bad annual land NO -0.38 0.08 -5.04 -0,10 0.03 	-3.13 -0.42 0.04 -10.68 
Irrigated annual land (%) 0.25 0.06 4.26 0.09 0.03 	3.20 0.24 0.03 8.72 
Constant 0.83 0.07 12.16 0.04 0.08 	0.54 1.01 0.11 9.25 
Regional dummies YES 
Commune dummies YES 
Obs 2820 2820 2820 
Centered R-Square 0.31 0.54 0.25 
Uncentered R-Square 0.86 
F-test 13.79 25.39 
P-value 0 0 0 
Shea Partial 12-square F-test 
Primary Education 0.016 4.84 
Lower Secondary Education 0.022 10.51 
Upper Secondary Education 0.092 41.59 
OVERID test of all IVs 
Sargan/Hansen J stat 8.81 
Chi-sq/P-value 0.45 
1-st stage regression 
Primary Education 
Phase 2 -0.01 0.07 -0.15 
Phase 3 -0.05 0.07 -0.71 
Phase 4 0.27 0.13 2.13 
Phase 5 -0.13 0.06 -2.36 
Phase 6 -0.03 0.06 -0.53 
Phase 7 0.15 0.09 1.72 
Phase 2 * Born in North -0.09 0.08 -1.13 
Phase 3 * Born in North -0.05 0.05 -0.99 
Phase 4 * Born in North -0.08 0.11 -0.7 
Phase 5 * Born in North 0.02 0.07 0.37 
Phase 6 * Born in North -0.16 0.06 -2.6 
Phase 7 * Born in North -0.15 0.06 -2.5 
Lower Secondary Education 
Phase 2 -0.15 0.07 -2.27 
Phase 3 -0.38 0.06 -6.39 
Phase 4 -0.79 0.11 -7.18 
Phase 5 -0.10 0.05 -1.99 
Phase 6 -0.26 0.06 -4.62 
Phase 7 -0.64 0.08 -8.35 
Phase 2 * Born in North 0.08 0.07 1.06 
Phase 3 * Born in North 0.20 0.04 4.59 
Phase 4 * Born in North 0.23 0.10 2.41 
Phase 5 * Born in North 0.04 0.06 0.77 
Phase 6 * Born in North 0.17 0.05 3.22 
Phase 7 * Born in North 0.26 0.05 4.91 
Upper Secondary Education 
Phase 2 -0.21 0.05 -4.24 
Phase 3 -0.58 0.05 -12.67 
Phase 4 -1.20 0.08 -14.27 
Phase 5 -0.13 0.04 -3.32 
Phase 6 -0.31 0.04 -7.4 
Phase 7 -0.90 0.06 -15.39 
Phase 2 * Born in North 0.11 0.06 1.95 
Phase 3 * Born in North 0.01 0.03 0.27 
Phase 4 * Born in North 0.02 0.07 0.27 
Phase 5 * Born in North 0.04 0.04 1 
Phase 6 * Born in North 0.16 0.04 3.79 
Phase 7 * Born in North -0.01 0.04 -0.31 
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3.6.2.3 Rice Yields / Numeracy (OLS vs. 2SLS-IV) 
LCVeLl s c,__= (11 
16 
	 OLS 
In(rice yield 1992) ' 	 061 _ 
15 
OLS 
17 
2SLS IV 
Counting (0/1) 0.11  0.03 3.70 0.06 0.02 3.57 0.24 0.07 3.44 
Birth in North -0.01 0.08 -0.11 
Experience -0.00 0.00 -1.73 -0.00 0.00 -1.38 -0.00 0.00 -0.76 
Experience Sq. 0.00 0.00 1.52 0.00 0.00 0.90 0.00 0.00 1.25 
annual land -0.04 0.03 -1.60 0.00 0.02 0.24 -0.05 0.02 -2.43 
Good annual land (%) 0.20 0.04 5.25 0.12 0.03 4.06 0.19 0.02 9.45 
Bad annual land (%) -0.38 0.08 -4.96 -0.10 0.03 -3.22 -0.38 0.04 -9.31 
Irrigated annual land (%) 0.24 0.06 4.21 0.09 0.03 3.15 0.23 0.03 8.74 
Constant 0.85 0.07 11.78 0.05 0.08 0.64 
Regional dummies YES YES 
Commune dummies YES 
Obs 2820 2820 2820 
Centered R-Square 0.31 0.54 0.30 
Uncentered R-Square 0.87 
F-test 16.39 25.81 
P-value 0 0 
Endogenous variable: Education 
Shea Partial R-square 
F-test 
OVERID test of all IVs 
Sargan/Hansen J stat 
Chi-sq/P-value 
0.08 
20.59 
9.49 
0.58 
1-st stage regression 
education 
Phase 2 -0.30 0.07 -4.33 
Phase 3 -0.63 0.06 -10.03 
Phase 4 -1.20 0.11 -10.41 
Phase 5 -0.21 0.05 -4.05 
Phase 6 -0.44 0.06 -7.58 
Phase 7 -0.96 0.08 -12.01 
Phase 2 * Born in North 0.08 0.08 1.02 
Phase 3 * Born in North 0.03 0.04 0.78 
Phase 4 * Born in North 0.02 0.10 0.18 
Phase 5 * Born in North 0.07 0.06 1.17 
Phase 6 * Born in North 0.20 0.06 3.53 
Phase 7 * Born in North 0.03 0.06 0.51 
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3.6.2.4 Rice Yields / Literacy (OLS vs. 2SLS-IV) 
  
        
ln(rice yield 1992) 
       
        
0.11  
	 OLS 
19 
0.03 3.59 0.07 
20 
OLS 
0.02 3.96 0.32 
21 
2SLS IV 
0.09 3.69 
Birth in North -0.00 0.00 -2.01 -0.03 0.08 -0.41 
Experience 0.00 0.00 1.79 -0.00 0.00 -1.50 -0.00 0.00 -1.06 
Experience Sq. -0.04 0.03 -1.56 0.00 0.00 1.09 0.00 0.00 1.94 
annual land 0.20 0.04 5.26 0.00 0.02 0.26 -0.05 0.02 -2.56 
Good annual land (%) -0.38 0.08 -4.96 0.12 0.03 4.03 0.19 0.02 9.25 
Bad annual land (%) 0.25 0.06 4.20 -0.10 0.03 -3.16 -0.35 0.04 -8.31 
Irrigated annual land (%) 0.09 0.03 3.13 0.23 0.03 8.70 
Constant 0.86 0.07 12.21 0.05 0.08 0.61 0.68 0.11 5.96 
Regional dummies YES YES 
Commune dummies YES 
Obs 2820 2820 2820 
Centered R-Square 0.31 0.54 0.28 
Uncentered R-Square 0.87 
F-test 17.11 25.86 
P-value 
Endogenous variable: Education 
Shea Partial R-square 
F-test 
OVERID test of all TVs 
Sargan/Hansen J stat 
Chi-sq/P-value 
7.52 
0.76 
1-st stage regression 
education 
Phase 2 -0.15 0.06 -2.32 
Phase 3 -0.47 0.06 -7.96 
Phase 4 -1.01 0.11 -9.38 
Phase 5 -0.22 0.05 -4.62 
Phase 6 -0.24 0.05 -4.38 
Phase 7 -0.76 0.07 -10.14 
Phase 2 * Born in North 0.00 0.07 -0.05 
Phase 3 * Born in North 0.03 0.04 0.61 
Phase 4 * Born in North 0.11 0.09 1.17 
Phase 5 * Born in North 0.10 0.06 1.82 
Phase 6 * Born in North 0.06 0.05 1.11 
Phase 7 * Born in North 0.05 0.05 0.91 
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Chapter 4 - Access to Land, Market 
Participation and Poverty Reduction in 
Vietnam (1992-1998) 
4.0 Introduction 
In the 1980s, Vietnam introduced a set of agricultural reforms, which vastly 
modified the productive environment of Vietnamese farmers. Collective farms 
were dismantled, land was redistributed to individual farmers, a new land tenure 
system based on de jure private property rights has been put into place, whilst 
prices trade and export markets were being liberalised 146 . Following the 
implementation of these reforms, Vietnam's agricultural sector grew steadily 
over the course of the 1990s at an average annual rate of 4 percent with one oft-
cited economic achievement being Vietnam's transformation from net importer 
of rice before 1989 to the world's second largest rice exporter in 1998. 
Meanwhile, Vietnam's achievements in poverty reduction were no less 
remarkable, with the incidence of poverty declining from 75 percent in 1984 to 
58 percent in 1993, and to 37 percent in 1998 147 . 
Whilst it is generally acknowledged that growth contributes to poverty reduction 
(Ravallion 2001; Rodrik 2002), the specific mechanisms through which this 
relationship operates are less well understood. In particular, a long-standing 
debate about the role of agriculture in the process of economic development and 
about its contribution to poverty reduction continues unabated. The sheer 
importance of agriculture in the livelihoods of the poor in low-income countries 
helps explain why agricultural growth can be an important contributor to poverty 
reduction. Theories that emphasize the role of agriculture in the process of 
economic development and posit the existence of multiple linkages between 
146 These reforms form part of the Doi Moi reforms, launched in 1986. See Dollar (1993); Dollar, Glewwe and 
Litvack (1998) and the vast literature on Vietnam's economic liberalisation reforms cited therein. 
147 These statistics on poverty are from the World Bank (2003d). Overall trends in poverty reduction in 
Vietnam are revisited in Section 4.1.1 below. 
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148 . agricultural growth and non-agricultural growth are long-standing 	They have, 
to some extent, been empirically validated by a large body of cross-country and 
country case studies, as well as, more recently, micro-econometric work using 
long time series of household surveys such as those available for India and 
Indonesia 149 . 
This chapter is inspired by a body of research, which highlights the role of access 
to productive assets such as land and human capital in mediating the impact of 
growth on poverty reduction. For example, in Latin America, where one can find 
the highest levels of land inequality, agricultural growth tended to be 
exclusionary (de Janvry 1981; Carter 2000; de Janvry and Sadoulet 2000). By 
contrast, in South-East , and East Asia, egalitarian access to land and 
employment-intensive, smallholder-based agricultural growth provided 
important pre-conditions for subsequent industrialisation and mass poverty 
reduction (Francks, Boestel, and Kim 1999; Lipton 2001; Thorbecke and Wan 
2004). 
At first sight, the potential for agricultural growth to reduce poverty in Vietnam 
is large. In the early 1980s, agriculture employed 70 percent of total labour force 
and contributed 40 percent of Gross Domestic Product (Tong Cuc Thong Ke 
2000). Ninety percent of the poor lived in rural areas, with about 80 percent of 
them engaged in farm activities that contributed 45 percent of total income 
(Benjamin and Brandt 2004). 
This chapter explores the relationship between agricultural growth and rural 
poverty reduction with a particular focus on the legacy of Vietnam's agrarian 
history. Throughout this chapter, the focus will be on rice, Vietnam's most 
important food staple, which accounted on average for 42 percent of total food 
expenditures and provided 75 percent of total calories in 1998. Data on rice 
production and consumption come from the Vietnamese Living Standard Survey 
(VLSS). 
148 See Johnston and Mellor (1961); Mellor (1966); Lipton (1977); Mellor (1986); Lipton and Longhurst (1989); 
Mellor (1999). 
149 Hayami, Ruttan and Southworth (1979); Francks (1984); Ravallion and Huppi (1991); Lipton and Ravallion 
(1995); Ravallion and Datt (1996); Timmer (1997); Datt and Ravallion (1998); Francks, Boestel and Kim (1999); 
Mellor (1999); Dorward and Morrisson (2000) 
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The argument in this chapter is developed in three stages. First, Section 4.1 
ascertains the extent to which economic growth during the 1990s was pro-poor, 
and shows that the general improvement in welfare in Vietnam was indeed 
widely shared: poverty was not only substantially reduced in absolute numbers, 
but the living standard of those who remained poor also improved significantly. 
Section 4.2 argues that Vietnam's agrarian history bequeathed extremely 
favourable structural initial conditions that allowed the gains from growth to be 
widely shared. These favourable initial conditions include an agricultural growth 
process spurred by labour intensive and smallholder-friendly wet-rice cultivation 
techniques; quasi-universal access to land in North Vietnam and limited 
incidence of landlessness in South Vietnam; widespread diffusion of yield-
raising technology; and relatively high levels of, and egalitarian access to, rural 
infrastructure and education. 
Although the liberalisation of agriculture generated substantial improvements in 
agricultural terms of trade, it also triggered a large increase in food prices. 
Section 4.3 explores the welfare consequences of such a large increase in food 
prices. The difficulty in disentangling the effects of higher food prices on welfare 
stems from the multiplicity of mechanisms at play, with food prices affecting 
rural households both as consumers and as income earners. Section 4.3.1 revisits 
the net benefit ratio method, which approximates first-order welfare impacts by 
the net production status of a household, and shows evidence of a substantial 
decoupling between net production status and welfare changes. 
To disentangle the ambiguous results obtained from first-order welfare impact 
methods, Section 4.3.2 explores the relationship between rice self-sufficiency 
and poverty reduction. Two plausible motivations for participation in rice 
markets are explored in theory, (i) changes in transaction costs and (ii) self-
insurance against price risks. Section 4.4 concludes. 
As Foster and Rosenzweig (2004) explain, research on the relationship between 
agricultural growth and poverty reduction has been hindered by the sheer 
complexity of the mechanisms at play and data requirements: 
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"Empirical evidence on the relative efficacy of farm and non-farm growth as 
sources of reduction in rural poverty and inequality has been limited and 
inconclusive despite the fact that a large share of the world's poor reside in 
rural areas. One key limitation has been the absence of appropriate data. A 
data set for examining these effects must be of sufficiently long duration to 
capture significant sectoral transformation, of sufficient spatial variation to 
contain different patterns of growth, and sufficiently disaggregated to permit 
examination of income by sector at the household level. This literature has 
also lacked a theoretical framework that is both rich enough to capture 
heterogeneity in the nature of non-farm sector and tractable enough to 
generate falsifiable predictions. As a result, empirical researchers frequently 
present contrasting results that are not readily resolved." (Foster and 
Rosenzweig 2004, my emphasis) 
The Vietnamese Living Standard Survey does not provide the type of data 
described in the quote above. As forewarned by Foster and Rosenzweig (2004), 
it has not been possible to explicitly identify the factors that allowed rural 
households to benefit from agricultural growth without suffering from the 
increase in food prices. Nor was it possible to conclusively distinguish between 
the two potential motivations for market participation identified in Section 4.3.3. 
This chapter illustrates the limitation of partial equilibrium and first-order 
welfare impact analysis. On the other hand, allowing for general equilibrium 
effects would require estimating own price, cross-price demand elasticities as 
well as wage-price elasticities (Porto 2003), and probably also estimating a 
structural model (e.g. de Janvry, Fafchamps, and Sadoulet 1991; Kurosaki and 
Fafchamps 2002). This endeavour is extremely data intensive and has been 
infrequently undertaken because of insufficient data. 
For countries that experience important shocks or implement wide-ranging 
economic reforms like Vietnam, this chapter shows that assessing the welfare 
impact of price changes through budget shares and income shares without 
integrating the impact on employment and earnings may yield deceptive 
results 15° . However, in the end, the paradox highlighted in this chapter remains to 
be further investigated: higher rice prices did not have negative effects on 
150 Caution is also provided by Barrett and Dorosh (1996) and Deaton (1997a). 
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poverty. In order to truly make sense of Vietnam's strong trends in agricultural 
growth and rural poverty reduction, more data need to be assembled to 
disentangle the multiple effects at play, and to account for the diversity of 
experiences across households and across regions, which differ in terms of their 
abilities to capture the gains from growth. Indeed, findings that rates of poverty 
reduction across countries varied from 0.6 percent to 3.0 percent per one percent 
growth (Ravallion 2001) indicates that the positive association between growth 
and poverty reduction is not automatic. Indeed, although the studies mentioned 
above are all suggestive of the significance and strength of the linkages between 
agricultural growth, non-farm growth, and poverty reduction, they also highlight 
the fact that these mechanisms are complex, multifarious, and require a large 
amount of data to be identified conclusively 151 . I provide thoughts about future 
avenues of research in the last section. 
4.1 Agricultural Growth and Rural Poverty Reduction 
Vietnam's poverty reduction trends during the 1990s have been documented in 
many studies of poverty 152 . Section 4.1.1 pushes the analysis further by making 
use of distribution-sensitive measures of poverty and finds that economic growth 
in Vietnam was remarkably broad-based: rural consumption growth considerably 
reduced poverty in absolute numbers, but also reached the poorest of the poor, 
whilst the average living standards of those remaining below the poverty line 
improved substantially. Section 4.1.2 quantifies the contribution of agricultural 
growth to poverty reduction and shows that intra-sectoral gains in the 
agricultural sector contributed to two-third of total poverty reduction. 
151 The difficulty in ascertaining the role of agricultural growth in the process of economic development and as 
a source of poverty reduction is not limited to the experience of low-income countries. In Britain for example, 
whether the agricultural revolution preceded or concurred with the advent of the industrial revolution 
remains intensely debated. Echoing the findings for low-income countries referred to above, the so-called 
'revisionists' (e.g. Allen (1999)) argue that in Great Britain, the industrial revolution was the result of a prior 
phase of agricultural expansion. In turn, slow economic growth in the early phases of the industrial revolution 
was the result of stagnation in the agricultural sector in the second half of the eighteen-century. 
152 See Dollar, Glewwe and Litvack (1998); GSO (2000); Haughton, Haughton and Phong (2001); Glewwe, 
Gragnolati and Zaman (2002); World Bank (2002); Justino and Litchfield (2003); World Bank (2003d); Dollar, 
Glewwe and Agrawal (2004). 
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4.1.1 Patterns of Poverty Reduction in Rural Vietnam (1992 - 1998) 
Measures of poverty that capture changes at the bottom of the income 
distribution are used to study Vietnam's patterns of poverty reduction. How the 
gains from growth were distributed is directly assessed by using the Growth 
Incidence Curve (GIC) method developed by Ravallion and Chen (2003). From 
the GIC, the mean growth rates for the poor can be derived to measure the gains 
to the poor from economic growth. Throughout this chapter, annual household 
expenditure per capita is the preferred measure of welfare. 
4.1.1.1 Wide and Deep Poverty Reduction Trends 
The Forster-Greer-Thorbecke measures have become standards in the study of 
N (— 	z)))  , where  w 	z 
a 
poverty and are defined as follows: FGT, = 1 	z -E 
N 
is the poverty line, y is the welfare measure 153 , N is the total population number, 
and a> 0 determines the weight given to the welfare of the poorest of the poor. 
Four measures of poverty are used: the three standard Forster-Greer-Thorbecke 
(FGT) measures, i.e. (i) the poverty headcount, (ii) the poverty gap, (iii) and the 
square poverty gap; and (iv) the Sen-Shorrocks-Thon (SST) index. 
The poverty headcount (FGTO with a = 0 ) 154 measures the number of poor 
people as a percentage of the total population. However, because it is insensitive 
to changes below the poverty line, most of the analysis presented in this section 
focuses instead on higher-order FGT measures such as the poverty gap (a = 1) 
and the severity of poverty index (a = 2) . The chief motivation for using 
distribution-sensitive poverty measures is to determine whether Vietnam's 
economic growth was not merely pro-poor (the headcount index would suffice 
for such a purpose and there is already ample evidence of this) but also reached 
the poorest of the poor and favoured those who remained poor. 
153 The welfare measure chosen throughout this thesis is expenditure per capita. 
154 The poverty headcount is also referred throughout this chapter as poverty. Higher-order FGT poverty 
measures are referred to by their full names (i.e. poverty gap or square poverty gap). 
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The poverty gap (FGT1 with a =1, also referred to as the depth of poverty) 
measures the mean expenditure by which the poor fall short of the poverty line 
and expresses it as a percentage of the poverty line. Changes in the poverty gap 
capture the extent to which the living standards of those who remained poor 
improved over time. To complete the analysis, I use the square poverty gap index 
(FGT2 with a = 2, also referred to as the severity of poverty), or the weighted 
sum of the squared poverty gaps, which gives greater weight to the welfare of 
the poorest among the poor and thus allows one to capture changes in inequality 
among the poor 155 
The fourth measure used in this section is the Sen-Shorrocks-Thon (SST) index 
(Xu and Osberg 2002; World Bank 2003a). The SST index is defined as follows: 
SST = FGTO. FGT1. (1 + G), with G being the Gini coefficient of the poverty 
gap ratios of the population: G = (1— FGTO)+ FGTO.G p , i.e. 
"the sum of the Gini index of the average poverty gap ratios between the 
non-poor and the poor sub-population, 1— FGTO , and the poverty-rate- 
weighted Gini index of the poverty gap ratio of the poor FGTO.Gp " (Xu 
and Osberg 2002: 12). 
The SST index increases when the welfare of a poor person declines (i.e. when 
the poverty gap augments), or when a pure transfer is made from a poor to a less 
poor person (Shorrocks 1995) 156 . Most importantly for our purpose, the SST 
index can be decomposed into the three sources of changes in poverty that are of 
particular interest for this chapter, (i) the changes in the headcount index, (ii) in 
the average poverty gap, and (iii) in the inequality among the poor, i.e. 
A In SST = A In FGTO + A ln FGT1+ A ln(1 + G). 
Using only one poverty measure (most often, the poverty headcount) may 
produce deceptive patterns. For example, the number of poor people may have 
declined, making growth 'pro-poor', whilst the average welfare and the 
inequality among those who remained poor may have worsened. Conversely, the 
155 Other values of a greater than 1 may have been chosen. I follow the convention in the literature to use a=2. 
It has to be noted that because the FGT2 lacks intuitive appeal and is therefore less easy to interpret, it has 
been the least used of the FGT measures in the poverty literature 
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poverty headcount may have increased, but the depth of poverty may have 
become shallower and inequality among the poor may have declined. Using 
these four measures of poverty together allows different patterns of poverty 
reduction to emerge and provides a better understanding of the poverty-reducing 
impact of growth in Vietnam. 
Two poverty lines are used 157 . First, the food poverty line is defined as the cost of 
procuring 2,100 calories per person per day 158 . The basket of food consumed by 
the third quintile of the population, which provided a total of 2052 calories, was 
used as the basis for the food poverty line in 1992/1993. The quantities of each 
food item were scaled up to yield a total of 2,100 calories per person per day and 
priced using regional and monthly price indices to give a food poverty line of 
749,722 Vietnamese Dong (VND) per person per year in January 1993 prices. 
Second, the general poverty line adds non-food expenditures to the food poverty 
line, using the average non-food expenditures consumed by the third quintile 
adjusted by regional and monthly prices. Average non-food expenditures 
amounted to VND 410,690, yielding a general poverty line of VND 1,160,000 in 
January 1993 prices. To obtain the value of the food poverty line in 1997-1998, 
the 1992-1993 food basket was directly re-valued in January 1998 prices at VND 
1,287,000 using regional and monthly prices. The general poverty line was re-
valued at VND 1,790,000 in January 1998 by inflating the 1992/1993 non-food 
expenditures by the official consumer price index and adding the new value to 
the 1998 food poverty line. For ease of exposition, results for FGT1 and FGT2 
are presented using the general poverty line (results are similar when using the 
food poverty line). 
A detailed analysis of the changes in poverty between 1992 and 1998 in rural 
Vietnam is now presented. Results are shown in Table 4-1 (see page 152 below) 
and are divided in three panels. Panel 1 presents the poverty headcount using the 
food and the general poverty line. Panel 2 presents the higher-order FGT 
measures of poverty (the poverty gap and the square poverty gap calculated 
156 That is, the SST index meets all the poverty axioms defined in Sen (1976), including the monotonocity and 
the transfer axioms. 
157 See Dollar, Glewwe and Litvack (1998) for a detailed description of these two poverty lines determined by 
the World Bank and used in all studies of poverty that make use of the VLSS. Note that the Vietnamese 
government uses a lower poverty line. 
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using the general poverty line), and the Gini coefficient of the poverty gap ratios. 
All three measures are used for the calculation of the SST index shown in Panel 
3. 
Panel 1 confirms the dramatic reduction in the incidence of poverty that has 
already been largely documented in the literature 159 . Overall, the incidence in 
rural poverty 160 dropped by 21 percentage points from 66 percent to 45 percent 
of the rural population. This pattern is confirmed across all regions and, as 
shown by Justino and Litchfield (2003: 15), is robust to the choice of poverty 
lines. 
The most striking outcome from this analysis of poverty is the fact that poverty 
was reduced across all three dimensions of poverty discussed above, that is, the 
depth (measured by the poverty gap or FGT1) and the severity of poverty 
(measured by the square poverty gap or FGT2) declined as fast, if not faster, than 
the poverty headcount. 
This result is already apparent when one compares changes in general poverty 
and food poverty rates presented in Panel 1. In four regions (the Red River Delta, 
North Central Coast, South East and Mekong River Delta regions), the decline in 
food poverty actually exceeded the drop in general poverty, suggesting that a 
large (sometimes a larger) proportion of the poorest of the poor (compared to the 
less poor) also benefited from the general increase in welfare. 
This result is further confirmed by looking at the distribution-sensitive measures 
of poverty reported in Panel 2. Declines in the poverty gap (42 percent) and in 
the square poverty gap (49 percent) were actually greater than for the poverty 
headcount (29 percent). Key regional trends are as follows 161 . 
158 The food poverty line is close to the World Bank one-dollar-day (PPP) poverty line. 
159 According to Vietnam Inter-Ministerial Working Group (2003), the overall (i.e. urban and rural areas 
together) poverty headcount calculated using the World Bank one-dollar-day (PPP) poverty line, declined 
from 39.3 percent in 1993 to 16.4 percent in 1998 and 13.6 percent in 2002. Using the two-dollar-day (PPP) 
poverty line, the poverty headcount declined from 80.5 percent in 1993 to 65.4 percent in 1998 and 58.2 percent 
in 2002. 
160 In the text, the term "poverty" refers to the poverty measure using the general poverty line. The term food 
poverty is used in reference with the food poverty line. 
161 Whilst trends in poverty reduction across regions are generally unambiguous, it is important to note that 
there are considerable variations in poverty trends within regions. For example, Minot and Baulch (2002), who 
used census data to obtain poverty estimates across provinces, show that even in the South East region, where 
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The strongest improvements in the depth and severity of poverty are found in the 
Red River Delta (initially a rather poor region) and the South East region 
(initially the least poor region), which also experienced the fastest decline in the 
incidence of poverty (50 percent and 70 percent respectively). In the South East 
region, food poverty was nearly eradicated (it dropped by 78 percent and stood at 
3 percent in 1998), and the depth (FGT1) and severity (FGT2) of poverty 
decreased by 81 percent and 87 percent respectively. The trends in the Red River 
Delta were no less spectacular with the poverty gap and the square poverty gap 
dropping by 66 percent and 73 percent respectively. 
Declines of similar magnitude in the depth and severity of poverty are also 
observed in the Northern Uplands and the North Central Coast, although declines 
in poverty headcounts were considerably slower. The Mekong River Delta, 
which produces half of Vietnam's rice output and experienced the fastest 
agricultural growth, only saw a moderate decline in poverty (11 percent). This 
may be due to the impact of Typhoon Linda that hit the Delta in 1997. 
Nonetheless, the declines in food poverty, poverty gap and square poverty gap 
were strong, suggesting that a substantial number of the poorest of the poor were 
lifted above the food poverty line and those who remained poor saw their living 
standards improve. 
The Central Highlands experienced different poverty reduction dynamics: food 
poverty actually increased by 6 percent, whilst the general poverty headcount 
declined by 22 percent (this is only half the national rate of decline in poverty). 
The depth and severity of poverty did decline, but at a much lower rate than in 
other regions. As a result, by 1998, the Central Highlands had the highest levels 
of poverty gap (19 percent of the general poverty line) and square poverty gap. 
The Sen-Shorrocks-Thon poverty index confirms two broad regional trends in 
poverty reduction (see the last set of columns in Panel 3 for a decomposition of 
the changes in SST poverty). First, in the three northern regions of Vietnam 
(Northern Uplands, Red River Delta and North Central Coast), changes in 
poverty gaps contributed between 37 to 46 percent of the total reduction in SST 
the general poverty rate dropped to 13 percent in 1998, two provinces had very high poverty rates such as in 
Binh Tuan (50 percent) and in Ninh Tuan (62 percent). 
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poverty. By contrast, in the three southern regions of Vietnam (South Central 
Coast, Central Highlands and South East regions), the decline in SST poverty 
was largely due to changes in the poverty headcount (73 to 86 percent of the total 
changes in SST poverty). This is particularly true for the Central Highlands 
where changes in poverty gaps contributed only 10% of total poverty reduction. 
The limited impact of changes in poverty gaps in the South East region, despite 
the earlier finding that the decline in poverty gap had been considerable (81 
percent) is explained by the poverty gap being already low in 1992 (12 percent 
of the poverty line). By contrast, in the Mekong River Delta, improvements in 
poverty gaps contributed 74 percent of the changes in SST poverty. Finally, data 
on income distribution show that inequality among the poor was low in 1992 
(0.33) and had increased moderately in 1998 (0.38) (see the Gini of poverty gaps 
in Panel 2). As a result, changes in the income distribution among the poor 
contributed marginally, albeit negatively, to the decline in poverty. 
In sum, Vietnam's achievements in poverty reduction during the 1990s were 
remarkable in that (i) poverty was substantially reduced in absolute numbers in 
all regions; (ii) growth reached the poorest of the poor; and (iii) the average 
living standards of those below the poverty line improved substantially 162 . 
Table 4-1: Poverty Reduction by Region (1992-1998) 
Panel 1 Expenditures per capita 
General Poverty 
Headcount (%) 
Food Poverty 
Headcount (%) 
!rowth %) s.d. 1992 1998 ch!e. 1992 1998 ch:.e. 
Northern Uplands 42 56 80 65 -19% 38 33 -14% 
Red River Delta 61 71 68 34 -50% 28 9 -68% 
North Central Coast 56 79 74 52 -29% 34 21 -38% 
South Central Coast 51 78 54 42 -23% 23 21 -7% 
Central Uplands 61 100 67 52 -22% 30 31 6% 
South East 78 85 43 13 -70% 14 3 -78% 
Mekong River Delta 35 71 47 42 -11% 17 13 -25% 
All Vietnam 52 75 63 45 -29% 27 18 -32% 
NB: The food poverty line is the cost of the basket offood that provides 2,100 calories per person per day: 
VND 749,722 in January 1993 prices and VND 1,287,000 in January 1998 prices. The general poverty line 
adds non-food expenditures to the food poverty line and amounts to VND 1,160,000 in January 1993 prices 
and VND 1,790,000 in January 1998 prices. 
162 This does not mean that all individuals' welfare actually increased. The identities of the poor change over 
time, with previously non-poor individual falling into poverty. Using the panel features of the VLSS, 
Haughton, et al. (2001) show that a small but non negligible proportion of people actually fell into poverty. 
However, the mean welfare of the bottom distribution deciles did increase. 
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Panel 2 Poverty gap s Sq. poverty gap s Gini Poverty gap 2 
1992 1998 chge. 1992 1998 chge. 1992 1998 chge. 
Northern Uplands 27 19 -31% 12 7 -40% 0.31 0.33 9% 
Red River Delta 20 7 -66% 8 2 -73% 0.33 0.40 24% 
North Central Coast 24 13 -46% 10 5 -55% 0.31 0.35 14% 
South Central Coast 19 13 -29% 9 6 -34% 0.37 0.38 4% 
Central Uplands 24 19 -21% 13 10 -24% 0.37 0.35 -4% 
South East 12 2 -81% 5 1 -87% 0.37 0.41 11% 
Mekong River Delta 14 9 -32% 5 3 -43% 0.35 0.39 11% 
All Vietnam 20 12 -42% 8 4 -49% 0.33 0.38 14% 
The general poverty is used 
2 Part of the Sen-Shorrocks-Thon index. See definition in the text. 
Panel 3 
Sen-Shorrocks- 
Thon Index (SST) , Decomposition of change in SST 2 
Contribution to 
reduction in SST 
poverty 
Regions 1992 1998 chge. chge 	chge 	chge 	chge FGTO FGT1 Gini 
InSST InFGTO 1nFGT1 In(l+G) FGT1 
Northern Uplands 0.36 0.25 -30% -0.35 -0.21 -0.16 0.02 60% 	46% -6% 
Red River Delta 0.26 0.10 -63% -0.99 -0.68 -0.37 0.06 69% 	37% -6% 
North Central Coast 0.32 0.18 -44% -0.58 -0.35 -0.26 0.03 61% 	44% -6% 
South Central Coast 0.26 0.18 -30% -0.35 -0.28 -0.09 0.01 78% 	25% -3% 
Central Uplands 0.34 0.26 -25% -0.28 -0.25 -0.03 -0.01 86% 	10% 4% 
South East 0.17 0.03 -81% -1.65 -1.21 -0.46 0.03 73% 	28% -2% 
Mekong River Delta 0.19 0.13 -30% -0.36 -0.13 -0.27 0.03 35% 	74% -8% 
All Vietnam 0.27 0.16 -40% -0.51 -0.35 -0.20 0.04 68% 	39% -7% 
The general poverty is used 
2 FGTO and FGT1 are the poverty headcount and the poverty gap respectively. See definition in the text. 
4.1.1.2 Pro-Poor Growth: Vietnam's Growth Incidence Curve (1992-
1998) 
How the gains from growth were distributed can be more directly assessed by 
using the Growth Incidence Curve (GIC) method developed by Ravallion and 
Chen (2003), which provides a graphical illustration of how the gains from 
growth were distributed across the income distribution. Table 4-2 presents the 
growth rate in expenditures at a given percentile and compares the mean growth 
rate for the poor (also called the 'pro-poor growth rate' 163 and evaluated at 
different poverty lines) to the mean growth rate over the entire distribution, and 
to the growth rate in mean expenditures. Figure 4-5 and Figure 4-6 in the 
Appendix of this section page 191 present the growth incidence curves for 
Vietnam and for all regions separately. 
163 Ravallion (2004: 4-5) explains that, "the Ravallion-Chen (2003) 'rate of pro-poor growth' is the mean growth 
rate of the poor. [...] Notice that the mean growth rate of the poor is not the same thing as the growth rate in 
the mean for the poor, which will not in general be consistent with even the direction of change in any sensible 
measure of the level of poverty". Rates of pro-poor growth are presented for different poverty headcounts 
(5%, 10%, 20% 30%, 50%, etc.). 
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The growth rates in Table 4-2 below confirm the trends in poverty reduction 
identified above. The fast reduction in poverty experienced in the Red River 
Delta and the South East region are explained by mean growth rates for the poor 
as high as 8 percent and 14 percent respectively at the 30 th expenditure decile. In 
the South East, the pro-poor growth rates evaluated at different poverty lines are 
consistently higher than those for higher deciles. These trends in pro-poor 
growth rates help explain the remarkable speed and depth in poverty reduction 
experienced in these two regions. 
The mean growth rates of the poor in other regions are much lower, also 
reflecting lower growth rates across the entire distribution and lower growth rate 
in mean expenditures (around 2 to 5 percent). Interestingly however, in all 
regions, the growth rates of the poor were equivalent or even higher than the 
mean growth rate. This is the case especially in the Mekong River Delta where 
the mean welfare of the poor grew at a rate twice higher than the mean growth 
rate, explaining why the depth of poverty could drop so sharply despite a 
moderate decline in poverty incidence. 
Table 4-2: Pro-Poor Growth Rates 
(Rural areas) All 
Vietnam 
Northern Red River 
Upland 	Delta 
North 
Central 
Coast 
South 
Central 
Coast 
Central 
Highlands 
South 
East 
Mekong 
River 
Delta 
Poverty Headcount (%) 
5 5.5 8.3 4.8 6.6 14.0 4.6 16.7 3.6 
10 4.8 6.3 6.5 6.4 9.0 4.4 15.6 4.5 
20 4.8 4.7 7.7 5.7 5.6 3.7 14.0 4.5 
30 4.9 4.0 8.0 5.7 4.8 3.5 13.7 4.2 
50 5.0 3.8 8.4 5.7 4.6 3.4 13.0 3.5 
60 5.1 3.8 8.5 5.6 4.5 3.5 12.8 3.2 
70 5.1 3.8 8.7 5.7 4.3 3.7 12.6 2.9 
80 5.2 3.8 8.8 5.7 4.2 3.7 12.4 2.6 
Mean growth rate 5.2 4.3 9.2 6.2 4.2 3.7 11.7 2.0 
Growth rate in mean pcexp 5.3 4.6 9.6 6.6 4.0 3.9 10.5 1.0 
Poverty headcount 1998 (%) 45 65 34 52 42 52 13 42 
Change in poverty headcount -29% -19% -50% -29% -23% -22% -70% -11% 
Change in poverty gap -42% -31% -66% -46% -29% -21% -81% -32% 
Change in square poverty gap -49% -40% -73% -55% -34% -24% -87% -43% 
4.1.2 Sectoral Growth and Poverty Reduction 
To what extent did agricultural growth contribute to Vietnam's impressive 
record in poverty reduction? At first glance, the potential for agricultural growth 
to increase welfare (directly or indirectly) is large. Most of the poor lived in rural 
areas and the livelihoods of rural households depend in large parts on agriculture 
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(World Bank 2003d 9-10). Therefore, a priori, rapid labour-intensive cereal-
based agricultural growth could have been an all-important factor in lifting 
livings standards through its various multiplier effects (Mellor 1966; Mellor and 
Desai 1986; Timmer 1988; Lipton and Longhurst 1989; Delgado, Hopkins, and 
Kelly 1998; Mellor 1999). 
However, it does not automatically follow that agricultural growth did play a key 
role in the reduction of poverty described in the previous section. On the one 
hand, some have argued that, particularly in the early stages of economic 
development, intra-sectoral agricultural growth matters most by having a direct 
effect on the income of the poor who are mainly employed in the agricultural 
sector (Mellor 1966; Lipton and Longhurst 1989; Huppi and Ravallion 1991; 
IFAD 2001; Lipton 2004). On the other hand, others have claimed that the 
interdependence among sectors implies that cross-sectoral spillover effects (i.e. 
between the agriculture, industry and service sectors) may matter more for 
poverty reduction (see the discussion of the impact of cross-sectoral spillover 
effects on poverty in Ravallion and Datt 1996: 4-5). 
Secondly, as will be explained in detail later, the liberalisation of agricultural 
product markets in Vietnam during the 1990s triggered a sharp increase in food 
prices. Although higher food prices and lower input prices enhance farmers' 
incentives to increase food production, they also harm the welfare of net 
purchasers of food (Mellor 1986; Mellor and Desai 1986; Deaton 1997b). The 
net effect of agricultural reforms is therefore ambiguous. Before turning to the 
impact of price liberalisation on poverty in Section 4.2.3, I turn to the 
methodology proposed by Ravallion and Huppi (1991: 1656) to ascertain the 
contribution of agricultural growth to poverty reduction. 
Changes in poverty are decomposed into three effects: (i) intra-sectoral effects 
that capture the contribution of gains to the poor originating within a particular 
sector; (ii) inter-sectoral effects, which capture the contribution of gains to the 
poor for shifting to other employment sectors; and (iii) interaction effects or the 
effects due to the interaction between intra-sectoral gains and population shifts 
between sectors. The decomposition of poverty performed here largely follows 
Bales, Tung and Cuc (2001) and differs from their work in that the 
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decomposition treats rural and urban households separately. Making this 
distinction allows one to ascribe rural poverty reduction directly to changes in 
the agricultural sector. 
Seven major employment sectors, denoted by the subscript i in the equation 
below, are distinguished: (i) self-employed farmers; (ii) hired farm workers; (iii) 
self-employment in industry and construction; (iv) hired labour in industry and 
construction; (v) working in services (sales, restaurants, hotels); (vi) working for 
the government, the Communist Party or other social organisation; (vi) other 
services. Households were categorised in one employment category according to 
the total number of hours worked in that sector 164 . 
The decomposition of poverty is performed as follows: P refers to the FGT 
measures of poverty described in Section 4.1.1.1. The subscript refers to the 
VLSS survey year 1992 or 1998. The superscript U and R refer to the urban and 
rural sector respectively. 
Sectoral Decomposition of Changes in Poverty: 
P98 p
92 	(p9U8i p Ui ll 	 p Ri )pi Ri 
92 	92 
▪ 	
98 	92 	92 
=1 	 i =1 
(Intra-sectoral effects: changes in poverty within each sector at the 1992 
population share) 
+ E  (n9u8, — n9u2; 	
▪ 
E (n9R8, — n9R2i )p9R2 i 
i =1 	 i =1 
(Inter-sectoral effects: changes in poverty arising from population shift 
between sectors) 
+ 	(p9U8 i p9U2 i Xn9U8i n9U2i 	E (p9R8 i AR2 i 	_ n9R2, 
i=i 
(Interaction effects) 
Two results are noteworthy. First, the decomposition between urban and rural 
areas in Table 4-3 shows that, although most of the poor reside in rural areas, 
intra-sectoral effects within the urban sector contributed to 45 percent of the total 
decline in poverty. The large contribution of the urban sector to total poverty 
164 The VLSS collected information on individuals' main and supplementary jobs. I adopt the categorisation 
used by Bales, Tung and Cuc (2001: 50), based on the number of hours work in one sector. Adults age 15 to 65 
only are included in the analysis. Changes in poverty are aggregate measures for all households weighted by 
hours worked in each sector. 
156 
reduction probably reflects the remarkable drop in urban poverty from 25 percent 
in 1992 to 9 percent in 1998. 
Secondly, and most importantly for the argument developed in this chapter, the 
results in Table 4-3 show that economic growth within each sector played a 
significant role in the reduction of poverty. The contribution of labour shifts 
between urban and rural areas remained marginal: inter-sectoral (urban/rural) 
effects accounted for only 5 percent of the total reduction in the poverty 
headcount. When poverty is measured by the poverty gap and the square poverty 
gap, the contribution of the rural sector is even more accentuated: intra-sectoral 
effects in the rural sector accounted for 63 percent and 68 percent of the total 
reduction in the total poverty gap and square poverty gap respectively. 
Table 4-3: Urban/Rural Sectoral Decomposition of Poverty Reduction 
Decomposition of poverty changes between rural and urban sectors 
(as a percentage of total poverty reduction)  
Intra-sectoral 	Inter- 	Interaction 
effects 	sectoral 	effect 
rural urban population 
shifts 
Headcount 51.1% 44.8% 4.6% -0.5% 
Poverty gap 62.6% 34.6% 4.3% -1.4% 
Square poverty gap 67.7% 30.0% 4.2% -1.9% 
Table 4-4 presents the sectoral decomposition of the changes in the poverty 
headcount. Similar decompositions of the poverty gap and the square poverty 
gap are shown in Table 4-5 and Table 4-6 respectively. In each table, Column 1 
and 2 show the decomposition for the rural and the urban sector respectively. 
Within each sector, intra-sectoral effects accounted for 95 percent of the total 
reduction in poverty incidence (97 percent when using the poverty gap and 
square poverty gap indices). Focusing on the rural sector (see column 1), gains in 
the agricultural sector 165 accounted for 67 percent of the reduction in poverty, 
although they represent only 12 percent of the gains in total value added between 
1992 and 1998 (ADB, Bank, and UNDP 2000: 135). This proportion increases to 
74 percent when poverty is measured using higher-order FGT measures, again, 
suggesting that the gains from agriculture growth were widely shared and 
165 Corresponding to employment sector 1 and 2 — self-employed farmer and hired farm worker. 
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reached the poorest of the poor. Improvements in welfare in the rural non-farm 
production sector 166 (which has direct and indirect linkages with the agricultural 
sector) accounted for 13 percent of the total reduction in poverty, a proportion 
that does not change when poverty is measured by the poverty gap or the square 
poverty gap. 
It is also notable that in the urban sector (column 2), the agricultural sector 
accounted for 22 percent of the changes in the incidence of poverty 167 . Alike the 
trend observed in the rural sector, the contribution of the agricultural sector 
increases as one uses higher order FGT measures of poverty. 
Population shifts between employment sectors (see column 3 in Table 4-4, Table 
4-5, and Table 4-6) only explained a small proportion of the changes in poverty. 
Nevertheless, population shifts away from the agricultural sector, where poverty 
was at its highest levels, did contribute to the reduction of poverty by 10 to 14 
percent. At the same time, the interaction effects were negative indicating that 
because poverty was also falling fast in the agricultural sector, this outward 
population shift had a negative offsetting effect on poverty reduction. 
In sum, three main results stand out from this sectoral decomposition of poverty 
changes: 
(i) Intra-sectoral effects account for an overwhelming share of the total 
changes in poverty 168; 
(ii) Within the rural sector, intra-sectoral gains in the agricultural sector 
account for more than two-third of total poverty reduction; 
(iii) The contribution of the agricultural sector to poverty reduction increases as 
one uses higher-order FGT measures of poverty, indicating that amongst 
all employment sectors, the gains from agriculture growth also reached the 
poorest of the poor. 
166 Corresponding to employment sector 3 and 4 - self-employed production and hired production worker. 
167 Similarly, Ravallion and Datt (1996) find that in India, agricultural growth does more for urban poverty 
than does non-agricultural growth. 
168 Bales, Tung and Cue (2001) found that intra-sectoral gains accounted for 92 percent of the 
reduction in the poverty headcount, of which the agricultural sector accounted for the largest 
share (60 percent). 
158 
Table 4-4: Sectoral Decomposition of Changes in Poverty Incidence 
Poverty Headcount 
(as a % of total poverty reduction) 
Intra-sectoral 
effects 
Inter- 
sectoral 
population 
shifts 
(3 ) 
Interaction 
effect 
(4) 
w/i 
rural 
sector* 
( 1 ) 
w/i 
urban 
sector* 
(2) 
1 self-employed farmer 63% 18% 9% -4% 
2 hired farm worker 4% 4% 5% -2% 
3 self-employed production 7% 9% 1% - 1% 
4 hired production worker 6% 23% -2% 1% 
5 sales-hotel-restaurants 10% 24% -3% 2% 
6 gov-party-soc org 3% 4% - 1% 1% 
7 other services 2% 14% -4% 3% 
Total 95% 96% 5% - 1% 
NB: *Contribution of intrasectoral effects to poverty reduction in rural and urban sector 
Table 4-5: Sectoral Decomposition of Changes in Poverty Gap 
Poverty Gap 
(as a % of total poverty reduction) 
Intra-sectoral 
effects within 
Inter- 
sectoral 
population 
shifts 
Interaction 
effect 
w/i 
rural 
sector* 
w/i 
urban 
sector* 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
1 self-employed farmer 67% 21% 7% -4% 
2 hired farm worker 6% 7% 5% -2% 
3 self-employed production 7% 7% 1% -1% 
4 hired production worker 5% 20% -2% 1% 
5 sales-hotel-restaurants 8% 25% -2% 2% 
6 gov-party-soc org 2% 3% -1% 0% 
7 other services 2% 16% -3% 2% 
Total 97% 98% 4% -1% 
NB: *Contribution of intrasectoral effects to poverty reduction in rural and urban sector 
Table 4-6: Sectoral Decomposition of Changes in Square Poverty Gap 
Square Poverty Gap 
(as a % of total poverty reduction) 
Intra-sectoral 
effects within 
Inter- 
sectoral 
population 
shifts 
(3) 
Interaction 
effect 
(4) 
w/i 
rural 
sector* 
( 1) 
w/i 
urban 
sector* 
(2) 
1 self-employed farmer 68% 21% 6% -4% 
2 hired farm worker 7% 9% 4% -3% 
3 self-employed production 6% 6% 1% 0% 
4 hired production worker 5% 18% -1% 1% 
5 sales-hotel-restaurants 7% 25% -2% 2% 
6 gov-party-soc org 2% 2% -1% 0% 
7 other services 2% 18% -3% 2% 
Total 97% 99% 4% -2% 
NB: *Contribution of intrasectoral effects to poverty reduction in rural and urban sector 
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4.1.3 Preliminary Conclusions 
It is time to take stock of the results obtained so far. This section focused on 
changes in welfare at the bottom of the income distribution and showed that 
poverty was not only substantially reduced in absolute numbers, but the living 
standard of those who were poor in 1998 had also improved significantly 169 . 
Whilst at this stage, it is not possible to attribute any causal factor to these 
patterns in poverty reduction, it is evident that economic growth was broad-
based and reached the poorest of the poor. 
Vietnam's growth incidence curve shows that the deep poverty reduction trends 
documented above were achieved through high pro poor growth rates. Where 
the average growth rate in expenditure between 1992 and 1998 was high (such as 
in the Red River Delta and the South East region), the growth rate for the poor 
was also high. Where the average growth rate was lower, the growth rate for the 
poor was higher than for higher deciles. This pattern in pro-poor growth allowed 
a substantial number of poor people to either see their living standards improve 
or move out of poverty, even in regions where growth was slower. 
Secondly, the sectoral decomposition of poverty reduction confirmed that growth 
in the agricultural sector had a major impact on poverty: in rural areas, intra-
sectoral gains in the agricultural sector accounted for more than two-third of the 
total reduction in poverty; in urban areas, it even accounted for 22 percent of the 
changes in poverty. 
169 According to the Vietnam Inter-Ministerial Working Group (2003), preliminary analysis of data from the 
third round of the Vietnamese Living Standard Measurement Survey collected in 2002 indicates that poverty 
continued to decline at similarly rapid rates between 1998 and 2002. 
160 
4.2 Favourable Initial Conditions for Pro-Poor Agricultural 
Growth 
This section explores the legacy of Vietnam's recent agrarian history and argue 
that egalitarian access to land, to irrigation, and to other yield-increasing 
technology, in conjunction with improving agricultural terms of trade at the start 
of the agricultural liberalisation period, made it possible for many Vietnamese 
farmers to directly benefit from agricultural growth through higher yields and 
higher farm income. 
4.2.1 Initial Conditions and Obstacles for Pro-Poor Agricultural 
Growth in Theory 
Research on the determinants of the poverty-reducing impact of growth across 
countries highlighted the role of assets in mediating the impact of growth on 
poverty reduction, and in influencing the rate of growth itself 170 . In brief, asset 
ownership (notably land wealth) influences growth and poverty reduction by 
stratifying the population into groups that distinguish themselves by their ability 
to access product and factor markets 171 . 
A particular point of contention in the literature centres on the relationship 
between access to land, agricultural growth, and poverty reduction. The debate 
has crystallised around three major standpoints 172, which differ as to how land 
should be redistributed but strikingly agree on the existence of initial structural 
conditions that need to be in place for growth to benefit the poor. 
17° For a theoretical and empirical overview, see Deininger and Squire (1998); Bardhan, Bowles and Gintis 
(2000); Carter (2000); Ravallion (2001); Rodrik (2002). 
171 See Banerjee and Newman (1993); Carter and Mesbah (1993); Basu (1994); Carter (1996); Carter and Barham 
(1996); Piketty (1997); ibid. (1998); Atkinson and Bourguignon (2000); Bardhan, Bowles and Gintis (2000); de 
Janyry, et al. (2001); Rodrik (2002); Bourguignon (2003); Carter and Olinto (2003); Zimmerman and Carter 
(2003). 
172 A fourth standpoint, which strongly criticises the views presented here in a special issue of the Journal of 
Agrarian Change edited by Terence J. Byres (2004a) is not discussed here. The omission of power in economics 
and in researching land issues, acknowledged by Khan (2004), Dreze (2002) and Bardhan (2003), is admittedly 
an important limitation. 
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One stance championed by the World Bank (World Bank 2003b) relies on 
markets (land rental or land sales markets) to redistribute land to the rural poor. 
By contrast, the second stance is highly sceptical of the possibility to improve 
land access for the poor through market operations. It supports a radical transfer 
of land ownership from large landowners to smallholders through outright 
confiscation or through state interventions that lower land prices if land markets 
are to be used (Griffin, Khan, and Ickowitz 2002: 341; Griffin, Khan, and 
Ickowitz 2004). A third stance is equally sceptical of market-mediated land 
reforms but puts the emphasis on credit market failures and insists that land 
policies be accompanied with credit policies that lift the credit constraints faced 
by asset-poor smallholders (Carter and Mesbah 1993; Carter and Barham 1996; 
Carter 2000; Carter and Olinto 2003). 
At the centre of all three stances lies the inverse relationship between farm size 
and land productivity (in labour surplus economies) 173 , which has been the 
subject of intense theoretical and empirical debates that to this date remain 
unsettled 174 . While various hypotheses have been proposed 175 , the inverse 
relationship is largely attributed to the labour costs advantage of small-scale 
producers who resort to cheap and easy-to-monitor family labour, in contrast 
with large-scale producers who need to hire labour and incur important search, 
supervision and coordination costs 176 . The inverse relationship provides the 
central rationale for all three standpoints, all somewhat agreeing that supporting 
smallholder agriculture is desirable both from an equity and efficiency 
perspective 177 . 
On the other hand, smallholders face a number of disadvantages that offset their 
labour cost advantage: (i) when economies of scale arise during the production 
173 See the recent literature review on farm size by Eastwood, Lipton and Newell (2005). 
174 Dyer (2004) recently questioned the empirical evidence for the existence of the inverse relationship. A reply 
was to Dyer's challenge was provided by Griffin, Khan and Ickowitz (2004). Most of the evidence on the 
inverse relationship dates from the 1960s-1980s - see Berry and Cline (1979); IFAD (2001). Griffin, Khan and 
Ickowitz (2004) present some evidence for the 1990s. 
175 See particularly Sen (1966); Lipton (1974); Berry and Cline (1979); Sen (1981a); ibid. (1981b); Rudra (1982); 
Lipton (1983); Lipton and Longhurst (1989); Platteau (1992a); Benjamin (1995); Binswanger, Deininger and 
Feder (1995). 
176 Lipton and Longhurst (1989: 114-119); Platteau (1992a); Binswanger, Deininger and Feder (1995: 2707-2711) 
present evidence that small farms also use hired labour. However, since it is easier to supervise hired labour 
over a small surface with many family members per hectare, they still face lower supervision costs. 
177 The possibility to achieve both equity and efficiency aims through land reform is severely critiqued by 
Byres (2004b). 
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process 178 , or (ii) when constrained access to working capital or consumption-
smoothing credit prevents them from adopting a new technology or from 
engaging in high-growth activities 179 . 
Recent research comparing three Latin American countries 180 , which have 
dissimilar agrarian structures but experienced similar agricultural export-led 
periods of growth during the 1970s and 1980s, showed that the severity of the 
wealth bias on rural markets was linked to the underlying ownership structure, or 
the country's agrarian structure. 
In Chile and Paraguay, where land was highly unequally distributed, export 
crops either required important capital investments and involved greater risk 
exposure (fruits in Chile), or were not particularly responsive to the intensive 
application of labour (wheat and soy in Paraguay). Smallholders were therefore 
less likely to (i) access credit, (ii) adopt high-value added crops and (iii) choose 
long-term as opposed to short-term investments. They were squeezed out of the 
growth process and the agrarian structure grew even more unequal. By contrast, 
in Guatemala, where a more egalitarian agrarian structure prevailed, the labour 
intensive character of the export crop (winter vegetables) favoured small-scale 
production. The agro-export boom substantially contributed to reduce poverty 
and even allowed smallholders to accumulate land. 
These Latin American case studies also illustrate how certain crop 
characteristics, when combined with a number of favourable initial conditions, 
can help mitigate the disadvantages faced by small-scale farmers when accessing 
factor markets. Smallholder-friendly crop attributes include: (i) high 
responsiveness to increases in the skilful application of labour (thereby 
exploiting the labour advantage of smallholders); (ii) short periods of time 
between the planting and the harvesting of the crop that reduce exposure to risks; 
(iii) low requirements in purchased inputs that minimise working capital 
requirements; (iv) no economies of scale during the production, processing or the 
179 Admittedly, this is hardly ever the case in agriculture. 
179 Binswanger, Deininger and Feder (1995: 2695) review the case for smallholder agriculture and discuss the 
existence/non-existence of economies of scale in agriculture. Lipton and Longhurst (1989) present evidence 
showing that where it was introduced, small farmers adopted the technology only two or three seasons after 
middle-size farmers (and not large landowners) adopted it. 
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marketing stages that cannot be circumvented through cooperative arrangements 
or rental markets I81 . By contrast, crops requiring large initial investments and 
with long gestation periods (e.g. plantation crops) are more likely to be adopted 
by rich farmers, who have more ready access to credit182 . 
Importantly also, the diffusion of scale neutral and labour-intensive yield-raising 
techniques played an important role in the reduction of rural poverty (Lipton and 
Longhurst 1989). In their analysis of the agricultural development cum 
industrialisation process of Japan, Korea and Taiwan, Penelope Francks, Boestel 
and Kim (1999) showed that investments in large-scale irrigation infrastructures 
during the feudal and early modernisation periods allowed the diffusion of water 
control needed for the successful adoption of high-yielding varieties of seeds and 
other yield-raising inputs. Similarly, rural infrastructures (roads) and high levels 
of education (notably primary education) played a key role in enabling poor 
households to participate in the non-farm growth process in rural India 
(Ravallion and Datt 2002) or to multiply the returns from their land in Mexico 
(Finan, Sadoulet, and Janvry 2005). 
To summarise, three important sets of conditions that favour pro-poor growth 
emerge from the literature. First, for a given growth rate, the distribution of land 
affects the rate of poverty reduction by influencing the degree to which rural 
markets, in particular credit markets, are biased against poor households. 
Second, promoting crops or technologies that exploit the advantages of small-
scale farming can mitigate the disadvantages faced by smallholders. Finally, the 
impact of agricultural growth on poverty reduction can be substantially enhanced 
when a number of enabling conditions are in place. Three enabling factors are 
particularly important: (a) the development and diffusion of yield-raising 
technology, (b) investments in rural infrastructure (notably road and irrigation 
systems) and (c) human capital development. These three sets of conditions, i.e. 
(i) Vietnam's agrarian structure, (ii) the production characteristics of rice, 
180 The results and a comparative analysis are presented in a series of articles by Carter and Barham (1996); 
Carter (2000); Carter and Olinto (2003). 
181 Binswanger, Deininger and Feder (1995) explain that intermediation generally allowed smallholders to 
thrive in many crops with post-harvest scale economies, notably rubber, tea, cotton, and sugar. 
182 The centrality of credit in agricultural production decision-making amply justifies the emphasis laid upon 
credit market failures. 
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Vietnam's main food and export crop, and (iii) other initial conditions, are 
explored in turn in the following section. 
4.2.2 The Legacy of Vietnam's Agrarian History 
Over the past 50 years, Vietnam experienced momentous economic and political 
changes (Kolko 1985; Beresford 1988; Kolko 1997; Le Ba Thao 1998). In this 
section, I argue that Vietnam's unique agrarian history created favourable 
conditions for agricultural growth to be inclusive of the poor. Key legacies of 
Vietnam's agrarian reforms include: (i) an egalitarian access to land brought 
about by past redistributive land reforms; (ii) an agrarian system centred around 
the production of rice using wet-rice farming techniques that are friendly to 
smallholders; (iii) widespread access to irrigation and other yield-increasing 
technology; (iv) relatively high levels of human capital in rural areas. Each of 
these factors is now reviewed in turn. 
4.2.2.1 Egalitarian Access to Land 
When Vietnam emerged from 30 years of war in 1975, it could benefit from the 
legacy of exceptionally far-reaching agrarian reforms that resulted in near-
universal access to land in North Vietnam, and limited incidence of landlessness 
in South Vietnam. 
Exceptional historical events allowed Vietnam to implement drastic changes in 
land property relations in a short historical time span. Kolko (1985: 14-16) 
explains how, during the French colonial period, agriculture was dominated by 
French colonial plantations, large estates, high levels of landlessness, and 
extreme misery. The land distribution figures of the late 1930s provided by 
Kolko are startling. In Cochinchina, 6,200 landlords with estates over 50 
hectares owned 45 percent of rice land; an additional 60,000 landowners owned 
37 percent of rice land. Tenancy was predominant (three-fifth of the Mekong 
River Delta, Vietnam's most important rice-growing region, was farmed by 
tenants), and three-fifth of the population was landless. In Tonkin, during the late 
1930s, 30 percent of rice land belonged to large estates of 50 hectares or more, 
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those with 5-50 hectares of land, or only 2 percent of the landowning population, 
held another 20 percent. 
In 1954, North Vietnam carried out a major land reform (the Land 
Revolution 183), during which 810,000 hectares of farmland formerly owned by 
landlords were redistributed to 2.1 million peasants (Tran Phuong 1968). The 
redistribution of land was quickly followed by an extensive land collectivisation 
programme. Figure 4-1 below shows the reach of agricultural collectivisation in 
each region. In 1960, 86 percent of rural households had joined a cooperative 
(Chu Van Lam 1992: 33). By 1975, this share had increased to 97 percent of all 
households, including 88 percent who had joined high-level cooperatives 184 . 
Figure 4-1: Cooperatives (1980) 
Share of Agricultural Households Enrolled in Cooperatives (1980) 
183 The Land Revolution (Cac Mang Duong Dat in Vietnamese) recalls an intense period where land relations 
were completely redrawn and that still resonates in today's memories. See for example in "Paradise of the 
Blind" a powerful narration of that period by Vietnamese novel writer Duong Thu Huong. 
184 See Chu Van Lam (1992: 9-34); Hy V. Luong (1992); Yvon-Tran (1994). Between 1958 and 1965, several 
attempts were made to accelerate the collectivisation of land and enrol households into larger scale 
cooperatives. In keeping with the model of the Soviet Kolkhozes, large cooperatives (Hop Tac Xa in 
Vietnamese) regrouped households up to commune level (the Xa). Concurrently, the State increased its 
investments in rural infrastructure, most notably in large-scale irrigation systems. Joining a high-level 
agricultural cooperative meant that households had to hand over their land and their production tools (water 
buffalos, etc.) to the cooperative. Farm households retained their garden land (or the so-called 5-percent land), 
which they could farm independently. It also meant that farmers relinquished all agricultural management 
decisions to the cooperative leadership. Paddy land was worked in common by farmers who were integrated 
in specialised task teams. The cooperative management determined land use, which resulted in the spread of 
rice mono-cultivation during the cooperative period at the expense of the cultivation of other food crops. The 
cooperative leadership determined the production objectives and ensured the delivery of all necessary 
services (equipment, delivery of seeds, fertilisers, irrigation, veterinary services). Cooperatives also provided 
welfare services to their members, such as schooling, nurseries, and medical services. The fact that these social 
services could only be accessed by cooperative members served as an incentive to entice farmers to join the 
collective. 
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After two decades of collective farming, the decollectivisation of agriculture 
during the 1980s oversaw drastic changes in agriculture. Agricultural 
cooperatives were dismantled 185 , the pre-eminence of household-based farming 
over collective farming was re-established, and farmland was redistributed to 
households according to family labour endowment. By all accounts, the 
redistribution of land during the late 1980s and early 1990s resulted in a 
remarkably egalitarian distribution of land 186 . 
The agrarian history of South Vietnam took a different trajectory after the 
partition of Vietnam in 1954, and until the country was reunified in 1975. A 
land-to-the-tiller programme was implemented in the early 1970s and saw the 
redistribution of 80 percent of agricultural land to 70 percent of the rural 
population. Following the reunification of Vietnam in 1975, the effort to 
collective land in South Vietnam was staunchly resisted, particularly in the South 
East region and the Mekong River Delta (Kolko 1985). Figure 4-1 shows the 
reach of the land collectivisation effort in 1980, and confirms the failure to 
collectivise land in the Southern regions of Vietnam (the South East and the 
Mekong River Delta, and to a lesser extent, the Central Highlands). 
When one bears in mind the transformations in Vietnam's agrarian relations over 
the past 50 years, it is possible to appreciate the remarkable position in which 
Vietnam found itself at the start of the agricultural liberalisation period in 1992. 
As illustrated in Table 4-7 below, the redistribution of land undertaken in the late 
1980s or early 1990s in North Vietnam, and in the early 1970s in South Vietnam, 
resulted in a remarkably limited incidence of landlessness and an egalitarian 
distribution of land. 
Note however that the divergence in agrarian histories between North and South 
Vietnam is reflected in the higher prevalence of landlessness and a more unequal 
land distribution in South Vietnam. This North-South agrarian contrast is best 
illustrated by comparing the Red River Delta and the Mekong River Delta. 
185  The 1988 Land Law marks the formal dismantling of agricultural cooperatives and the re-establishment of 
household-based farming. One has to wait until the enactment of the 1996 Cooperative Law for the 
reinstatement of a legal framework that allows cooperatives to be formed and provide services. 
186  See Hy V. Luong (1992); Chabert (1994); CIRAD-URPA (1995); Le, et al. (1996); Jesus and Anh (1998); Tran 
Thi Que (1998); Gironde (2001); Tanaka (2001); Ravallion and van de Walle (2004). 
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In the Red River Delta, land inequality is remarkably low: in 1992, landlessness 
was nearly absent at 3 percent, and the land Gini coefficient was only 0.29. 
Owing to its high population density (1,180 persons per km 2) 187 , average farm 
size was only 0.3 hectare. Table 4-7 shows the extreme degree of land 
fragmentation that prevails in the Red River Delta, where 93 percent of 
farmsteads were smaller than 0.5 ha and 99 percent were smaller than 1 hectare. 
Most farms are small-scale family farms and competition from large-scale farm 
producers is extremely limited. 
In the Mekong River Delta, land is more unequally distributed: in 1998, the farm 
size ratio of the fifth over the first expenditure quintiles was 2.3. Landlessness 
was much more prevalent (17 percent of households in 1992) and farms were 
larger: only 32 percent of farms were smaller than 0.5 ha, 27 percent ranged 
between 1 and 2 hectares, and 9 percent were larger than 2 hectares. In contrast 
to the Red River Delta, smallholders in the Mekong River Delta face greater 
competition from large-scale producers 188 . 
Overall, Vietnam's redistributive land reforms created a situation of quasi-
universal access to land in North Vietnam and relatively limited incidence of 
landlessness in South Vietnam 189 . 
Table 4-7: Distribution of Land by Farm Size and Land Gini (1992) 
1992 owned 
land 
Northern 
Mountains 
Red River 
Delta 
North 
Central 
Coast 
South 
Central 
Coast 
Central 
Highlands 
South East 	Mekong 
River Delta 
All Viet 
Nam 
Landlessness' 2% 3% 4% 11% 4% 21% 17% 8% 
Land Gini 0.41 0.29 0.41 0.43 0.45 0.45 0.44 0.49 
<0.1 ha 9 10 13 9 10 8 2 9 
0.1-0.2 ha 10 23 20 21 10 7 4 15 
0.2-0.3 ha 12 31 20 20 7 10 6 17 
0.3-0.4 ha 13 21 16 17 6 10 10 15 
0.4-0.5 ha 9 7 12 11 6 7 9 9 
0.5-0.6 ha 12 4 7 7 3 10 8 7 
0.6-0.8 ha 12 1 6 5 17 10 14 8 
0.8-1 ha 7 1 2 4 11 9 10 5 
1-2 ha 12 1 4 4 21 24 26 11 
>2 ha 3 0 1 2 10 5 9 3 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
NB: VLSS 1992, rural households only. [self-weighted] 
' Vietnam Development Report 2004 (World Bank), Table 3.1 
187 Dang Nguyen Anh, Tacoli and Thanh (2003) 
188 A similar agrarian structure has emerged in the South East region, where the prevalence of landlessness is 
highest, but where nevertheless the incidence of poverty declined the fastest and food poverty was eradicated. 
389 For comparison, Benjamin and Brandt (2004) document land Gini coefficients of 0.39 for Japan, 0.47 for 
Taiwan, 0.20 for South Korea, and 0.21 for China. 
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4.2.2.2 Smallholder-Friendly Rice Cultivation System 
Over centuries, confronted to land scarcity and plentiful labour, Vietnam 
developed a permanent and intensive system of rice exploiting the advantage of 
small-scale farming 190- 191 . In fact, the characteristics of wet-rice farming meet 
most of the conditions for pro-poor agricultural growth highlighted above. 
First, wet-rice farming includes a number of tasks 192 , which, when carefully 
executed, can make a decisive contribution to enhance yields 193 . Rice 
productivity is therefore critically dependent on the availability of skilled and 
experienced workers. In this case, family labour, which is easy to monitor and 
has a direct stake in the final output through own consumption and farm profits, 
has a definite advantage over hired labour. In fact, in the wet-rice cultivation 
systems of South-East Asia, household-based farming has been the most 
enduring form of agricultural organisation 194 . As Francesca Bray explains, under 
conditions of high population pressure and land scarcity, 
"Once rice cultivation techniques reach a certain level of intensification, the 
family farm comes to predominate as the basic unit of production. It shows a 
remarkable historical resilience: in China, family rice farms gradually ousted 
other forms of organisation in medieval times, served as a basis for 
flourishing and diverse economy for several centuries, and survived not only 
the demographic pressures and economic deterioration of the period 1800-
1949 but also the rise and fall of the People's communes. In the other 
countries of monsoon Asia too, the household farm has persisted as the basic 
unit of agricultural production despite significant changes in other levels of 
economic and productive relations." (Bray 1986: 186) 
199 Gourou (1936); ibid. (1952) documents the acute population pressure in the Red River Delta in the 1930s 
and describes the labour intensive cultivation methods that were developed over time across South-East Asia 
191 See Gourou (1936); Bray (1986); Nguyen Sinh Cuc (1995b); Le Ba Thao (1998). See also the quote from Bray 
(1986: 25) describing the main characteristics of wet-rice farming in Chapter 3. 
192 These tasks include: the selection of seeds to be planted in specially prepared seedbeds; the transplantation 
of seedlings in ploughed and flooded fields; during the maturation period other tasks comprise the weeding 
of fields, the application of fertiliser and spraying of pesticide, the monitoring of water levels, and finally the 
harvesting, threshing and drying of rice grains. 
193 Rice productivity is particularly responsive to complex decisions regarding the timing of operations and the 
type and quantity of fertilisers and pesticides, which need to be adjusted for local variations in soil quality, 
temperature, and water control. 
194 According to Yvon-Tran (1994); Hoang Viet (1999), the low productivity of agricultural cooperatives in 
North Vietnam can be attributed to the loss of the family labour advantage and to the prohibitively high costs 
of monitoring cooperative workers. 
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Other characteristics of rice production also work in favour of small family 
farms. For example, rice grains can be easily stored and do not require heavy 
investments in processing facilities 195 ; economies of scale appearing during the 
marketing phase can be circumvented through cooperative arrangements; 
indivisible inputs like oxen can be hired or, as often happens in Vietnam, can be 
purchased and shared among a cluster of family farms 196 . 
4.2.2.3 Other 'Initial Conditions' 
At the outset of the decollectivisation period, Vietnam benefited from important 
initial conditions favouring pro-poor agricultural growth: an egalitarian agrarian 
structure, and an agricultural sector dominated by a smallholder-friendly rice 
cultivation system. In addition, investments in rural infrastructure (in particular 
in irrigation) and in education undertaken during the pre-liberalisation period, 
added two favourable initial conditions. 
Irrigation 
Vietnam's irrigation infrastructure consists in large-scale hydraulic units (canals, 
reservoirs and pumping stations) and small-scale systems (wells and boreholes) 
and was built over centuries. Important efforts to expand irrigation and drainage 
systems were especially undertaken during the colonial period in South Vietnam, 
and during the collective period in North Vietnam. 
During the French colonisation period, additional irrigation and drainage 
investment allowed the expansion of cultivated land and the establishment of a 
plantation system, transforming South Vietnam into an exporting agricultural 
area. In North Vietnam, large-scale irrigation projects were initiated in the 1960s 
and the 1970s, absorbing 80 percent of the government's direct investments, and 
bringing 500,000 hectares of land under irrigation. By 1966, 73 percent of 
cultivated areas in the Red River Delta were equipped with electric irrigation and 
drainage pumping stations (Fontenelle and Tessier 2001). During the de-
collectivisation period (1980-1993), another investment push across Vietnam 
195 Lipton and Longhurst (1989: chapter 3, 136-138 and 142-144) 
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brought 1 million hectares under irrigation and doubled the total irrigated area to 
3.0 million hectares out of a total of 7.5 million hectares (see the top line in 
Figure 4-2 below, which maps the progression of irrigation between 1962 and 
1999). 
Data from the Vietnamese Living Standard Survey confirm this trend (see Table 
4-8): between 1992 and 1998, the average proportion of irrigated annual land 
increased from 58 percent to 77 percent. In the Red River Delta, a large 92 
percent of annual land was already irrigated by 1992, whilst in the Mekong River 
Delta, the share of irrigated annual land increased from 50 percent to 92 percent 
of annual land (see Table 4-8 below). Counterbalancing these positive 
achievements in the diffusion of water control, several studies have highlighted 
the severe state of disrepair of Vietnam's irrigation infrastructure because of 
insufficient maintenance work (van de Walle 1998; Fontenelle and Tessier 
2001) 197 . 
Figure 4-2: Fertiliser Use and Irrigation (1962-1999) 198 
Fertiliser Use and Irrigation (1962-1999) 
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196 Lipton and Longhurst (1989: 143) present several examples of the persistence of the inverse relationship in 
several areas where modern varieties seeds were introduced. Yang (1996) explains: "one of the clearest IRs 
was a careful survey in Muda, Malaysia, which by 1972-3 was dominated by MV rice." 
197 The role of cooperatives in the provision of water control services actually expanded during the early 
decollectivisation period. Small pumping stations managed by cooperatives at the local level were able to 
provide farmers with a more flexible irrigation timetable than public companies operating larger primary 
hydraulic units. Fontenelle and Tessier (2001) reported that 50 percent of the irrigated area in the Red River 
Delta is supplied by cooperatives that are run independently from the public Irrigation and Drainage 
Management Companies (IDMCs). 
198 Source: FAO-STAT 
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Table 4-8: Irrigated Annual Land by Region (1992-1998) 
Rural sample Cultivating annual land Irrigated land 
1992 	1998 1992 	1998 
(% housesholds) (% annual land) 
Northern Uplands 91 95 43 58 
Red River Delta 92 93 92 94 
North Central Coast 89 88 53 66 
South Central Coast 61 86 56 70 
Central Highlands 20 62 9 66 
South East 34 50 30 62 
Mekong River Delta 70 68 50 92 
All Rural Vietnam 71 82 58 77 
Yield-Increasing Inputs 
As explained earlier, the role of cooperatives was dramatically reduced during 
the early decollectivisation period. As shown in Table 4-9, the role of 
cooperatives in the provision of inputs nonetheless survived, albeit only for a 
limited number of inputs (land preparation, irrigation, plant protection), solely in 
the Northern part of Vietnam, and had essentially disappeared with respect to the 
provision of seeds and fertilisers. 
By 1992, the provision of agricultural inputs (fertilisers, seeds and pesticides) 
had been privatised, although a small and diminishing percentage of farmers in 
North Vietnam were still supplied by the government or cooperatives (Table 
4-10). Cooperatives were mostly active in providing irrigation services and to a 
more limited extent technical assistance for plant protection. 
Despite the privatisation of factor markets in North Vietnam, access to yield-
raising inputs (seeds, fertilisers, pesticides) remained widely distributed, as 
evidenced in Table 4-11, which shows that in 1992 as many as 95 percent of 
households farming annual land had used chemical fertilisers and pesticides. 
Moreover, where access to technology was lowest, in the Central Highland, 
pesticide use rate increased from 55 percent to 73 percent between 1992 and 
1998. 
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Table 4-9: Provision of Agricultural Inputs by Cooperatives (1992) 
Rural sample Received 	irrigation preparatio 	seeds 	fertilisers 	plant 	other 
input from n services protection 
cooperative 
(yes/no)' 
*as a % of rural households having received inputs from cooperatives 
Northern Uplands 84 88 0 0 10 50 61 
Red River Delta 98 98 29 4 2 33 45 
North Central Coast 88 79 7 2 0 37 28 
South Central Coast 78 99 69 11 18 61 6 
Central Highlands 31 92 0 0 0 8 0 
South East 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mekong River Delta 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
All Rural Vietnam 89 92 23 3 5 39 39 
' as a % of HH fanning annual land; Question from the VLSS: "have cooperatives provided land preparation, seeds, fertilisers, plant 
protection services, other, on annual cropland, allocated or LT use (question s9q9 and s9q10) 
Table 4-10: Providers of fertilisers (1992 —1998) 
Provider 
Government 
of fertilisers (as °A 
Cooperative 
of users) 
Private 
Northern Uplands 
Red River Delta 
North Central Coast 
South Central Coast 
Central Highlands 
South East 
Mekong River Delta 
All Rural Vietnam 
Table 4-11: Diffusion of Modern Agricultural Technology by Region (1992 —
1998) 
1992 
	
1998 
	
1992 	1998 
	
1992 
	
1998 
8% 
	
25% 
	
15% 	10% 
	
82% 
	
71% 
12% 
	
2% 
	
15% 	8% 
	
80% 
	
91% 
10% 
	
7% 
	
11% 	2% 
	
87% 
	93% 
6% 
	
0% 
	
23% 	3% 
	
82% 
	
99% 
4% 
	
2% 	.3% 	0% 
	
96% 
	
99% 
0% 
	1% 0% 0% 
	99% 
	
100% 
1% 
	
1% 
	
0% 	0% 
	
99% 
	
100% 
7% 
	7% 	11% 	5% 
	
87% 
	90% 
Rural sample Use of chemical fertilisers Use of pesticides Received technical advice 
1992 	1998 	1992 	1998 	1992 
	
1998 
(as a % of households farming annual land) 
Northern Uplands 	94 	 94 
Red River Delta 99 100 
North Central Coast 	94 	 96 
South Central Coast 95 96 
Central Highlands 	79 	 73 
South East 	 91 90 
Mekong River Delta 	93 	94 
All Rural Vietnam 95 95 
91 	47 
99 
94 
97 
73 
88 
96 
95 
91 
99 
96 
89 
55 
89 
94 
 94 
53 
89 
86 
79 
56 
42 
48 
 70 
82 
85 
49 
11 
40 
53 
 62 
Education 
With respect to education, the reader is referred to Chapter 3, which documented 
in detail how Vietnam emerged from 30 years of war in 1975 with literacy and 
numeracy levels normally achieved by middle-income countries such as 
Thailand or Indonesia. Thanks to the push to generalise access to primary 
education during the early Communist period, by 1992, Vietnam's educational 
attainments were indeed remarkably high, with a low 7 percent illiteracy rate, 
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and an average of 6 years of education for the household head. Nevertheless, 
large disparities in educational attainments exist across regions in Vietnam and 
can attributed to the 1954 partition between North and South Vietnam (see Table 
3-2 and Chapter 3 of this thesis for an in-depth discussion). 
4.2.3 Preliminary Conclusions 
This section showed how at the start of the agricultural decollectivisation period, 
Vietnam benefited from favourable initial conditions for pro-poor agricultural 
growth. These initial conditions included an agricultural growth process spurred 
by labour intensive and smallholder-friendly wet-rice cultivation techniques; 
quasi-universal access to land in North Vietnam and limited incidence of 
landlessness in South Vietnam; widespread diffusion of yield-raising technology; 
and relatively high levels of education. 
All together, findings from Section 4.1.2 (Sectoral Growth and Poverty 
Reduction) and Section 4.2 suggest a strong link between agricultural growth 
and poverty reduction. However, the chain of causality remains unclear. Beyond 
the commonalities, there are important variations in poverty reduction, as well as 
significant disparities in initial conditions, and wide differences in agro-
ecological conditions across regions. Moreover, within one region, it is important 
to account for the diversity of experiences across households, which may have 
similar levels of expenditures but hold different assets and therefore differ in 
terms of their abilities to capture the gains from growth. All of this is likely to 
influence the nature of the mechanisms at play in a particular region, and for a 
particular household. 
I now turn to the welfare impact of the liberalisation of prices during the 1990s. 
Whilst higher agricultural terms of trade favour producers, they typically harm 
consumers. As is shown in the next section, rice being the main food staple and a 
major contributor to farm income, the overall welfare impact of the liberalisation 
of rice markets is far from clear. 
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4.3 Market Participation and Food Security in Vietnam 
Although the liberalisation of agriculture generated substantial improvements in 
agricultural terms of trade, it also triggered a large increase in food prices. Thus, 
the reforms posed a central dilemma expressed by Amartya Sen as follows: 
"The real issue is that irrespective of whether the indirect effects of high 
food prices in raising rural incomes through incentives are strong, the direct 
effects of high food prices on poverty are substantial. Even if the indirect 
effects were powerful, which is far from obvious, the direct effects would 
remain immediate and important. [...] What is crucially important in this 
context is the fact that the two types of effects do not necessarily -indeed, do 
not even typically- work on the same group of people." (Sen 1986: 187) 
This section explores the welfare consequences of such a large increase in food 
prices. Section 4.3.1 revisits the net benefit ratio method, which approximates 
first-order welfare impacts by the net production status of a household, and 
presents evidence of a substantial decoupling between net production status and 
welfare changes. To disentangle the ambiguous results obtained from first-order 
welfare impact methods, Section 4.3.2 explores the relationship between rice 
self-sufficiency and poverty reduction. Two key motivations for participation in 
rice markets, (i) changes in transaction costs and (ii) self-insurance against price 
risks, are discussed in Section 4.3.3. 
4.3.1 Net Production Status and Rice Price Changes in Vietnam (1992-
1998) 
In Vietnam, the liberalization of agricultural export markets and the lifting of 
internal trade barriers during the 1990s triggered a substantial increase in 
agricultural prices. As shown in Table 4-12 below, between 1992 and 1998, 
consumer and producer rice prices rose by 46 percent and 50 percent 
respectively. At the same time, the lifting of import quotas for fertilisers and 
pesticides triggered a steep decline in agricultural input prices. According to 
Niimi, Vasudeva-Dutta, and Winters (2003), fertiliser prices fell by 19 percent in 
real terms (relative to CPI) between 1993 and 1998. 
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The fact that poor rural households have a high share of food expenditure and 
depend heavily on the market to procure food has raised concerns that higher 
food prices would worsen poverty 199 . On the other hand, the contention that 
higher food prices systematically harm the welfare of the poor has also been 
questioned, for example by research on India and Bangladesh, which showed 
that higher food prices benefited the landless poor through higher agricultural 
wages (Ravallion 1990; Ravallion 2000) 200 . Conversely, in Mexico, gains in 
household welfare from lower consumer prices were offset by reductions in 
unskilled wages and agricultural profits (Nicita 2004). 
Whilst higher agricultural terms of trade favour the rural poor as farm producers, 
they can also harm them as rice consumers. Rice being Vietnam's main food 
staple and a major contributor to farm income201 , the overall welfare impact of 
the liberalisation of rice markets and of improving agricultural terms of trade is 
therefore far from clear. The difficulty in disentangling the effects of higher food 
prices on household welfare stems from the multiplicity of mechanisms at play, 
with food prices affecting rural households both as consumers and as income 
earners. 
First, as consumers, households can respond to higher food prices by substituting 
away from expensive goods towards cheaper lower quality food items. As 
agricultural producers, they can modify crop choices and input uses in 
accordance with crop prices and factor returns to generate higher farm 
profitability. As wage-workers, they can modify their labour allocation decisions 
in response to changes in agricultural or off-farm wage rates. In addition, to 
complicate matters further 202 , as Martin Ravallion explains, 
199 This would be the case in most of Asia, Africa and Latin America according to Ravallion (1990); Barrett and 
Dorosh (1996), Eastwood and Lipton (2000: 51-52). See Saith (1981); Sen (1981c); Mellor and Desai (1986); 
Lipton and Longhurst (1989); Ravallion (1990); Barrett and Dorosh (1996); Carter (1996); Carter and Barham 
(1996); Ravallion and Datt (1996); Barrett (1998); Ahmed and Haggblade (2000). 
200 On the other hand, early research by Raisuddin Ahmed showed that rural labourer in Bangladesh, when 
rice prices rose, lost more as consumers than they gained as rice farmers. 
201 Rice cultivation clearly continues to dominate the livelihoods of Vietnamese households. On the production 
side, paddy is grown by 80 percent of rural households and contributes 85 percent of total food production. 
On the consumption side, rice procures on average 75 percent of total calorie intake. 
202 In their literature review of the welfare impact of trade policy, Winters, McCulloch and McKay (2004) and 
Hertel and Reimer (2004) identified a total of six channels linking prices changes and household welfare, 
These linkages include (a) price and availability of goods, (b) factor prices, income and employment, (c) 
government taxes and transfers influenced by changes in revenues from trade taxes; (d) incentives for 
investment and innovation, which affect long-run economic growth; (e) external shocks such as changes in 
terms of trade; (f) short-run risk and adjustment costs. 
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"These income effects probably take longer than the expenditure effects. 
Some of the poorest households in rural areas could well lose initially from 
higher food prices, with the initial gains being concentrated amongst the rural 
non-poor. The proportionate losses of real spending power will be higher for 
the poor than the non-poor." (Ravallion 2000:355) 
Therefore, the net impact of higher food prices on household welfare is 
ambiguous and depends on a household's ability to compensate negative 
expenditure effects with countervailing income effects: higher farm income, 
higher farm and off-farm employment levels, and/or higher wage rates. In fact, 
the large decline in poverty among urban wage-workers and rural non-farm 
workers in Vietnam indicates that part of the increase in food prices may have 
stemmed from rising demand from people with better living standards and who 
still have a high-income elasticity of demand203 . 
Table 4-12: Changes in Consumer and Producer Rice Prices (19924998)204 
Rice - Unit values 	Consumer Unit Value Producer Unit Value A CPI 
(1998- 
1992) 
Consumer Price / 
Producer Price 
Jan 93 
prices 
(1) 
Jan 98 
prices 
(2) 
A 
(1998- 
1992) 
Jan 93 
prices 
(3) 
Jan 98 
prices 
(4) 
A 
(1998- 
1992) 
1992 	1998 
(1)/(3) 	(2)/(4) 
(V00 dong per kg) ('000 dung per kg) 
Northern Uplands 1.88 2.76 1.47 1.78 2.55 1.43 1.46 1.06 1.08 
Red River Delta 1.87 2.78 1.48 1.81 2.61 1.44 1.46 1.03 1.06 
North Central Coast 1.79 2.61 1.46 1.57 2.39 1.52 1.46 1.14 1.09 
South Central Coast 1.93 2.83 1.47 1.51 2.32 1.53 1.47 1.27 1.22 
Central Uplands 1.89 2.73 1.44 1.37 2.43 1.78 1.44 1.39 1.13 
South East 1.76 2.57 1.47 1.63 2.34 1.44 1.47 1.08 1.10 
Mekong River Delta 1.66 2.42 1.46 1.42 2.14 1.51 1.46 1.17 1.13 
All Vietnam 1.81 2.65 1.46 1.62 2.42 1.50 1.46 1.12 1.09 
NB: Only rural households 
Notwithstanding the multiplicity of mechanisms at play, the first-order welfare 
impact of price changes has been approximated by the net production status of a 
household. To see why, let V(p,y) denote a household's indirect utility 
function, which depends on y, the household's total income, and on p, a vector of 
consumption prices. Let Ma denote the marketed food surplus generated by the 
200 Insight from Michael Lipton. 
2" Note that the figures are different from those in Benjamin and Brandt (2004). This is because during 1998, 
the price of rice increased by 25.6 percent, whilst the price of non-rice food and general consumer price 
increased by only 2.7 percent and 7.4 percent respectively. To express the unit value of rice in January 93 or 
January 98 prices, consumer and producer unit values are adjusted by the monthly deflator for rice. Using a 
different deflator as Benjamin and Brandt seem to have done would inflate the unit value expressed in 
January 1998 and overstate the inflation in the price of rice between 1992 and 1998. 
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farm household. It can be shown that —av —av ma (Barrett and Dorosh 1996; ap ay 
av Barrett 1998). Since by common assumption, 
ay 
— > 0, the impact of higher 
prices on welfare is of the same sign as Ma . This result states what has become 
the standard partial equilibrium outcome: on the one hand, higher prices 
stimulate production and benefit net sellers; on the other hand, an increase in 
producer prices translates itself into higher consumer prices and impacts the 
welfare of net buyers adversely. 
The net production status of a household is measured by the net benefit ratio 
(NBR), defined as the difference in monetary terms between the production and 
the consumption of rice as a proportion of total expenditures (Deaton 1997b). 
Producers with positive NBRs would benefit from an increase in prices. 
Households with negative NBRs are net consumers of rice and would be 
adversely impacted by an increase in food prices. 
The Net Benefit Ratio methodology has been applied to study the welfare impact 
of price changes in Vietnam by Minot and Goletti (1998; 2000), and by 
Benjamin and Brandt (2004). In particular, Benjamin and Brandt (2004, Figure 
5.4 and 5.5 - pp. 172-175) gauged the distributive impact of higher consumer 
rice prices between 1992 and 1998 by regressing the NBRs non-parametrically 
on log per capita income. They conclude: 
"The liberalization of rice prices has been a double-edged sword, increasing 
the incomes of the poor, especially in the south, but also increasing the cost 
of food, which falls most heavily on the poor. On balance, except for the very 
poorest farmers, southern farmers across the income distribution benefited 
from the changes, whilst most northern households were better off, except at 
the bottom of the income distribution." (Benjamin and Brandt 2004: 177) 
These trends seem at odds with the deep reduction in poverty documented in 
Section 4.1.1 above, and with the fact that, according to Van de Walle and Crafty 
(2004), "farm-only households are nationally both the poorest and the most 
common household type in rural Viet Nam". 
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Households are categorised as having a rice surplus (deficit) if their NBR is 
positive (negative). Looking at the NBRs more closely, one finds that higher rice 
prices would have affected a large proportion of the rural population adversely. 
A tabulation of NBRs by Minot and Goleta (2000, Table 39, page 61) shows that 
in 1992, about 60 percent of rural households were net consumers of rice. The 
smallest proportions of deficit households are in Vietnam's largest rice 
producing regions, the Red River Delta and the Mekong River Delta, where 45 
percent and 55 percent of rural households had negative NBRs respectively. The 
highest percentages of deficit households are found in the Northern Upland, the 
Central Highlands, and in the South East region, where 62 percent, 82 percent, 
and 81 percent of rural households respectively were net consumers of rice. 
Therefore, a large percentage of the rural population was exposed to 
consumption price risks at the same time as the liberalisation of agricultural 
markets induced a sharp increase in food prices 
An important caveat to the NBR method is that households at similar levels of 
income may have very different asset endowment and income-earning sources. 
As a result, when second-order income effects are taken into account, welfare 
impacts may vary widely amongst household at the same income level (Hertel 
and Reimer 2004; Ravallion and Lokshin 2004). This heterogeneity in impact at 
the same income level is likely to be particularly salient in Vietnam because of 
its diverse geographic and socio-economic landscape. Figure 4-3 below, which 
presents a scatter plot of the 1992 NBRs against the log of per capita 
expenditure, confirms that there are considerable variations in NBRs at a given 
level of expenditure. 
Figure 4-3: Rice Benefit Ratio 1992 
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Caution is therefore required when interpreting the NBRs as they can only trace 
partial equilibrium effects and overlook more complex, general equilibrium 
effects, which need to be taken into account given the magnitude of the changes 
taking place in Vietnam. Most crucially, when wage and other supply responses 
affecting household income are taken into account, "the net position of the 
household becomes endogenous: sufficiently large consumption and income 
responses may cause an ex-ante net consumer become an ex-post net producer" 
(Porto 2005, p.1). Therefore, assessing the welfare impact of price changes 
through budget shares and income shares without integrating the impact on 
employment and earnings may yield considerably biased results (Ravallion 
1998)2°5 . 
In fact, using the panel data component of the VLSS and disaggregating the 
movements in and out of poverty by net production status suggests a substantial 
disconnect between net production status and changes in welfare. In most 
regions, most of the households that became non-poor (in relation to the food 
poverty line) were either deficit households in 1992 and in 1998, or had switched 
from being surplus producers in 1992 to being deficit households in 1998 (see 
columns 1, 2 and 4 in Table 4-13). In total, 63 percent of households that moved 
out of food poverty in 1998 were net consumers of rice. Therefore, if anything, 
poverty reduction seems to be associated with rice deficit rather than rice 
surplus. 
205 Ravallion (1990) provides the formulation of a second partial equilibrium model that takes into account 
adjustments on labour markets. When doing so, the standard partial equilibrium result depends on two 
further conditions: (i) whether the household is a net buyer or a net supplier of labour, and (ii) whether the 
price elasticity of wages is large enough, relative to the ratio of net food expenditures/earnings to net wage 
earnings. Similarly, if one extends the model to include the whole set of traded and non-traded goods as in 
Porto (2003), one needs to take into account how changes in the price of traded goods affect the price and the 
demand and production of non-traded goods. Porto evaluates the (first-order) welfare impact of changes in 
the price of traded goods with the budget shares of each good, the price elasticity of non-traded goods relative 
to traded goods, and wage price elasticities weighted by the share of labour income in total household income. 
The estimation of these models is extremely data intensive and unfortunately, there is insufficient data in the 
VLSS to estimate them. 
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Table 4-13: Moving Out and Falling into Food Poverty by Net Production 
Status 
Moving out of food poverty 	i Falling into food poverty 
Surplus 
92! 
Surplus 
Surplus 	Deficit 92 
92/ Deficit / Surplus 
Deficit i 
92/ 	I Surplus 
Deficit i Surplus 92/ 	92/ Deficit 92 / 
Deficit 
92/ 
Deficit 
98 98 98 98 Surplus 98 Deficit 98 Surplus 98 98  
(1 ) (2) (3) (4) (5 ) 	(6) (7) (8) 
Northern Uplands 15 15 7 63 16 18 14 52 
Red River Delta 52 25 7 16 44 	16 12 28 
North Central Coast 22 21 4 52 28 22 9 41 
South Central Coast 21 16 21 43 6 	6 13 74 
Central Highlands 0 0 7 93 0 0 0 100 
South East 21 13 3 64 0 	0 50 50 
Mekong River Delta 27 15 15 43 40 13 13 35 
Rural Vietnam 29 19 8 44 25 	15 13 48 
NB: Panel households only 
Owing to the large number of households with negative net benefit ratios and the 
importance of rice in the livelihoods and consumption of rural households, one 
would therefore have expected a worsening in poverty. However, the poverty 
reduction trends documented earlier showed a deep decline in rural poverty. 
These two trends could be reconciled if poor households were more likely to 
have positive NBRs and be the beneficiaries of high rice prices. Analysis of rice 
production and consumption by both Minot and Goletti (Minot and Goletti 2000) 
and Benjamin and Brandt (Benjamin and Brandt 2004) seems to point to the 
contrary. In addition, there does not seem to be any systematic relationship 
between poverty reduction and the net production status of rural households. 
4.3.2 Market Participation and Welfare in Vietnam 
In order to disentangle the ambiguous results obtained from first-order welfare 
impact methods, this section explores the relationship between self-sufficiency in 
rice and poverty reduction. The consumption module of the VLSS collected data 
on whether rice consumed by households was acquired on the market or 
originated from own production. These consumption data are combined with 
production data to classify rural households into five categories according to 
their involvement in rice markets. First, households are self-sufficient in rice 
when they procure 100 percent of their rice consumption from home-production. 
Moreover, households are: 
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(i) autarkic if they cultivate rice for own consumption only, and are not 
involved in rice market activities, neither as sellers nor as buyers; 
(ii) sell-only households if they participate in rice markets only as rice 
sellers; all their rice consumption comes from own production; 
(iii) buy-only households if they participate in rice markets only as buyers but 
never as sellers of rice; 
(iv) sell & buy households if they participate in rice markets both as sellers 
and as buyers of rice. 
Note that self-sufficient households include autarkic and sell-only households. 
Table 4-14 below presents a simple tabulation of participation in rice markets in 
1992 and 1998. Overall, there was a substantial increase in the number of 
autarkic and 'sell-only' households, and a corresponding decline in the 
percentage of 'buy-only' households. All together, despite a significant number 
of households opting out of rice farming 206, the proportion of self-sufficient 
households increased significantly from 37 percent of rural households in 1992 
to 45 percent in 1998. Furthermore, to explore how market participation 
decisions differ across income levels, three sets of nonparametric regressions are 
estimated where the independent variable is the logarithm of per capita 
expenditure and the dependent variable is a binary variable indicating the market 
participation status of a household. The results for self-sufficient, autarkic, and 
`sell-only' households in 1992 and 1998 are shown below in Table 4-16. Each 
panel shows the average for North and South Vietnam. The two vertical lines in 
each graph indicate the expenditure thresholds for the food and the general 
poverty line. The graph labeled 'Total' shows the aggregate results for Vietnam 
in each year. A decomposition of the results in 1998 by region can be found in 
the appendix (Figure 4-8: Market Participation (decomposition by region)). 
Although there was considerable variation in market participation across regions, 
two patterns in market participation nevertheless stand out, in particular between 
North and South Vietnam. First, on average, self-sufficiency diminished as 
income rose (see the bottom graphs in Panel A that show the aggregate results 
206  The proportion of rural households growing rice declined by 26 percent in the Central Highlands (to 61 
percent of rural households in 1998), and by 20 percent in the South East region (to 48 percent of rural 
households). These two regions are characterized by high levels of crop specialization in perennial crops such 
as coffee in the Central Highlands, or in vegetable production in the South-East region. 
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for Vietnam in each year)207 . Second, and most strikingly, in 1998, autarky 
increased with income levels in North Vietnam, whilst it decreased with income 
levels in South Vietnam. 
Finally, that autarky is not necessarily associated with poverty is further 
confirmed in Table 4-15, which shows the poverty headcount ratio for each 
category of market participant 208 . Whilst food poverty generally declined for all 
four categories of market participants, improvements in living standards were 
particularly pronounced among autarkic and 'sell-only' producers. All together, 
food poverty among self-sufficient households declined by 53 percent between 
1992 and 1998. This general pattern of food poverty reduction was particularly 
apparent in the Red River Delta, where food poverty declined by 86 percent 
among autarkic households, by 79 percent among 'sell-only' households, and by 
35 percent among 'buy-only' and 'buy & sell' households. However, by contrast, 
in the Central Highlands and in the South Central Coast, food poverty actually 
increased among autarkic rice producers by 80 percent and 106 percent 
respectively. 
Table 4-14: Rice Self-Sufficiency and Market Participation (1992-1998) 
Red River Delta 94 92 51 58 54 62 14 24 58 52 1 	28 24 19 14 1 33% 30% 
North Central Coast 88 85 30 44 1 	35 50 15 22 41 44 1 	44 34 21 16 138% 29% 
South Central Coast 82 87 35 48 1 	42 55 21 15 34 61 1 	45 20 13 24 1 36% 21% 
Central Uplands 80 60 125 25 1 	28 42 17 26 15 21 1 	68 49 4 10 1 59% 36% 
South East 57 47 24 26 41 53 3 	14 16 58 70 I 	28 22 31 10 142% 34% 
Mekong River Delta 74 64 1 	32 37 42 55 7 6 76 86 1 	17 7 41 38 147% 39% 
All Rural Vietnam 84 80  37 45 i 	43 56 15 20 51 55 1 	34 25 22 20 I 39% 30% 
NB: self-sufficient means that 100% of rice consumed comes from own production 
mean share among rice producers buying rice 
207 On the other hand, note that although better-off farmers were more likely to participate in markets are net 
rice sellers, they were also less likely to grow rice. 
208 Results are shown using the food poverty line. Similar results are found when using the general poverty 
line. 
Rural Households 	Rice 
producers 
Self-Sufficient in rice 1 Autarkic 	Rice Seller !Buy-Only I Sell & Buy i 	Share of I households 	rice 
1 1 	bought* 
1992 1998 1992 1998 1992 19981 1992 1998 1992 19981 1992 1998 1992 19981 1992 1998 
(1) (2) (3) 	(4) (5) 	1 	(6) (7) 	1 	(8) 
(% of rural 	(% of rural (01 of rice 	(01 of rice (%, of rice 	i 	(01 of rice 	% of rice 	I CA total rice 
households) 	households) producers) 	producers) 	producers) 	1 producers) 	producers) 	I 	consumed) 
Northern Uplands 	94 	89 	39 	50 41 	54 	22 	27 	34 	40 	I 45 	33 	15 	13 	1 35% 	26% 
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1992 1998 
13. 
Panel A: Rice Self Sufficiency 
4 t.pa 1992 
04481.4.444 
B 7 9 9 10 
98 FCC 19118 
08.6. 9,649 
4 	 6 	 6 	 1 
lag PCE 1982 
9.94941946 
6 7 9 	 9 10
lag PCE 1999 
0891448 
Table 4-15: Market Participation and Food Poverty (1992-1998) 
Food Poverty 
headcount (%)  
Rural Sample - rice 
producers 
Autarkic 	Seller only 	Buyer only 	Seller & Buyer 	Self-Sufficient 
1992 1998 chg. 	1992 1998 chg. 	1992 1998 dig. 	1992 1998 chg. 	1992 1998 dig. 
Northern Uplands 	37 14 -61% 	24 25 2% 	44 35 -20% 	47 34 -28% 	31 	19 -37% 
Red River Delta 	25 	3 -86% 	32 	7 -79% 	28 18 -35% 	30 19 -36% 	30 	6 -82% 
North Central Coast 33 18 -46% 	33 19 -41% 	36 19 -48% 	37 27 -28% 	33 	19 -43% 
South Central Coast 15 32 106% 	22 	8 -64% 	31 23 -26% 	23 10 -54% 	19 	14 -25% 
Central Highlands 	33 60 80% 	45 34 -25% 	28 34 18% 	50 25 -49% 	38 	50 33% 
South East 	4 	0 -100% 	8 	0 -100% 20 	1 -95% 	27 2 -93% 	7 	0 -100% 
Mekong River Delta 20 	11 -41% 	10 	5 -52% 	18 12 -30% 	13 	8 -34% 	12 	6 -52%  
All Bird Vietnam 	27 14 -49% 24 11 -56% 30 21 -31% 	27 17 -38% 	25 	12 -53%  
Figure 4-4: Proportion of self-sufficient households, autarkic, and 'sell-only' 
producers (1992-1998, North and South Vietnam) 
Panel C: Sell-Only Rice Producers 
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4.3.3 Food security and Market Participation Decisions in Theory 
In theory, there are two important motives for crop self-sufficiency. First, self-
sufficiency may actually be an optimal choice for a household confronted to 
prohibitively high transaction costs; secondly, when risks are pervasive and 
insurance markets are missing, households may choose to become self-sufficient 
in order to insure themselves against price risks. Each explanation is now briefly 
reviewed in turn. 
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4.3.3.1 Transaction Costs 
By most accounts, high transportation costs and trade barriers constitute 
important obstacles to the integration of product and factor markets in Vietnam. 
In the pre- and early reform period, substantial bottlenecks existed in the transfer 
of food from surplus to deficit regions, and in some regions, retail prices could 
be higher than farm-gate prices by 70 percent (Goletti and Minot 1997a; Goletti 
and Minot 1997b; Goletti, Minot, and Berry 1997)209. 
In the presence of high transaction costs, market participation decision become 
endogenous and depend on a household's own valuation of the non-traded good 
(Goetz 1992; Key, Sadoulet, and Janvry 2000) 210 . Let pa be the market price of 
food and ra be the transaction costs incurred when selling or buying food on the 
market211 . Chiefly, transaction costs lower the selling price for sellers 
(pa' = p a +i-a ), and increase the purchasing price for buyers (pas = pa — za ). 
Households select themselves into one of three market participation regimes 
(autarky, net seller, and net buyer regimes) depending on the size of the 
transaction costs and the level of a household's internal price of food (also called 
shadow price). 
In its standard formulation, the transaction costs model does not take into 
account the seasonality of agriculture and assumes away uncertainty and 
preferences for risk. Households are assumed to make discrete choices between 
selling, buying, or being self-sufficient in rice, and farm households that engage 
both in selling and buying activities (representing 20 percent of rice producers in 
Vietnam — see Table 4-14 on page 183) are ignored. Nevertheless, despite being 
highly stylized, the transaction cost model yields important insights as to how 
farm households react to changes in market conditions. 
Figure 4-7 in the Appendix of this Chapter (page 193) gives a graphical 
illustration of how households switch regime when prices or transaction costs 
209 IFPRI's study showed that regional price differences in Vietnam were in excess of transportation and 
marketing costs. 
21 ° A transaction cost model developed by de Janvry, Fafchamps and Sadoulet (1991) shows how prohibitively 
high transaction costs motivate households to become self-sufficient in food. 
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change. To see how household select a particular market regime, define by p, 
the household's internal price of food (also called shadow price), which 
equilibrates the household's demand (Xa ) and supply (a) for food. The wedge 
between the selling and the buying price [pa; 'Jab ] is called the price band (see the 
area shaded in light blue colour in Figure 4-7). Because the shadow price p: is 
determined by the household's food self-sufficiency condition, market 
participation regime is a function of household characteristics, including the 
household's endowments in land (A) and labour (L), other production 
characteristics (Zq ), factors that may influence the household's preference for 
food such as its dependency ratio (Z,), the household's total income (y), as well 
as other market prices: pa = pa p„w,y,L,A,Za ,Zq 
Autarky212 is chosen when the household's shadow price is located inside the 
price band (pas < p: < p al?). This is because with p: below the purchasing price, 
the household is better off purchasing the staple from itself, whilst with p: 
above the selling price, the household is better off supplying the good to itself. 
Similarly, the household chooses to be a seller when its shadow price is below 
the selling price (p: < pa' ). Finally, the household chooses to be a buyer when 
its shadow price is above the market buying-price (pa > p ba ). 
When transaction costs decline, the price band narrows such that, at a given 
market price, and depending on the level of their shadow prices, previously 
autarkic households may decide to either become sellers or become buyers (see 
the area shaded in dark blue colour that indicates the narrowing of the price band 
in Panel B of Figure 4-7 in appendix). Higher food prices induce buyers with 
shadow prices between Al and B1 to revert to autarky, and autarkic households 
with shadow prices between AO and BO to become net sellers (see Panel C). 
211 Transaction costs are assumed to be similar for households living in the same community, and for buyers 
and sellers alike. 
212 In the transaction cost literature, autarky is also referred as self-sufficiency in reference to the self-
sufficiency condition equilibrating demand and supply that is the hallmark of the model. In this chapter, I 
define as self-sufficient households that satisfy their consumption needs through own-production, but that can 
also generate a surplus to sell on the market. 
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Finally, when transaction costs decrease at the same time as prices increase, a 
greater proportion of autarkic households become sellers, whilst at the same 
time, a smaller number of households switch from the buyer to the autarkic 
status (see Panel C). 
4.3.3.2 Self-Insurance against Price Risk 
When price and output risks are pervasive, households' attitudes towards risks 
may affect ex-ante production decisions. When risk and self-insurance are taken 
under consideration, one obtains results that run counter to the classic finding 
that crops whose revenues are highly variable are less likely to be grown by risk-
averse households (Finkelshtain and Chalfant 1991). On the contrary, one finds 
that risk-averse households would grow more of the risky crop (Barrett 1993). 
Growing a crop whose revenue is positively correlated with consumption prices 
becomes a form of self-insurance when insurance markets are missing and credit 
markets are rationed (Fafchamps 1992; Kurosaki and Fafchamps 2002). 
These theoretical insights are particularly relevant for Vietnam, where drought, 
flood, typhoons, pests and other risks associated with the use of new seeds, 
pesticides and fertilisers are common occurrences, and where rice is both an 
important contributor to total income and is dominant in the diet of Vietnamese 
households. Whilst Vietnamese rural households undoubtedly benefited from 
lower transaction costs as trade barriers were lifted, they were also confronted to 
higher levels of food prices and still subject to important variability in prices due 
to agricultural seasonality and slow market integration (Minot and Goletti 1998; 
Minot and Goletti 2000). 
4.4 Conclusion 
This chapter showed that poverty in Vietnam was not only substantially reduced 
in absolute numbers, but that growth had also reached the poorest of the poor. It 
was also shown that growth in the agricultural sector contributed the most to 
poverty reduction. Moreover, the legacy of an eventful agrarian history enabled 
Vietnam to benefit from favourable initial conditions for pro-poor agricultural 
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growth, including a smallholder-friendly wet-rice cultivation system; widespread 
universal access to land; extensive diffusion of yield-raising technology; and as 
detailed in Chapter 3, a literate labour force. 
The last section of this chapter highlighted a dilemma and a paradox: a dilemma 
because the increase in food prices triggered by the liberalisation of agricultural 
markets favoured the rural poor as farm producers, but possibly harmed them as 
consumers; a paradox because the deep trends in poverty reduction documented 
in Section 4.1 took place at the same as the rural poor experienced a large 
increase in food prices. 
The net benefit ratio analysis showed that the majority of rural households were 
net consumers so that the overall welfare impact of higher food prices is far from 
clear. On the other hand, an important disconnect between the changes in welfare 
and the net production status of farm households was identified in Section 4.3.1. 
First-order welfare analysis are based on a simplified model of the farm 
household, which captures the instantaneous effects of small price changes on 
welfare, holding everything else constant. In Vietnam's context, these methods 
are likely to yield considerably biased results as they ignore important longer-
term general equilibrium effects, which depend on households' consumption, 
labour supply, and production choices, and would require modelling a complete 
supply and demand system. This limitation is readily acknowledged by Barrett 
and Dorosh213 : 
"These first-order effects plainly ignore, however, partial equilibrium 
consequences of food prices on quantities demanded and supplied, as well as 
the general equilibrium consequences on employment patterns, wages, the 
prices of other factors and products, technological innovation, and other 
determinants of welfare." (Barrett and Dorosh 1996: 657) 
For example, when adjustments on labour market are taken into account (holding 
everything else constant), the standard partial equilibrium result described in 
Section 4.3.1 depends on two additional conditions: the household's family 
labour endowment, and the price elasticity of wages relative to the ratio of net 
213 Deaton (1997a) provides similar caveats to the use of the net benefit ratio method. 
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food expenditures or earnings to net wage earnings (Ravallion 1990). A food 
deficit household who is also a net supplier of labour could eventually gain from 
an increase in food prices if the elasticity of wage to price and wage earnings as a 
proportion of total income are both large enough to compensate for the direct 
welfare loss due to the household's food deficit position 214 . As Porto explains, 
when wage and other supply responses affecting household income are taken 
into account, 
"the net position of the household becomes endogenous: sufficiently large 
consumption and income responses may cause an ex-ante net consumer 
become an ex post net producer" (Porto 2005, p.1). 
Therefore, for countries that experience important shocks or implement wide-
ranging economic reforms like Vietnam, assessing the welfare impact of price 
changes through budget shares and income shares without integrating the impact 
on employment and earnings may yield considerably biased results (Ravallion 
1998). On the other hand, allowing for general equilibrium effects would require 
estimating own price and cross-price demand elasticities as well as wage-price 
elasticities, an endeavour that is extremely data intensive and has been 
infrequently undertaken because of lack of data. 
Section 4.3.2 presented a descriptive analysis of rice market participation and 
self-sufficiency using non-parametric methods, and pointed at a possible strategy 
adopted by households to protect themselves against price risk: higher levels of 
consumption out of own production. I have attempted to use reduced-form 
regressions to obtain a better understanding of the circumstances that induced the 
changes in market participation and rice self-sufficiency documented above, but 
have been unsuccessful at uncovering any relevant result. This does not come as 
a surprise as identification issues are rife. In the literature, only Kurosaki and 
Fafchamps (2002) could test the insurance against price risk model exposed 
above. They present both a reduced-form model that turns out to be suggestive of 
the presence of the insurance motive, but argue that only a structural model, 
214 Similarly, if one extends the model to include the whole set of traded and non-traded goods as in Porto 
(2003), one needs to take into account how changes in the price of traded goods affect the price and the 
demand and production of non-traded goods. Porto evaluates the (first-order) welfare impact of changes in 
the price of traded goods with the budget shares of each good, the price elasticity of non-traded goods relative 
to traded goods, and wage price elasticities weighted by the share of labour income in total household income. 
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which they go on testing, could conclusively test for this insurance against risk 
hypothesis. The literature on transaction costs is equally sparse because of lack 
of data. 
As this chapter ultimately shows, despite the strong trends in agricultural growth 
and rural poverty reduction documented in Section 4.1, and despite the existence 
of favourable initial conditions as shown in this section, the sheer multiplicity of 
effects at play makes it difficult to causally determine the precise mechanisms 
through which (agricultural) growth translated itself into poverty reduction. 
Ultimately, the paradox remains, although probably because second-order 
effects, in particular the effect on wage-rates and labour demand, cannot be 
properly accounted for because of lack of data. 
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Figure 4-5: Growth Incidence Curve for Vietnam and North Vietnam 
(Northern Uplands, Red River Delta and North Central Coast) 
growth In mean growth In mean 
23.6389 — 
1.95183 — 
.026048 
All Rural Vietnam 
Growth Incidence Curve 
99.974 30 	50 	60 
Northern Uplands 
Growth Incidence Curve 
70 00 
191 
BO 
BO 
Figure 4-6: Growth Incidence Curve for South Vietnam (South Central 
Coast, Central Highlands, South East and Mekong River Delta) 
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Figure 4-7: Market Participation and Transaction Costs 
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Figure 4-8: Market Participation (decomposition by region) 
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Chapter 5 - Contribution of the Thesis and 
Future Avenues for Research 
This concluding chapter offers a review of the main findings from this thesis and 
discusses future avenues of research. It concludes with a discussion of the most 
important contributions, both methodological and substantive, of this thesis. 
Chapter 2 investigated the impact of the 1993 Land Law on investment 
incentives, and found that the new Land Law seemed to have fulfilled its 
objective to stabilise expectations and encourage long-term investments. More 
interestingly, regional differences indicated a more complex working of land 
property relations and provided a way to pry into the very process of establishing 
a new private property rights system. One innovation in this chapter was to 
distinguish two distinct aspects of that process, i.e. (i) the strengthening of tenure 
security through a body of public rules; (ii) the role of formal institutions in 
enforcing or protecting these rights, and to identify them separately, with land 
tenure data extracted from the VLSS, and with provincial land titling data 
respectively. Basing the interpretation of the results on the history of Vietnam's 
land tenure, and exploiting diverging property rights ideologies between North 
and South Vietnam, it was possible to not only ascertain the importance of tenure 
security as an investment incentive, but to discuss and highlight the role of 
(formal) institutions in promoting a new property right paradigm. 
The new Land Laws in Vietnam are effectively establishing a quasi-private 
property rights system, with an important emphasis on exclusion rights: i.e. the 
right to exclude others from accessing one's land. This is in sharp contrast with 
traditional land property rights, as they existed in pre-colonial times. Part of 
agricultural land was then communally held and was periodically redistributed in 
order to ensure a minimum subsistence level for the members of the village. The 
practice of land redistribution as it briefly re-emerged in Northern Vietnam from 
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the mid-80s up until around 1993 is evocative of this traditional form of land 
management and mutual insurance. 
The 1993 Land Law (and subsequent Land Laws) expands and promises to 
protect the land rights to which individuals are entitled. On the other hand, the 
Land Law effectively promotes rights that become exclusive of the 
• 	215 community . Sikor (2001a) documents a situation in the Northern Uplands of 
Vietnam where a traditional conception of land rights centred on a guaranteed 
access, rather than on an exclusive right, to land clashed with the implementation 
of the new Land Laws. In that respect, the 1993 Land Law represents a potent 
shift in Vietnam's land tenure history. In such a context, where property rights 
ideologies clash, law enforcement institutions can play an important role in 
encouraging and supporting the shift towards the new property right paradigm. 
However, the emphasis on exclusion rights and the ban on land redistribution 
brought about by the 1993 Land Law officially deprive village authorities of a 
potentially important insurance mechanism. Notwithstanding the political 
difficulties associated with such divestment of power, even if privatising land 
rights may be effective in providing better incentives for investments as showed 
in Chapter 2, it can also involve welfare costs (Baland and Francois 2003). This 
aspect of a land tenure system is important as resistance or scepticism towards 
the privatisation of land rights finds its origin in the loss of the insurance 
properties embedded in the periodic reallocation of land. Having explored the 
efficiency gains from privatising land, future important avenues of research 
include investigating the welfare costs stemming from that privatisation process. 
The main results of Chapter 3 are historical, empirical, and methodological. 
First, the analysis in Chapter 3 showed that it is possible to use household survey 
data to map the history of education in ways that are congruent with historical 
accounts and anecdotal evidence. Second, Chapter 3 shed light on the 
circumstances that allowed Vietnam to emerge from thirty years of war with 
high literacy and numeracy levels, despite severe resource constraints. 
Obviously, the exceptional circumstances under which the increase in literacy 
215  In law, the land belongs to the whole people, so that, as land rights become exclusive, the ultimate authority 
become the State. 
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took place in Vietnam cannot be generalised. However, several other countries 
also boasted relatively high levels of human development despite having low 
levels of welfare, including China and Kerala as noted by Dreze and Sen (1989), 
and Cuba as noted by Birdsall, Ibrahim and Gupta (2004). 
Third, the results in Chapter 3 add more directly to the literature on education 
and productivity by highlighting the existence of non-linearities in the impact of 
schooling. In order to understand how education effects economic efficiency, 
more data need to be collected on the cognitive and/or knowledge content of 
each additional year of education. Empirically ascertaining the role of education 
in the process of economic development is extremely challenging because of the 
difficulties to obtain good measures of education, but also because of the near-
intractable problem of controlling for omitting abilities. Chapter 3 contributed to 
the literature on the returns to education by providing an instrumental variable 
strategy that makes use of exogenous variations in educational attainments 
brought about by the 1954 partition of Vietnam. 
However, as pointed out by Card (1999) and Heckman, Lochner and Todd 
(2003), estimating the precise returns to education is not necessarily of great 
interest since these are likely to vary across individuals, across regions, and 
across time. Therefore, making use of the different measures of education in 
order to uncover the processes through which education matters for economic 
efficiency, as is done in Chapter 3, is an avenue of research that is worth 
exploring further. 
The contributions of Chapter 4 are several-fold. First, it documented the width 
and the depth of poverty reduction trends in rural Vietnam, highlighting the 
remarkably pro-poor character of Vietnam's agricultural growth. To achieve 
such a result, Vietnam benefited from favourable initial conditions for pro-poor 
agricultural growth. Chapter 4 also highlighted the existence of a paradox: the 
deep trends in poverty reduction documented earlier took place at the same time 
as the rural poor experienced a large increase in food prices, and as the large 
majority of households were actually net consumers of rice. The decoupling 
between changes in welfare and net production status highlights the importance 
of accounting for second-order earning effects. In this chapter, I have 
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encountered the limits of partial equilibrium analysis, and have felt the need to 
account for general equilibrium effects. New tools are being developed that 
combine the use of macro-data (computable general equilibrium models) with 
micro-data to account for earning effects (Porto 2003). However, the data 
challenges are likely to remain great for a long time to come. It is probable that 
the only way to crack this paradox is to uncover it indirectly, as one assembles 
the jigsaw of a puzzle. Identification problems are also likely to remain 
challenging. 
In this thesis, I hope to have shed some light on the multiplicity of mechanisms 
that enabled Vietnam to grow equitably since the start of its agricultural 
decollectivisation programme. Vietnam offers interesting lessons about equitable 
growth, since despite the considerable increase in food prices that followed the 
liberalisation of agricultural markets, Vietnam's growth pattern remained 
exceptionally pro-poor: poverty declined significantly in absolute terms, and a 
large proportion of the poorest of the poor also benefited from the general 
increase in welfare. In the past 50 years, Vietnam has provided different answers 
to the question of 'How to grow equitably'. Today, more than ever, Vietnam still 
asks itself that question, as it continues to grow, to industrialise and to urbanise, 
and as concerns grow about the prospects of an imbalanced growth. 
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